Using Behavioral Interventions to Foster Resource Sustainability by Tonke, Sebastian Soung-Un
  
USING BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS TO FOSTER 
RESOURCE SUSTAINABILITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inauguraldissertation  
zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades  
der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät  
der Universität zu Köln 
 
2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vorgelegt von  
Sebastian Soung-Un Tonke, M.Sc. 
Aus Berlin 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Referent: Prof. Dr. Bettina Rockenbach 
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Matthias Sutter 
Tag der Promotion: 26.03.2019 
i 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I thank Bettina Rockenbach for her excellent supervision during my doctoral studies. I am 
truly grateful for her support, encouragement, advice, trust and inspiration that led to the 
completion of this thesis. I am also indebted to the other members of the thesis committee: 
Matthias Sutter and Oliver Gürtler. 
I also thank my other co-authors Timo Vogelsang and Arne Weiß for countless 
valuable academic discussions that have shaped and contributed to my academic development. 
It was a particular great pleasure to share the PhD experience in and outside of university with 
Timo Vogelsang and Sebastian Schneiders. I thank them and Suparee Boonmanunt, Matthias 
Heinz, Felix Kölle, Thomas Lauer, Anne Schielke, Uta Schier, Marcin Waligora, Lukas 
Wenner and Jarid Zimmermann for their companionship, generous feedback and numerous 
insightful conversations over lunch. 
I also thank Dagmar Weiler and the Cologne Graduate School of Management, Social 
Sciences and Economics (CGS) for providing financial support during my PhD studies. I thank 
Lotte Westermann and Felix Povel from KfW who made the research cooperation in Kosovo 
possible.  
None of the chapters in this thesis would exist without the enormous effort that 
research teams in Namibia and Kosovo exerted to implement the research projects. I am truly 
grateful for the excellent field management assistance provided by Benedikt Dechamps, 
Michail Kortt and Myrielle Gonschor. I also thank all of the involved students in the research 
projects in Windhoek and Pristina. All of them worked long hours while maintaining rigorous 
academic standards under tight deadlines. I thank Silvy Lungameni, Selma Nghifindaka, 
Hendrieka Gorases, Victoria Nekongo, Miryam Amunime, Penny Sheetekela, Maria 
Nkunkumo, Barbara Scharfbillig, Tjivari Kandjii, Abner Kambonde, Stephanus Kaishungu, 
Aubrey Goraseb, Kateuru Tjiuana, Kristof Nghidinihamba, Venomukona Tjiseua, Saija 
Kristof, Aili Thomas, Albertina Johannes, Demetrius Henok, Eillo Shidiwe, Frida Elunde, 
Johanna Ndengu, Ndapunikwa Moses, Tulinawa Neshuku, Fanni Shikongo, Sesilia Josef, 
Emma Josef, Linda Kalili, Johanna Nambahu, Menesia Nangolo, Josua Kandume, Kristof 
Johannes, Daniel Oreseb, Stabby Moyo, Jason Abraham, Erastus Andreas, Dennis 
Munyingwa, Erkki Iita, Amupolo Junias, Lukas Keinamseb, Fatbardha Muqiqi, Donika 
Kastarati, Drini Vitija, Egzona Bejtullahu, Erdonita Humolli, Arbenita Gashi, Donika 
Krasniqi, Rrezarta  Bllaca, Ndriqim Bujupi, Linda Berisha, Saranda Berisha, Ninëz Kosumi, 
Djellzë Bllaca, Kaltrina Tosuni, Veriana Muqiqi, Erza Rexhepi, Ibrahim Murati, Ardita Fazliu, 
Anduena Kuqi, Gëzim Kurteshi, Martin Günther and Viet A Nguyen. 
ii 
 
I would also like to express my gratitude to Job Horohua, Wilma Husselmann, Aino 
Nsinano, Cornwell Chadya and Vaino Shivute at NamWater who supported the research 
projects throughout all phases. I thank Ilir Abdullahu, Gazmend Behluli, Aferdita Bejta and 
Fatmir Murtezaj at the Regional Water Company Pristina and their welcoming atmosphere 
and cooperation that has led to the success of the project.  
Finally, I thank my family for their moral support and their positive influence on me. 
This thesis is dedicated to them. 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedicated to: 
The courage of my mother. 
The benevolence of my father. 
The integrity of my brother. 
The love of my wife. 
 
  
iv 
 
CONTENT 
 
1. Introduction....... ................................................................................................................. 1 
2. Using Behavioral Insights to Decrease Non-Payment for Public Utilities .................... 6 
2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 6 
2.2 Experimental Setting and Design ........................................................................... 11 
2.3 Treatments .............................................................................................................. 13 
2.4 Conducting the Experiment .................................................................................... 17 
2.5 Estimation Strategy and Results ............................................................................. 20 
2.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 30 
2.7 Appendix to Chapter 2 ........................................................................................... 31 
3. The Pivotal Role of Specific Tips to Encourage Water Conservation ......................... 39 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 39 
3.2 Experimental Sample and Data .............................................................................. 43 
3.3 Treatments .............................................................................................................. 45 
3.4 Hypotheses ............................................................................................................. 47 
3.5 Estimation Strategy and Results ............................................................................. 48 
3.5.1 Water Consumption ....................................................................................... 48 
3.5.2 Payment Behavior .......................................................................................... 49 
3.6 Discussion of Results ............................................................................................. 52 
3.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 56 
3.8 Appendix to Chapter 3 ........................................................................................... 58 
 4. Using Identity Labels To Decrease Non-payment for Water ...................................... 64 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 64 
4.2 Research Setting and Behavioral Diagnosis ........................................................... 69 
4.3 Experimental Design .............................................................................................. 72 
4.4 Estimation Strategy and Results ............................................................................. 77 
4.5 Post-Experimental Survey Results ......................................................................... 82 
v 
 
4.5.1 Behavioral Mechanism ................................................................................... 82 
4.5.2 Ruling Out Alternative Channels ................................................................... 85 
4.5.3 Further Survey Insights .................................................................................. 87 
4.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 89 
4.7 Appendix to Chapter 4 ........................................................................................... 91 
5. Self-serving Behavior Of the Rich Causes Contagion Effects Among the Poor ......... 98 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 98 
5.2 Experimental Design ............................................................................................ 100 
5.2.1 Experimental Set-up ..................................................................................... 100 
5.2.2 Treatments .................................................................................................... 101 
5.3 Predictions ............................................................................................................ 105 
5.4 Results .................................................................................................................. 106 
5.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 109 
5.6 Appendix for Chapter 5 ........................................................................................ 110 
Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 135 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Nearly a decade ago, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein published the international bestseller 
“Nudge” (2008) which inspired behavioral economics to go beyond the understanding of 
decision-making and into the design of behavioral interventions as a policy measure. The 
promise of these behavioral interventions is that even small changes in the decision context 
can lead to large behavioral effects. This makes behavioral interventions in many cases more 
cost effective and arguably less restrictive than traditional policy measures like the prohibition 
of socially undesirable behavior and its enforcement. The effectiveness of behavioral 
interventions has now been proven across many domains such as retirement savings, health, 
charitable giving, energy conservation, tax evasion and many more (see for example Dolan et 
al., 2012). 
Since human decision-making is complex and context dependent, policy interventions 
do not always work as expected. Behavioral interventions are no exception and while the same 
intervention may work in one context, it may not work or even backfire on its intention in 
another context (Madrian, 2014). From a policy perspective, understanding what causes these 
interventions to work or not to work is critical for obvious reasons. Investigating the causes 
requires a theoretical understanding of how these interventions work. From an ex-post 
perspective, it is arguably easier to rationalize behavior given the plethora of theoretical 
models. This approach, however, may not always be informative, since it may suffer from 
hindsight bias. From an ex-ante perspective, one of the most popular phrases when economists 
are asked for policy advice is “it depends”. Given the nature how most economic models are 
constructed, this is almost always the correct answer to any question in economics (Rodrik, 
2017). This doctoral thesis argues that in order to fully take advantage of economic theory for 
policy design, one needs to understand the local environment and identify the factors that “it 
depends” on ex-ante (Datta and Mullainathan, 2012; Duflo, 2017). Economic theory can then 
be used as a framework to guide survey and intervention design in an increasingly complex 
world.  
The first theme of this thesis is the use of extensive diagnostic pre-intervention surveys 
to understand the local context before designing and testing behavioral interventions. Doing 
so among highly heterogeneous subject pools in the field requires not only the credible 
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identification of a particular relevant behavioral factor (bottleneck), but also trying to quantify 
the prevalence of that behavioral factor among the population. This is particularly challenging 
to extract from expert interviews since their views may suffer from availability bias. Therefore, 
the pre-intervention studies used in this thesis are conducted among hundreds of subjects to 
respect the heterogeneity of human decision-making in the field. The pre-intervention 
diagnostic often identify factors that neo-classical economics could have disregarded as 
seemingly irrelevant factors (Thaler, 2015). Using rigorous experimental methodology, 
however, the results of this thesis suggest otherwise and show that addressing these factors 
may lead to highly effective and in particular cost-effective interventions.  This approach 
seems to be very fruitful, since the treatment effects in this thesis are among the largest in the 
comparable literature. Should we expect the interventions used in this thesis to have similar 
effects elsewhere? That depends on whether the context is comparable, which may make it 
necessary to conduct pre-intervention studies. For example, when there is no lack of attention, 
we should not expect reminder interventions to be particularly effective. When there is no lack 
of understanding, we should not expect simplifications to be effective. This thesis therefore 
advocates to proceed from what works to what works when. 
The second theme of this thesis is the use of behavioral interventions in settings where 
traditional policy tools are difficult to enforce due to ethical, legal, technical or financial 
reasons. In such settings, the complementarity and potential of behavioral interventions can 
fully unravel. They are attractive here not only because of their cost effectiveness, but also for 
their unrestrictive character as they do not forbid behavior or restrict access. A prime setting 
to use behavioral interventions is in the water sector. Water is one of the most important 
resources on the planet. It is fundamental for the health and wealth of individuals and therefore 
a key component for sustainable economic development. The lack of access to purified water 
sources leads to waterborne diseases like diarrhea and typhoid fever (Amrita, Kremer and 
Zwane, 2007), infant mortality (Gamper-Rabindran, Khan and Timmins, 2010) and inferior 
educational attainment (Ashraf, Glaeser, Holland and Steinberg, 2017). Affordable and 
dependable access to water is also crucial input factor for industrial and agricultural 
productivity. In fact, three out of four of the jobs worldwide are water-dependent for example 
in agriculture, manufacturing or construction (World Water Assessment Programme, 2016).  
Because of its fundamental value to livelihood on the planet, lack of access to purified 
water has been named the third largest global risk in terms of impact by the World Economic 
Forum (2017). Two thirds of the world’s population already experience severe water scarcity 
for at least one month a year (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2016) and water demand has been 
increasing by 1% per year over the past decades (World Water Assessment Programme, 2018). 
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Water scarcity will likely continue to affect billions of lives due to population growth, 
economic development, changing consumption patterns, climate change, urbanization and de-
forestation (World Water Assessment Programme, 2018).  
Behavioral interventions are intriguing in the water sector since the usefulness and 
applicability of traditional policy may be limited. Reducing water demand by increasing water 
prices has caveats: Meta-studies show that price elasticity can be low in particular in the short 
term (e.g., Olmstead, Hanemann and Stavins, 2007), implying that price increases need to be 
large in order to reduce water demand substantially. Such price changes, though, may lack 
political acceptance, for example because of unequal distributional effects among poorer 
households and the fact that access to purified water is a basic human right.  
Non-payment of water bills is another threat to resource sustainability as it inhibits the 
maintenance and expansion of infrastructure. The financial health of many water utilities 
depends crucially on the cost-recovery of high fixed costs infrastructure through its users. 
Denial of access to non-paying customers is problematic because water is a basic human right. 
Many countries consequently have legal provisions against, for instance, cutting off the supply 
of water (Finger, Allouche and Luis-Manso, 2007).  
Finding effective interventions to improve water management is therefore a global 
challenge. In this thesis, I contribute to the endeavor of ensuring resource sustainability by 
identifying the behavioral bottlenecks obstructing the sustainable use of resources and 
showing that these bottlenecks can be overcome by behavioral interventions. Behavioral 
interventions offer a complementary approach to traditional policy measures. They can be 
employed rather quickly with immediate effects, are cost effective and might be more accepted 
among the population than traditional measures of water management like pricing strategies 
or disconnections from the water network. This may be particularly important in less 
developed countries as both policy makers and customers are often severely budget 
constrained. In addition, the consequences of water scarcity are often felt the harshest among 
the poor. The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapter Two is based on Rockenbach, Tonke and Weiß (2018a).1 We conduct a 
large-scale field experiment in cooperation with the national Namibian Water provider 
NamWater to reduce non-payment for piped residential water. We first conduct diagnostic 
surveys to identify behavioral bottlenecks that hinder payments. The surveys show that around 
half of customers neither receive nor understand their invoice properly. Moreover, the vast 
                                                     
1 Chapter two is joint work with Bettina Rockenbach and Arne Weiß. The project was funded under the Institutional 
Strategy of the University of Cologne within the German Excellence Initiative of the DFG. The experiment was 
preregistered at the AEA RCT registry (AEARCTR-0000925). 
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majority seems to be willing to pay for water. Based on this diagnosis, we treat around 10,000 
customers of the national water utility by providing simplified invoices via phone and 
additionally applying different psychological commitment techniques. Initially, payments 
increase by 30 to 56 percent (depending on treatment) and by about 10 percent over the course 
of the intervention in comparison to an untreated control group. This chapter provides novel 
results on both short and long-term effects of commitments to pay and investigates potential 
backfiring effects. We find that the intervention is highly effective even among high-debt 
customers and that water consumption is unaffected. 
Chapter Three is based on Tonke (2018a).2 I conduct a large-scale field experiment 
to encourage water conservation among 15,000 residential customers. At the time of the 
intervention (2017), parts of Namibia were facing a potential drought due to limited rainfall in 
past years. The treatments in the experiment vary the content of a text message that customers 
receive only once on their mobile phone. Messages containing specified conservation tips 
decrease water consumption by 5.8 percent, while messages encouraging customers to come 
up with their own ways to save water are entirely ineffective. The treatment effect is driven by 
high users and does not negatively affect payment behavior. The study shows that customers’ 
lack of knowledge on how to conserve water effectively is a substantial bottleneck to pro-
environmental behavior. This bottleneck can be overcome by a text message containing 
specific saving tips. The intervention is one of the most successful in the mass communication 
literature and saved 25.6 million liters within six months at a cost of merely 600 USD. The 
study also provides systematic advice on how to select water savings tips. The specific text 
message contains three simple, yet in a pre-intervention survey uncommonly mentioned water 
saving tips in the customers’ most salient domains of water usage. The strength of this 
intervention is its simplicity, even in comparison to other highly cost-effective behavioral 
interventions: Unlike for example social comparison interventions, the text messages does not 
require the production of individualized graphs and redesign of invoice letters. This might be 
crucial factor, when droughts are already imminent or unforeseen. 
Chapter Four is based on Tonke (2018b). This experiment shows that identity 
concerns are an important motivation for the payment of utility bills and that identity of adults 
is malleable through written statements about one’s identity (identity labels), which 
substantially improve payment behavior. In a large-scale field experiment in Kosovo, 
customers of the public water provider randomly receive stickers with or without identity label 
attached to their invoice in order to reduce non-payment for piped residential water. Positively 
                                                     
2 The research was funded by the Center for Social and Economic Behavior (C-SEB) at the University of Cologne. 
The experiment was preregistered at the AEA RCT registry (AEARCTR-0002280.). 
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framed identity labels include the statements “Please be a responsible citizen” or “You are a 
responsible citizen”. Negatively framed identity labels include the statements “Please don’t be 
an irresponsible citizen” or “You are not an irresponsible citizen”. Negatively framed identity 
labels increase collection efficiency (payments divided by billed amount) by 26 percentage 
points in comparison to an untreated group and are about twice as effective as positively 
framed labels. Post-intervention, stickers without identity labels yield significantly smaller 
treatment effects than stickers with identity label. Survey evidence suggests that these effects 
are caused by changes in customers’ self-perception and rules out alternative mechanisms like 
social norms, sanctioning, monitoring or reminder effects.  
Identity labels are a highly effective policy measure. The best performing sticker type 
increases annual payments by about 7 Euro per customer in comparison to an untreated group 
at a cost of only 12 cents. This roughly corresponds to two to three hourly wages or one 
additional monthly bill paid per year. In addition, survey results suggest that the intervention 
is well accepted among the population. There are many other domains in which identity labels 
could be used to encourage civic behavior as for example voter mobilization, avoiding 
littering, volunteering for public services, driving carefully, energy conservation or paying 
taxes. Some of these domains might be even more promising than the paying for utility bills 
since they constitute behaviors that might be more intuitively associated with being a 
responsible citizen. 
Chapter Five is based on Rockenbach, Tonke and Weiß (2018b).3 We conduct a 
framed field experiment in an impoverished neighborhood in Namibia to study how charitable 
donations to disaster management (e.g. to fight floods, droughts, etc.) depend on the sharing 
behavior of others. While social norms ask the rich to serve society and to share their wealth 
with the less fortunate, they often fail to comply with this expectation. We ask whether the 
rich’s self-serving behavior causes contagion effects among the poor. To do so we vary both 
the reference group (rich and poor) as well as the information of the behavior of others 
(egoistically and prosocially) in a 2x2 design. The rich’s failure to share is not only unexpected 
by the poor, it also changes their view on the acceptability of own egoistic behavior and leads 
to an increase in egoistic behavior. The poor use the rich’s norm violation to justify their own 
self-serving behavior. The number of egoistic choices increases by 18 percentage points, 
which translates into a reduction of donations by about 26%. Thus, the rich’s self-serving 
behavior causes a double damage: Society not only suffers from their low contributions but 
also from contagion effects among others.  
                                                     
3 Chapter five is joint work with Bettina Rockenbach and Arne Weiß. The project was funded under the Institutional 
Strategy of the University of Cologne within the German Excellence Initiative of the DFG. 
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USING BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS TO DECREASE NON-PAYMENT 
FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES 
 
 
Joint work with Bettina Rockenbach and Arne Weiß 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Dependable and affordable access to public utilities such as electricity and water is a key pre-
requisite for economic and social development. Public utilities provide important input factors 
for industry and agriculture and are crucial for the development of human capital, for example 
in schools or hospitals. The maintenance and expansion of infrastructure is constrained when 
customers do not pay their utility bills. While non-payment is also an issue in rich countries, 
it is a particular problem in low and middle-income countries (Szabó and Ujhelyi, 2015; Jack 
and Smith, 2015). The existing literature on reasons for non-payment in these countries are 
attributed to customers’ low income and a low willingness to pay, for instance due to low 
quality of service or a lack of enforcement of non-paying customers (Aguilar-Benitez and 
Saphores, 2008; Vásquez, 2015, Vásquez and Alicea-Planas, 2017). Addressing these causes 
requires investments in the infrastructure to improve service quality or the enforcement of 
heavy-handed interventions, such as denial of future service. Both options impose serious 
challenges for policy makers. The first option (investments to improve service) may itself be 
constrained by non-payment such that the utility and customers remain stuck in a bad 
equilibrium (Strand, 2012). The second option (denying access to non-paying customers) is 
constrained by water and electricity being basic needs (see UN sustainable development goals) 
and fundamental for the welfare of individuals (for micro-level evidence on the negative 
effects of water outages on health and economic activity see Ashraf, Glaeser, Holland and 
Steinberg, 2017). Many countries consequently have legal provisions against, for instance, 
cutting off the supply of water (Finger, Allouche and Luis-Manso, 2007). When heavy-handed 
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interventions are difficult to implement, the toolbox of softer behavioral interventions (e.g., 
“nudges”) may offer a powerful alternative (Madrian, 2014; Chetty, 2015).  
In this paper, we investigate the potential of behavioral interventions to address non-
payment for water. We present a natural field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) among 
9,833 customers in northern Namibia in cooperation with the national public water provider 
Namibia Water Corporation (NamWater). Our administrative dataset covers an extended 
period of both pre- and post-intervention data, which allows us to study short-term and long-
term effects as well as the effectiveness of the intervention among high and low debt 
customers. We conduct the experiment in an area of 84,610 square kilometers (about the size 
of South Carolina) over a period of nine months. At the start of our study, 84% of our 
eventually treated sample had arrears on their account and about 33% had arrears of at least 
three average monthly bills. The average debt of our treated sample corresponds to about 334 
USD (Median 10 USD)4. Payment enforcement through legal action is slow and sanctioning 
non-paying customers by cutting-off supply is difficult due to ethical, technical and logistical 
constraints. 
In the basic treatment of our experiment, we call customers to offer a free monthly 
text message service that contains simplified invoice information. The text message ensures 
that customers have easy access to the invoice information in a non-technical language. The 
basic treatment serves as a comparison group to two psychological commitment treatments 
(i.e., the self-concept and the plan treatment) that are implement on top of the basic treatment. 
The comparison of the basic and the commitment treatments isolates the effects of the 
commitment treatments from the effects of reminders, personal interactions on the phone, 
reciprocity for being offered a free service, and feeling monitored. In the self-concept 
treatment, we invoke a self-concept of a reliable water payer. This is done by eliciting answers 
from the customers to questions such as “How important is it to you to be reliable water 
payer?” The intervention builds on individuals’ desire to shape their self-concepts and ties 
their (desired) self-concept to their payment behavior (Bryan, Walton, Rogers and Dweck, 
2011). In the plan treatment, customers commit to their own plan for future payments by 
responding to questions such as “How do you make sure you pay your bills on time?” Plan 
making creates personal rules and can help customers to develop strategies to overcome 
logistical obstacles. Further, eliciting plans creates cognitive links between a future cue and 
behavior. Once a cue becomes available (such as when receiving the invoice), individuals 
automatically switch to the pre-conceived plan (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 
                                                     
4 10 USD correspond to roughly 9 hourly wages. 
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2006; for reviews see Beshears, Milkman, and Schwartzstein, 2016; Rogers, Milkman, John 
and Norton, 2015). 
We find that simply offering and sending customers free monthly invoice information 
by text message raises average payments remarkably, both in the first month (about 30%) and 
by about 10% over the course of the intervention. On top of these effects, we find substantial 
short-term effects of the commitment treatments: In the first month, average payments increase 
- on top of the basic treatment - by a further 10% in the self-concept treatment and by another 
26.5% in the plan treatment. The commitment treatments are also highly effective among 
customers who have paid little or infrequently in the pre-intervention year. The effectiveness 
wanes over time, yet we find positive treatment effects more than half a year post intervention. 
Water consumption is unaffected by the treatments. The entire intervention is extremely cost-
effective and increased average payments per customer by about 10-11 USD, which 
corresponds to an estimated return-on-investment of roughly 1,000%.  
Why did these interventions work? The effectiveness of an intervention crucially 
hinges on diagnosing the underlying problem and understanding the local context (Duflo, 
2017). Before we implemented our behavioral intervention, we identified and quantified 
potential behavioral bottlenecks (Datta and Mullainathan, 2014) by conducting extensive pre-
intervention interviews among a randomized sample of 329 of customers. This is important 
because the literature on non-payment for water in Namibia suggests numerous yet 
unquantified reasons. Among such reasons are poverty and beliefs that water should be free 
because it is a basic human right and through publicly advertised slogans like “Water is Life”. 
Further, customers may have a lack of understanding of the cost-covering concept because 
water was supplied without charge until Namibia’s independence in 1990 (Du Plessis, Neels, 
Anyim and Matros, 2005; Klintenberg, Mazambani and Natanga, 2007). Moreover, some 
individuals perceive water as “a gift from God”, which should not be marketed (Mazambani, 
Schönbrodt-Stitt and Klintenberg, 2006). As these studies were mostly qualitative or relied on 
small samples, it remained unclear how representative these reasons were. 
Our own pre-intervention diagnostics show two surprising observations, which are not 
commonly mentioned in the previous literature: First, about half of the customers report to 
have problems receiving their postal invoice and understanding the invoice letter. The basic 
treatment addresses this first bottleneck by providing comprehensible invoice information. 
Secondly, a remarkably high share of customers seems to be willing to pay for water. For 
instance, more than 90% of customers state that water should be paid for and name coherent 
reasons for the necessity of paying.  Furthermore, in an incentivized dictator game customers 
would allocate, on average, 75% of a lottery price (about 50 USD) to paying back arrears on 
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the account. These results indicate a gap between the willingness to pay and the actual payment 
behavior recorded in the administrative data set. Our commitment interventions address this 
second behavioral bottleneck by using psychological commitment techniques. Individuals 
commit either to a desirable self-concept or to a concrete plan and then try to act consistently 
with their commitment. These interventions are commitment techniques in the sense that 
acting inconsistently with the elicited self-concept or plan creates cognitive dissonance, 
making it psychologically costly to renege (Festinger, 1957; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011).  
This paper is the first to study both short and long-term, as well as possible counter 
effects of commitments to pay among heterogeneous types and on the usage of consumption 
good. Thereby, we address unanswered questions on the impact of behavioral interventions 
beyond the immediate effect on the targeted behavior (Thaler, 2018). Our paper extents the 
previous literature in four important and policy-relevant ways: First, we complement the 
existing literature by showing the effectiveness of commitment mechanisms for a behavior 
that is monetarily costly to the customer and has a public goods character. Hitherto, self-
concept invoking treatments have only been used in the context of voter mobilization (Bryan, 
Walton, Rogers and Dweck, 2011), to promote pro-social behavior among children (Bryan, 
Master and Walton, 2014) and to decrease cheating behavior (Bryan, Adams and Monin, 
2013). Plan-making interventions have for example been used to increase voter mobilization 
(Nickerson, Rogers, 2010), vaccination rates (Milkman, Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian, 
2011) or preventive colonoscopy screening rates (Milkman, Beshears, Choi, Laibson and 
Madrian, 2013).  
Secondly, we show long-term evidence in a domain where recurrent action is 
necessary. This is important because behavioral interventions may induce rebound effects in 
the long-term, resulting in the absence of a net effect (Sunstein, 2016).5 These concerns are 
particularly important when interventions target payment behavior (Szabó and Ujhelyi (2015). 
On the one hand, households might budget over time such that higher payments now induce 
lower payments in the future. In addition, psychological licensing effects (Merritt, Effron, 
Monin, 2010) could induce lower future payments. On the other hand, the literature on 
consistency and habit formation suggests positive spillovers from short-term to long-term 
effects (Neal, Wood, Labrecque and Lally, 2012, Frey and Rogers, 2014). Evidence on 
behavioral long-term effects of such commitment treatments is therefore important but hitherto 
very limited.6  
                                                     
5 For long-term effects of social norms interventions on water and energy conservation see Ferraro, Miranda and 
Price (2011) and Allcott and Rogers (2014) 
6 Conner and Higgins (2010) measure smoking behavior 48 months after the first elicitation of implementation 
intentions. 
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Thirdly, we document the effectiveness of such interventions for high and low debt 
customers. Taking account of the heterogeneity among customers is not only of scientific 
importance; it may also be viewed as a fairness imperative to design policy interventions that 
not only affect the average, but also, or even in particular, those customers that most severely 
free-ride on the cooperative behavior of others. We show that our commitment interventions 
are highly effective even among customers that have paid little in the past. This is particularly 
interesting for the self-concept treatment. Who one is or how one behaved in the past seems 
less important than who one wants to be. Furthermore, we would expect our commitment 
interventions to be particularly effective among customers with high debt since those are the 
individuals for which the gap between payment behavior and their stated willingness to pay is 
largest.  
Fourthly, our experiment provides empirical evidence on the question whether 
behavioral interventions that target payment cause spillovers on a closely related domain: 
water consumption. Predictions are unclear as higher payments might increase water 
consumption through psychological entitlement or licensing effects. On the contrary, 
awareness of the cost of water might lead to reduced usage. 
Our study highlights the importance of identifying, quantifying and appropriately 
addressing behavioral bottlenecks. We show that removing logistical and behavioral 
bottlenecks can help to bridge the discrepancy between willingness-to-pay and actually 
payments. This is not only highly cost-effective (we estimate a return-on-investment of around 
900%), but is also particularly important in settings where applying incentive-based economic 
solutions is restricted because of financial, legal or ethical constraints. 
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2.2 Experimental Setting and Design 
 
Namibia is one of the driest country in Sub-Saharan Africa with limited amount of 
surface water and low and unpredictable rainfall (Lu et al., 2016). Groundwater is often saline 
and not potable. Droughts are a recurrent threat in Namibia. About 61% of customers in our 
study area state that they do not have sources of water other than what is provided by 
NamWater.  
 
Pre-intervention telephone survey – To diagnose the causes for non-payments for water, we 
ran a telephone survey in June 2015 with a random sample (N=329) of NamWater’s customers. 
In addition, we conducted face-to-face interviews (N=31) among a convenience sample in 
Windhoek, Namibia’s capital, in which we asked interviewees to explain the invoice to us. 
Our research team of local students carried out the surveys and introduced themselves as part 
of a research team of the University of Cologne. The telephone questionnaire contains 39 
questions and completion lasts on average about 30 minutes. Questions address water 
management in the household, mode of payment, understanding and perception of water 
payments, personal and social norms, knowledge about cut-offs and demographics.  
Strikingly, about 42% of customers state to have experienced problems with late or no 
delivery of invoices and about 45% of participants of the Windhoek sample are unable to point 
out the total amount due when asked to explain the invoice. This finding is in line with older 
survey results by Du Plessis et al. (2005) who report that interviewees have trouble 
understanding and receiving their invoice. Secondly, a remarkably high share of customers 
seems to be willing to pay for water: 98% of customers state that water should be paid for and 
92% can name coherent reasons for water payments (e.g. “purification” or “maintenance”). To 
measure willingness-to-pay with monetary incentives we implement a dictator game as part of 
the telephone survey. Customers could win a lottery earning of about 50 USD (roughly 45 
hourly wages) for participation in the survey. We then asked participants how they would split 
the potential lottery earning between a direct mobile phone transfer (phone credit) and a 
repayment of arrears on their NamWater account. On average, participants would allocate 75% 
of the potential lottery earning to reduce arrears. We find that customers with higher debt 
allocate significantly more money to reduce debt on their account (p=0.008).7 This finding 
shows that customers do not only state being willing to pay for water. They also walk the talk, 
by foregoing money to repay debt. This strongly suggests a gap between customers’ 
                                                     
7 OLS regression with debt measured in average invoices on fraction of money allocated to repay debt. Measured 
among 254 customers for which we could match account information with survey answers.  
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willingness to pay and their actual payment behavior. We address this second bottleneck by 
using psychological commitment techniques. 
 
Experimental Sample – Our study focuses on private customers in the northern Cuvelai region. 
NamWater bills these customers directly. In most other regions, households living in cities and 
towns are typically billed by their municipality, which itself is billed by NamWater. We restrict 
our sample to private customers because the holder of a private account is typically also 
responsible for the household’s payment decisions, unlike community-based customers, 
government units or municipalities. A large overlap between the legal and the economic agents 
is an important prerequisite for any commitment-based intervention to work. Our sample is 
quite heterogeneous and ranges from predominantly small households to a few large 
businesses. The northern Cuvelai region comprises about 79% of NamWater’s directly billed 
private customers (August 2015). Most people in the Cuvelai region speak either Oshiwambo, 
the most widely spoken of Namibia’s many officially recognized local languages, or English. 
Restricting our experiment to this region therefore reduces potential noise that comes from 
translation into different local languages while at the same time allowing us to reach the vast 
majority of NamWater’s private customers.  
 
Experimental Data - NamWater compiles accounting data on a monthly basis, usually at the 
beginning of each month. The majority of the data is entered manually into the system (about 
95% of customers pay in cash at payment points) and then digitally compiled. Clear guidelines 
for quality checks of the manually entered data and a consistent notation of data correction 
were missing at the time of the study. This leads to some erratic data points (e.g. negative 
payments and extreme values) and missing values, which are typically corrected in the ensuing 
months. We therefore update incomplete payment records and extreme payment records by 
using the corrected account data from the ensuing month. Similar to field data on charitable 
giving, health expenditure or income data, the customers’ payment data has a large fraction of 
zeros and is heavily right skewed. The large fraction of zeros results from the fact that 
customers on average make only about four payments a year and often make bulk payments 
in multiples of 50 N$.8 We will provide estimates from several regression models and data 
transformations typically used with such data types to show robustness of our results. 
  
                                                     
8 In October 2015 1 USD was worth 13.5 N$. 
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2.3 Treatments 
 
Basic – In the basic treatment, we call customers and offer a free monthly text message service 
(SMS) in simplified language to ensure both access and understanding of the invoice 
information. The message contains the total amount due as well as the water consumption (in 
N$) of the last month. Table 1 provides the full telephone script and text message content. 
 
 
In addition to the basic treatment, we conducted two commitment treatments – the self-concept 
treatment and the plan treatment – to address the diagnosed gap between customers’ stated 
high willingness-to-pay and their low payments. 
   
Self-concept treatment – On top of the basic script, the self-concept treatment intends to invoke 
a water-paying self-concept by asking “How important is it to you to be a reliable water 
payer?” and three more comparable questions in which the adjective responsible is replaced 
Table 1. Basic Script and Text Message 
Telephone script (once)  Text message (every month) 
Hello, how are you today?  My name is 
[caller’s name]. I am calling from Namwater. 
Am I talking to Mr./Mrs. [customer’s name]? 
We would like to get to know our customers. 
Can I ask you a few questions? Are you the one 
who is paying for water in your house?  
 
We want to inform you about our new SMS 
service. The SMS service will make it easier 
for you to pay. The SMS will contain all 
necessary information for you to make 
payments, like the amount you have to pay and 
your NamWater account number. The SMS 
will be sent to you each month for free. Would 
you like to receive the SMS in English or 
Oshiwambo? 
 
That’s it, I don’t have any more questions. 
Thank you for your time and have a nice day. 
 Dear [Name], Here is your invoice: 
 
In [Month] you used water for N$ 
[Consumption amount]. In total you have to 
pay N$ [Amount] (Total amount due). Your 
NamWater account number is [Account 
Number]. Please pay via usual payment mode. 
Ignore this SMS if already paid. 
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by good, responsible and debt-free. The first sentence of the text message in the self-concept 
treatment differs in comparison to the basic treatment and reads “Here is your invoice to you 
as a committed water payer” to remind customers of their answers. We use nouns (“water-
payer”) rather than verbs (“pay water”) because previous literature has shown that the 
interventions based on nouns are more effective, as these are more representative of one’s self 
(Walton and Banaji, 2004) – think of “to lie” vs “being a liar”. The questions are adapted from 
Bryan et al. (2011), who use this type of intervention to mobilize voters in the US. In order to 
make sure that the self-concept treatment could be effectively implemented in the local 
language (Oshiwambo), we conducted a pilot study in which we asked native speakers about 
their perception about “lying” and “being a liar” in Oshiwambo. As in English, the latter 
provoked stronger reactions. 
 
 
Plan treatment – On top of the text basic script, we elicit concrete plans of customers about 
how, when, where they would make payments and ask them to commit to their plans to pay 
(see Table 3). The first sentence of the text message reads “As a reminder to your commitment 
to pay”. Table 1 provides an overview over the details of the telephone script and text message 
for each treatment. 
  
Table 2. Self-Concept Script and Text Message 
Telephone script (once)  Text message (every month) 
[Basic] +  
We also have a couple of questions to you as a 
NamWater Customer, is that OK? 
 
How important is it to you to be a reliable water 
payer? How much do you care about being a 
good water payer? How much do you care about 
being a responsible water payer? How 
important is it to you to be a debt-free water 
payer?  
 
That’s it, I don’t have any more questions. 
Thank you for your time and have a nice day. 
 Dear  [Name], Here is your invoice to you as a 
committed water payer: 
 
In [Month] you used water for N$ 
[Consumption amount]. In total you have to 
pay N$ [Amount] (Total amount due). Your 
NamWater account number is [Account 
Number]. Please pay via usual payment mode. 
Ignore this SMS if already paid. 
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Behavioral mechanism – The basic treatment addresses the diagnosed bottleneck of 
undelivered invoices and the lack of understanding of the invoices. However, the fact that 
customers interacted with our research team on the phone and repeatedly received invoices via 
text messages makes it difficult to identify one particular behavioral mechanism behind the 
basic treatment. Besides receiving and understanding their invoice, customers could also feel 
more scrutinized for having been called by the company and seeing, via text message, that 
their consumption and payments are monitored. Furthermore, reminder effects (e.g., Cadena 
and Shoar, 2013, Karlan, McConnel, Mullainathan and Zinman, 2016), or effects caused by 
personal contact with the phone caller (Karlan, Morten and Zinman, 2015) and reciprocity 
effects for being offered a free SMS service (Szabó and Ujhelyi, 2015) could drive the effects 
of the basic treatment. By comparing the commitment treatments to the basic treatment 
(instead of an untreated control group), we identify the additional effects of the psychological 
commitments on top of the potential effects, already present in the basic treatment.  
 The gap between willingness-to-pay and the actual payment behavior is addressed by 
the commitment treatments. These interventions are commitment techniques in the sense that 
customers commit to either a plan or a desirable self-concept. Deviating from one’ plans and 
self-concept may create disutility, in form of cognitive dissonance, as humans strive to act 
consistently (Festinger, 1957; Konow, 2000; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011). This drive for 
consistency makes it psychologically costly to renege. A necessary though not sufficient 
condition for these commitment techniques to work is that individuals indeed want to act in 
Table 3. Plan Script and Text Message 
Telephone script (once)  Text message (every month) 
[Basic] + We also have a couple of questions to 
you as a NamWater Customer, is that OK? 
 
How do you make sure you pay your bills on 
time? Can we count on your future payments? 
Are you going to pay next month? When exactly 
are you going to pay? Where are you going to 
pay? So Mr./Mrs. <name>, let me repeat:  When 
you are in <city name> in <month> can we 
expect your payments?  
That’s it, I don’t have any more questions. 
Thank you for your time and have a nice day. 
 Dear  [Name], As a reminder to your 
commitment to pay for water: 
 
In [Month] you used water for N$ 
[Consumption amount]. In total you have to 
pay N$ [Amount] (Total amount due). Your 
NamWater account number is [Account 
Number]. Please pay via usual payment mode. 
Ignore this SMS if already paid. 
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line with the targeted behavior (Sheeran, Milne, Webb and Gollwitzer, 2005; Bryan et al., 
2011). The two commitment treatments should therefore be ineffective if customers perceive 
the targeted behavior as undesirable. Commitment interventions are more effective when 
declared publicly (Rogers, Milkman, John and Norton, 2016). We make use of this, as 
customers commit publicly to their plan to pay or their self-concept towards the phone caller. 
To which degree any treatment effect is driven by this public commitment is beyond the scope 
of this study. 
A potential concern is that the commitment treatments change customers’ beliefs 
about being sanctioned differently than in the basic treatment. Disconnections, however, are 
very hard to enforce due to ethical (basic human right), technical and logistical constraints 
(e.g., limited staff and high cost). Before customers are placed on a cut-off list, they are 
contacted several times by NamWater staff and receive a warning letter about potential 
disconnections. Being placed on a cut-off list does also not lead to an immediate disconnection. 
Our own estimates suggest that at most 10% of customers on a cutting-list are eventually cut 
off. We trained the phone callers to be very polite and friendly during the phone calls. The 
phone call was framed as a service and “getting to know our customers”. Judged by the daily 
reports of our phone callers on their interaction with customers as well by the almost universal 
take-up of the SMS service, customers had a positive perception of the intervention. It 
therefore seems unlikely that customers confounded our phone call with a threat of potential 
sanctions.  
  
  
 
USING BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS TO DECREASE NON-PAYMENT FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES 
17 
 
2.4 Conducting the Experiment 
 
Randomization - We randomly create three groups among the 12,719 NamWater customers 
whose account information includes a mobile phone number. We use the min-max t-stat 
method stratified by geographical location (proxied by pipeline location to which a customers 
is connected) with 1,000 re-randomizations. We balance between each pair of treatments on 
the following variables of the pre-intervention year: number of payments made, yearly 
payment ratio (sum of payments divided by sum of invoices), amount of months being a 
NamWater customer, debt amount and total invoice amount.  
 
Implementation - In order to call the 12,719 phone numbers, we set up a call center in 
Windhoek with 25 local students in the last two weeks of September 2015 on NamWater’s 
premises. All phone callers took part in a three-day workshop and received in-depth training 
including mock callings and regular feedback. Treatments are balanced within day and phone 
caller. This ensures that treatment effects are not confounded by time (e.g. “end of the month 
effects”) or phone-caller idiosyncratic effects (e.g., gender or friendliness). Phone callers 
received their daily assignments in the morning briefing. Daily briefings in the morning and 
afternoon ensured that any questions of customers are handled in the same way.  
All interactions with customers were fully scripted, practiced and the adherence to the 
script rigorously monitored. This procedure allows us to provide full transparency and high 
control about the content of the phone calls. A phone call usually lasted about 3-5 minutes and 
was limited to this one conversation. The phone callers coded the answers given to the 
questions as well as the interviewee’s gender and the language of the phone call. The phone 
callers were trained and reminded to be as friendly and helpful as possible. All customers were 
called up to three times if the customer could not be reached during a previous call attempt. 
We managed to talk to 9,833 (77.3%) of the assigned customers which we will refer to as the 
intention-to-treat (ITT) sample. The majority of the customers that we could not reach had 
inactive or wrong phone numbers or were not answering the phone. Note, that these types of 
non-responses cannot cause a selection bias since unreachable customers cannot know which 
treatment they were assigned to.  
Based on the phone callers’ feedback, the vast majority of customers was delighted 
about the introduction of the SMS service, which is reflected in near universal take-up (about 
98%). Text messages were sent on a monthly basis from October 2015 until June 2016, timed 
as closely as possible to the mailing of the written invoices. The text message did not substitute 
the postal invoices.  
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Table 4 shows summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, 25th percentile, median 
and 75th percentile) for the basic, self-concept and plan group for the pre-intervention year as 
well as balance tests. The sample is well balanced with no statistically significant mean 
differences between the basic treatment and the self-concept and plan treatment. Note that the 
standard deviations are relatively large for many of our variables, highlighting the large 
heterogeneity of customers in our sample.9  
 
 
Summary statistics of the intervention – Summary statistics of the intervention are displayed 
in Table 5. The take up rate is very high in all three treatments (97-99%). Roughly 13% of text 
messages each month are on average undeliverable (after automated retries) over the nine-
month period. Typical reasons are technological restrictions, for example network errors, 
deactivated numbers or switched-off phones. Attrition rates are around 1%. There is no 
                                                     
9 The same table is reproduced with top coded variables at the 99th quantile in the appendix A1. Top coding reduces 
the influence of outliers on the mean value of the variables. 
Table 4. Pre-intervention Summary Statistics (ITT Sample) 
 Mean SD P25 Median P75 Mean 
diff. to 
Basic 
p-
value 
Basic (N=3,287)        
 Payment in N$ 111.75 546.39 0 0 100 - - 
 Payment in N$ if >0 313.35 879.77 81 158 312 - - 
 Consumption in N$ 133.01 309.41 21.20 53.40 119.40 - - 
 Number of payments 4.15 2.75 2 4 6 - - 
 Debt in N$ 536.42 2164.79 31.95 138.54 454.3 - - 
 Account age in month 44.26 39.178 19 34 53 - - 
Self-Concept (N=3,297)       
 Payment in N$ 111.11 363.25 0 0 100 -0.642 0.882 
 Payment in N$ if >0 309.85 553.53 84.50 155.40 300 -3.505 0.770 
 Consumption in N$ 132.26 325.28 26.70 53.70 115.70 -0.741 0.863 
 Number of payments 4.18 2.68 2 4 6 .0356 0.603 
 Debt in N$ 475.90 1451.69 37.35 125.87 407.69 -60.52 0.198 
 Account age in month 45.42 39.74 19 34 55 1.152 0.247 
Plan (N=3,249)        
 Payment in N$ 116.02 847.13 0 0 100 4.273 0.535 
 Payment in N$ if >0 325.13 1393.96 80 156.1 300 11.78 0.541 
 Consumption in N$ 136.83 575.72 21.66 50.75 111.65 3.828 0.562 
 Number of payments 4.15 2.70 2 4 6 0.005 0.948 
 Debt in N$ 501.11 1594.25 31.86 127.52 417.36 -35.31 0.467 
 Account age in month 45.13 39.64 19 34 55 0.862 0.388 
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of the pre-intervention year for the ITT sample. The table provides 
mean, standard error, 25th percentile, median and 75th percentile. The last two columns test for pre-treatment 
differences in means before the intervention using an OLS regression with treatment dummies and standard 
errors clustered at the customer level. We report the regression coefficients and p-values of the two commitment 
treatments in comparison to the basic treatment. 
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statistically significant difference in attrition rates between treatments nor among observable 
characteristics. In most cases, customers that attrite from the data become inactive. 
 Customers show a high commitment with respect to paying for water, which is what 
we expected given the answers in our pre-intervention survey. In the self-concept treatment 
about 96% of customers (i.e., even those with very high debt) state that being a reliable water 
payer is either very important or important to them.  In the plan treatment, 49% of customers 
mention more than four concrete steps of the payment process and thus provide relatively 
detailed plans. About 87% of customers make plans to pay during October. Lastly, about 72% 
of interviews were conducted in Oshiwambo (the local language). 
 
 
Cost of the intervention – The cost for the intervention was relatively low. A back-of-the-
envelope calculation suggests costs of about 1 USD per customer for a 5 minute phone call 
and the text messages over 9 months. The text messages cost 60 cents per customer and 
conducting a phone call costs 38 cents, including personnel cost for the phone caller and 
providing the necessary materials.  
Table 5.  Summary Statistics of the Intervention 
Treatment Take-up 
rate 
Successfully 
delivered 
messages 
 
Attrition 
rate 
 
Most 
common 
commitment 
answer 
2nd most 
common 
commitment 
answer 
Plans to 
pay in  
October 
Phone call 
in 
Oshiwambo 
Basic 0.990 0.873 0.010 - - - 0.703 
        
Self-concept 0.972  0.860 0.008 0.627 
(V. import.) 
0.329 
(Important) 
- 0.736  
Plan 0.973 0.860 0.011 0.493 
(4+ steps) 
0.441 
(2-3 steps) 
0.866 0.732 
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2.5 Estimation Strategy and Results  
 
Estimation strategy - This section analyzes how the two commitment treatments affected 
payment behavior beyond the effect of the basic treatment. The additional effect of the basic 
treatment in comparison to an untreated group is evaluated in a separate section.  
Table 5 shows the intention-to-treat effects (ITT) in the first month after the 
intervention (October). Regression 1 shows the marginal effects at means on the extensive 
margin (probability of making a payment) of a probit regression. Regression 2 shows the 
effects on the intensive margin (the effect on the natural logarithm of the payment amount 
conditional on being larger than zero). Regression 3 estimates the combined effects of 
regression 1 and 2 using a two-part model which multiplies the estimated effects from 
regression 1 and 2 (Belotti et al., 2015). Fitted values from the log transformation of the two-
part model are obtained using Duan’s (1983) smearing retransformation and standard errors 
are obtained by bootstrapping. We control for the pre-treatment values of the variables and 
strata used for randomization in the regression as recommended by Bruhn and McKenzie 
(2009). All standard errors are clustered at the customer level. 
Regressions 4 and 5 provide fixed effects difference-in-difference with clustered 
standard errors on the customer level (Betrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004). We use the 
inverse hyperbolic sine to transform our outcome variable. The inverse hyperbolic sine can be 
interpreted in the same way as the traditional log transformation.10 Unlike the log 
transformation, however, the inverse hyperbolic sine is defined for zero and negative values 
(Burbidge, Magee and Robb, 1988; MacKinnon and Magee, 1990). Such transformations have 
been recently used for example by McKenzie (2017) for profit data of entrepreneurs in Nigeria. 
In appendix A2, we present estimations when adding 0.1 and 1 to the log of payment amount 
and after a cube root transformation, which all yield similar results. Regression 6 shows the 
effects on the inverse hyperbolic sine of water consumption using the same specification as in 
regression 5. We use the following difference-in-difference estimator: 
 
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 +  𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 
 
where treatment is an indicator variable for the treatment groups and post is a dummy variable 
indicating periods after the intervention starts (October 2015). Table 6 reports the initial effects 
and Table 7 the long-term effects of the two commitment treatments. 
                                                     
10 The inverse hyperbolic sine is defined as ln (y+(y2+1)0.5). 
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Result 1: Both commitment interventions increase payments compared to the basic treatment 
in October: average payments increase by about 10% in the self-concept treatment and by 
about 26.5% in the plan treatment. 
 
The self-concept treatment increases the likelihood of paying by 2.8 percentage points 
(p=0.014) and the plan treatment by 7.5 percentage points (p<0.001). On the intensive margin, 
both point estimates are positive (approximately 1.3 and 3.5 percent) yet statistically 
insignificantly different from zero. The estimated combined effect from the two-part model 
for the self-concept treatment is 17.80 N$ (p=0.064) and for the plan treatment 47.19 N$ 
(p<0.001). This corresponds to an estimated increase of 10% and 26.5% respectively in 
comparison to the mean raw value of the basic treatment in October (178 N$). 
 
 
Table 6. ITT Effects in October in Comparison to Basic Group 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log 
(Payment 
amount | >0) 
Combined 
Effect on 
payment 
amount 
 IHS 
Payment 
amount in N$ 
 IHS 
Water usage 
in N$ 
        
Self-concept 0.028** 0.013 17.799*  0.161**  0.042 
 (0.011) (0.031) (9.608)  (0.072)  (0.042) 
Plan 0.075*** 0.035 47.187***  0.463***  0.009 
 (0.012) (0.031) (10.181)  (0.072)  (0.042) 
        
        
Model Probit OLS Two part 
model 
 Diff-in-Diff   Diff-in-Diff  
Observations 9,828 5,456 9,828  128,685  128,685 
R-Squared 0.115 0.329 -  0.017  0.024 
Notes: Table 6 reports ITT effects on payment behavior (regressions 1-4) and water consumption (regression 5) 
for the first month of the intervention (October 2015). Regression 1 shows the treatment effects of a probit 
regression on the likelihood of making a payment (marginal effects at means). Regression 2 reports the ITT 
effect using OLS on the intensive margin.  Regression 3 multiplies the effects of regressions 1 and 2 to get an 
estimate of the combined effect using a two-part model (Belotti et al. 2015). Fitted values from the log 
transformation of the two-part model are obtained using Duan’s (1983) smearing retransformation and standard 
errors are obtained by bootstrapping. Regression 4 and 5 show the estimates from a diff-in-diff regression 
including time and individual fixed effects. The outcome variables are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic 
sine (IHS). Regressions adjust for the randomization method as suggested by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009): We 
include pre-treatment means used for randomization as well as geographical location (proxied by pipeline 
connection), phone caller fixed effects and date of phone call fixed effects. Control variables are top coded at 
the 99th percentile. Five customers attrite in October. All reported standard errors are clustered at the customer 
level to account for serial correlation. ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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To put this in perspective, an hourly wage corresponds to about 15 N$11 (Namibian Statistics 
Agency, 2016). This means that the self-concept treatment increases average payments by 
about one and the plan treatment by about three hourly wages. The inverse hyperbolic sine 
estimates a larger positive and statistically significant effects on the payment amount of 16 
(p=0.025) and 46 percent (p<0.001). The coefficient of water consumption has a positive point 
estimate but is insignificantly different from zero. 
 
Result 2: Customers who have paid little in the past react strongly to the treatments  
 
In Figure 1, we visualize heterogeneous treatments effects across customers with respect to 
their past payment behavior by depicting the regression estimates of the combined effect of 
the two-part model by quartiles of the pre-intervention payment ratio (sum of payments 
divided by sum of invoices) in October. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The full 
regression tables are presented in appendix Table A3. The 1st quartile for example shows the 
worst 25% in terms of the pre-intervention payment ratio (i.e. those that paid the least fraction 
of their invoice). The 4th quartile shows the 25% with the highest fraction. The interventions 
are highly effective among customers that have paid relatively little in the past. The point 
estimates for the 1st and 2nd quartile for the self-concept treatment are 22.62 N$ (p=0.546) and 
43.31 N$ (p=0.041) and therefore larger than the corresponding estimate for the full sample. 
They are, however, statistically insignificantly different from zero, which may be due to a 
problem of statistical power. The point estimates for the plan treatment are 83.36 N$ (p=0.022) 
and 57.65 N$ (p=0.041) respectively and therefore also considerably larger than for the full 
sample. The point estimates for the 3rd and 4th quartile are close to zero and statistically 
insignificant in both treatments. Appendix A4 and A5 shows the same analysis using the pre-
intervention debt quartiles instead of the pre-intervention payment ratio with similar results. 
The finding that customers with little payments in the past react strongly to our 
interventions resonates well with our behavioral diagnosis because these customers showed 
the largest gap between stated values and actual payment behavior. 
 
                                                     
11 15 N$ is equivalent to about 1.11 USD at the time of the intervention. 
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Figure 1: Treatment Effects by Pre-intervention Fraction of Bill Paid 
 
A potential concern of the self-concept treatment was that customers with an 
unfavorable payment history might adopt (or reaffirm) a self-concept of being a non-paying 
customer (see Bryan, Adams and Monin, 2013). This could happen if customers are uncertain 
about their types and infer it through their actions (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; 2011). Our 
treatment may therefore make salient to them that they do not care about water payments since 
they have not paid in the past. The treatment could then induce a corresponding self-concept 
of an unreliable payer, making payments less likely in the future. We find, however, that 
evoking a desirable self-concept works even for customers that, given their payment history, 
have little reason to think of themselves as responsible water-payers. Evidence for the 
effectiveness among such groups is to the best of our knowledge missing. For customers in 
our self-concept treatment it seems to be more important who they want to be than who they 
are.  
This distinguishes the effects of the self-concept intervention from priming 
interventions, which make parts of one’s identity salient and therefore are most effective 
among individuals that already hold a certain identity. For example, priming the identity as a 
previous donor is more effective for more regular donors (Kessler and Milkman, 2016) and 
crime-related primes increase dishonest behavior among criminals, but not regular citizens 
(Cohn, Maréchal and Noll, 2015). 
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Result 3: No backfiring of the commitment treatments in the long term. 
 
Long-term effects of the intervention are show in Table 7. We use the same specifications and 
regressions as in previous tables and pool data for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd quarter in the intervention 
period. The left panel shows effects for the self-concept treatment, the right panel shows 
treatment effects for the plan treatment. In particular, we are interested whether rebound 
effects might offset the short-term effects. We find that both commitment interventions are 
particularly effective in the first quarter (Oct.-Dec.) of the intervention. The 2nd quarter (Jan.-
March) shows the smallest treatment effects overall. The negative, though statistically 
insignificant point estimate is driven by negative treatment effects on the intensive margin of 
about -4.2 to -4.5 percent (marginally significant in the plan treatment). The payment 
propensity is unchanged. In the 3rd quarter (April-June) of the intervention, we see a positive 
effect for the self-concept treatment on the likelihood of making a payment of 1.5 percentage 
points (p=0.036). The point estimate of the two-part model has the same size as in the first 
quarter (p=0.096). We do not observe such long-term effects for the plan treatment. 
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Table 7. ITT Long Term Effects 
 
Self-Concept  Plan 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log 
(Payment 
amount | 
>0) 
Combined 
Effect on 
payment 
amount 
IHS 
Payment 
amount in 
N$ 
IHS 
water  
usage in N$ 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log 
(Payment 
amount | 
>0) 
Combined 
Effect on 
payment 
amount 
IHS 
Payment 
amount in 
N$ 
IHS 
water  
usage in 
N$ 
            
Quarter 1 0.025*** -0.024 5.887 0.128*** 0.025  0.037*** -0.021 10.868*** 0.206*** -0.011 
(Oct-Dec) (0.007) (0.023) (3.992)  (0.041) (0.034)  (0.007) (0.024) (4.159)  (0.041) (0.034) 
            
Quarter 2 0.005 -0.042 -2.881 0.061 -0.003  0.006 -0.045* -3.445 0.014 -0.020 
(Jan-Mar) (0.007) (0.026) (3.258)  (0.048) (0.037)  (0.007) (0.027) (3.183)  (0.048) (0.038) 
            
Quarter 3 0.015** 0.013 5.968* 0.078* -0.029  0.007 -0.002 1.811  0.032 -0.015 
(Apr-June) (0.007) (0.028) (3.590) (0.041) (0.034)  (0.007) (0.028) (3.435)  (0.041) (0.035) 
            
            
Model Probit OLS Two-part 
model 
Diff-in-
Diff 
Diff-in-Diff  Probit OLS Two-part 
model 
Diff-in-
Diff 
Diff-in-
Diff 
            
Notes:  Table 7 reports ITT effects on payment behavior (regressions 1-4, 6-9) and water consumption (regression 5, 10) by quarter. Regression 1 shows the effect of the 
treatments on the likelihood of making a payment (marginal effects at means). Regression 2 reports the ITT effect on the intensive margin.  Regression 3 shows the estimated 
combined effect from regressions 1 and 2 using a two-part model (Belotti et al. 2015). Fitted values from the two-part model are obtained using Duan’s (1983) smearing 
retransformation and standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping. Regression 4 and 5 show the estimates from a diff-in-diff regression including time and individual fixed 
effects. The outcome variables are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS). Regressions adjust for the randomization method as suggested by Bruhn and 
McKenzie (2009): We include pre-treatment means used for randomization as well as geographical location (proxied by pipeline connection), phone caller fixed effects and 
date of phone call fixed effects. Control variables are top coded at the 99th percentile. All reported standard errors are clustered at the customer level to account for serial 
correlation. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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What could explain the negative point estimates on the intensive margin in the 2nd 
quarter (regression 2 and 7)? We discuss three possible explanations: First, the high treatment 
effect in October might lead to budgeting effects in later periods as customers now have less 
money in their household budget to pay for utility bills. Secondly, some customers might have 
reduced their debt by paying in October, so that the remaining debt is smaller, causing smaller 
payments. Lastly, customers might show psychological licensing effects, which induces them 
to make lower payments in subsequent periods.  
The last explanation, licensing effects, seems unlikely to be a driver since they would 
not only show up in reduced payments but also in a lower propensity to pay. The reason is that 
making a payment is quite effortful, as customer travel, on average, 25 km to their next 
payment point. A customer who feels licensed to non-payment would most probably not go at 
all instead of going and paying less.  
To shed more light on the other two explanations, budgeting and reduced debt, we run 
a regression that controls for (lagged) debt and consumption, which is shown in Table A6 in 
the appendix. These variables are not included in our main regression since it would distort 
the overall impact evaluation of the interventions (debt is endogenously affected by our 
treatments). Controlling for debt and invoice amount yields higher treatment effects 
throughout all quarters and in particular in the 3rd quarter. This suggests that reduced debt is 
one of the channels behind waning treatment effects. As the point estimates on the intensive 
margin in the 2nd quarter are still negative, albeit insignificant, when controlling for debt, both 
budgeting and reduced debt may explain reduced payments in the 2nd quarter (for similar 
results see Szabó and Ujhelyi, 2015). Yet, an important observation is that this effect is found 
only temporarily, as in the 3rd quarter the point estimates on the intensive margin improve by 
about 5.3 percent in the self-concept and 4.3 percent in the plan treatment in comparison to 
the 2nd quarter. The improved payment behavior in the third quarter shows that our intervention 
did not backfire in the long-term.  
 
Result 4: Water consumption is unchanged  
 
Learning about potential spillover effects across domains of behavior is important because the 
literature on spillovers of behavioral interventions is scarce. One the one hand, customers 
might increase water consumption due to licensing effects (Merritt, Effron, Monin, 2010). On 
the other hand, customers could become more aware of the cost of water and thus use water 
more carefully. From the water utility’s cost-profit perspective, it is not straightforward how 
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marginal changes in water consumption affect profits. The marginal cost of producing water 
is usually low since the main costs of production stem from fixed costs. Hence, large 
reductions in water usage could hurt the profits of the water utility, because it reduces the 
billable amount billed unproportionally to production costs. The point estimates for water 
consumption in October (Table 6, regression 5) are slightly increased, yet insignificantly 
different from zero (p=0.288 and p=0.743). In the long-run they are unchanged (Table 7, 
regressions 5 and 10). We conclude that there are no spillovers on water consumption.  
 
The basic treatment - This section estimates the effect of the basic treatment in comparison to 
an untreated comparison group. Since the effect of the basic treatment was not the main focus 
of the study, the untreated group was not experimentally varied (which allowed higher number 
of observations and thus higher statistical power for our commitment treatments). Instead, we 
estimate the treatment effect of the basic treatment in comparison to an untreated group using 
matching methods. Note that take-up of the treatment among the untreated group is 
impossible. Therefore, typical concerns with matching methods, for instance that individuals 
self-select into treatments, do not apply. Furthermore, our panel data allows us to construct 
groups with equal pre-intervention levels and parallel pre-intervention trends. Therefore, the 
main concerns about quasi-experimental methods (compared to randomization) should be 
alleviated when estimating the effects of the basic treatment.  
We match customers in the basic treatment with customers that we never had contact 
with.12 We provide estimates from two different matching methods in order to show 
insensitivity with respect to the matching procedure. As a first matching method, we use 
entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012). Entropy balancing is a procedure that reweights 
sample units such that the reweighted control group is balanced between treatment and control 
group with respect to a set of predefined covariates. Entropy balancing ensures high covariate 
balance even for larger sets of covariates and allows matching beyond the first moment of a 
variable. As a second approach we use coarsened exact matching (Iacus, King and Porro, 
2011). Coarsened exact matching (CEM) creates sets of strata for pre-defined covariates and 
then finds matches in control and treatment group that share these strata. The advantage of 
both methods over the more popular propensity score matching is that they guarantee a 
reduction in covariate imbalance (King and Nielsen, 2018).  
We test for differences in levels and trends between our matched comparison groups 
and the basic treatment with respect to payment amount, payment propensity, debt and water 
                                                     
12 Summary statistics of that group of customers are provided in Appendix A7. 
  
 
USING BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS TO DECREASE NON-PAYMENT FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES 
28 
 
consumption to ensure successful matching. Appendix Table A8 shows that for both matching 
groups there do not exist statistically significant differences with respect to level or trends over 
time between the basic and the matched untreated group. 
Table 8 shows the treatment effects using the regression models as in previous tables. 
Estimates of the entropy match are shown in panel A and estimates using the CEM are 
displayed in panel B. The treatment effects on payments are largest in October where the 
payments amount increase by about 38.22 N$ and 44.46 N$ in the basic treatment (regressions 
3 and 8), which corresponds to an increase of 30% (Entropy balancing) and 31% (CEM) in 
comparison to the respective untreated payment mean.13 
This effect is quite large and corresponds to about 2-3 hourly wages. This means that 
our two commitment treatment lead to a short term increase on payments of 40% and 56% 
respectively in comparison to an untreated group. Water consumption is unchanged 
(regressions 5 and 10). We find that there is a strong and lasting effect on the payment 
propensity throughout all quarters. Similar to the analysis of the two commitment treatments, 
we find a negative effect in the basic treatment on the intensive margin overall and especially 
in the second quarter of the intervention, which we interpret as budgeting effects for the same 
reasons as in the previous analysis.  
 
                                                     
13 The weighted mean of the payment amount in October for the entropy balancing sample is 149.12 N$ and for 
the CEM sample is 123.01 N$. The means differ since CEM matching results in less matched observations than 
entropy matching. 
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Table 8. Treatment Effects in Comparison to Untreated Group 
 
A. Entropy Balancing  B. Coarsened Exact Matching 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log 
(Payment 
amount | >0) 
Combined 
Effect on 
payment 
amount 
IHS 
Payment 
amount in 
N$ 
IHS 
water  
usage in N$ 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log 
(Payment 
amount | >0) 
Combined 
Effect on 
payment 
amount 
IHS 
Payment 
amount in 
N$ 
IHS 
water  
usage in N$ 
            
October 0.093*** 0.033 44.551*** 0.292*** 0.026  0.089*** 0.072* 38.218*** 0.541*** 0.030 
 (0.012) (0.038) (8.622) (0.045) (0.033)  (0.014) (0.043) (7.335) (0.079) (0.046) 
            
Quarter 1 0.089*** -0.011 32.907*** 0.387*** 0.027  0.084*** -0.003 25.950*** 0.484*** 0.010 
(Oct-Dec) (0.007) (0.029) (4.501) (0.034) (0.031)  (0.008) (0.032) (4.073) (0.043) (0.037) 
            
Quarter 2 0.043*** -0.112*** 0.287 0.150*** 0.035  0.040*** -0.153*** -4.397 0.164*** 0.011 
(Jan-March) (0.007) (0.029) (3.945) (0.036) (0.029)  (0.008) (0.032) (3.726) (0.042) (0.036) 
            
Quarter 3 0.040*** -0.034 9.227** 0.159*** 0.045  0.037*** -0.066* 4.053 0.175*** 0.022 
(April-June) (0.007) (0.031) (3.903) (0.036) (0.029)  (0.009) (0.035) (4.016) (0.044) (0.037) 
            
Model Weighted 
probit  
 
Weighted 
OLS  
 
Weighted 
Two-part 
model  
Weighted 
Diff-in-Diff  
Weighted 
Diff-in-Diff  
 Probit OLS Two-part 
model 
Diff-in-Diff  Diff-in-Diff 
Notes: Both matching procedures use the following pre-intervention variables to match on, which closely resemble those used for randomization. In addition, we include variables to account for time 
trends in the payment data. In particular we use:  Bi-annual payment propensity, bi-annual payment amount (if payment amount >0), debt in month before intervention, age of account, fraction of 
bill paid, inverse hyperbolic sine of water consumption, Inactivity (no water consumption) in month prior to intervention, total months of inactivity in pre-intervention year. Entropy uses a weighted 
sample of untreated customers to match the treated customers, which results in a match of all 3287 basic treatment customers with 8912 weighted untreated customers. CEM uses one-to-one matching 
with 5 bins for each of matching variables, which results in a sample of 2,626 basic treatment customers and 2,626 untreated control customers. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
We conduct a large-scale natural field experiment in cooperation with the Namibian 
public water utility NamWater in order to reduce non-payment for water through behavioral 
interventions. We design our behavioral interventions according to pre-intervention diagnostic 
surveys. Building on the survey evidence, we design three interventions, treating 9,833 
customers in total. The interventions aim to close the discrepancy between customers’ stated 
willingness to pay and their actual payment behavior. In the basic treatment, we send 
customers simplified invoice information via text message. On top of the basic treatment, we 
test two commitment treatments, in which customers commit either to a desirable water paying 
self-concept or to their own payment plans. In the first month of the intervention, average 
payments increase by 30% in the basic treatment, by 40% in the self-concept treatment and by 
56% in the plan treatment relative to an untreated comparison group. The effects of the 
commitment treatments wane over time. However, even more than six months after the start 
of the intervention, we find a significantly higher propensity to pay. On average, payments 
increased by an equivalent of nine hourly wages per customer in total. The intervention is 
extremely cost effective: A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests a return-on-investment 
of around 900%.  
We believe that a crucial success factor of our intervention is the identification of 
widespread behavioral bottlenecks impeding payments. This allows a broader view on reasons 
for non-payments beyond technical and economic aspects. In this case, a relatively simple 
intervention led to relatively large behavioral responses. This is even more remarkable given 
that we did not reduce the logistical hurdles to paying (customers travel on average 25 km to 
a payment point and wait on average 45 minutes in line to pay) and only treated one household 
member out of a median of seven, who are jointly responsible for consumption and possibly 
payments. Moreover, our sample also includes those customers who did not struggle with 
reception and understanding of the invoice and those 16% who did not have debt at the start 
of the intervention. Though difficult to quantify, the treatment-on-the-treated effects might 
therefore be substantially higher than the intention-to-treat effects reported in the paper. This 
underlines that tailored behavioral interventions can be a powerful policy measure, in 
particular in settings where monetary incentives or heavy-handed interventions are difficult or 
even impossible to implement. 
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2.7 Appendix to Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1. Pre-intervention Summary Statistics (ITT Sample)   
Top Coded at 99% Percentile 
 
Mean SD P25 Median P75 
Mean 
diff. to 
Basic 
p-
value 
Basic (N= 3,287)        
 Payment in N$ 100.41 239.78 0 0 100 - - 
 Payment in N$ if >0 293.62 383.18 81 158 312 - - 
 Consumption in N$ 125.17 228.39 21.20 53.40 119.40 - - 
 Number of payments 4.14 2.75 2 4 6 - - 
 Debt in N$ 508.85 1276.79 31.95 138.54 454.30 - - 
Account age in month 44.26 39.15 19 34 53 - - 
Self-Concept (N=3,297)       
 Payment in N$ 100.44 239.68 0 0 100 0.02 0.991 
 Payment in N$ if >0 293.63 389.24 84.50 155.40 300 0.01 0.999 
 Consumption in N$ 123.13 224.11 26.70 53.70 115.70 -2.04 0.521 
 Number of payments 4.18 2.68 2 4 6 0.04 0.603 
 Debt in N$ 466.61 1201.72 37.35 125.87 407.69 -42.23 0.180 
Account age in month 45.41 39.70 19 34 55 1.150 0.247 
Plan (N=3,249)        
 Payment in N$ 100.35 240.75 0 0 100 -0.057 0.982 
 Payment in N$ if >0 293.79 386.97 80 156.10 300 0.166 0.983 
 Consumption in N$ 124.07 227.92 21.66 50.75 111.65 -1.105 0.734 
 Number of payments 4.15 2.70 2 4 6 0.005 0.948 
 Debt in N$ 490.99 1317.07 31.86 127.52 417.36 -17.86 0.590 
 Account age in month 45.11 39.61 19 34 55 0.862 0.388 
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of the pre-intervention year for the ITT sample. All continuous 
variables are top coded at the 99th percentile. The table provides mean, standard error, 25th percentile, 50th 
percentile and 75th percentile. The last two columns test for pre-treatment differences in means before the 
intervention using an OLS regression with treatment dummies and standard errors clustered at the customer 
level. We report the regression coefficients and p-values of the two commitment treatments in comparison to 
the basic treatment. 
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Table A2. Alternative Regression Specifications 
 Self-Concept  Plan 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Log 
(payment 
amount in 
N$ +0.01) 
Log 
(payment 
amount in 
N$ +1) 
Cube 
Root  
(payment 
amount in 
N$) 
 Log 
(payment 
amount in 
N$ +0.01) 
Log 
(payment 
amount in 
N$ +1) 
Cube Root  
(payment 
amount in 
N$) 
        
October 0.263** 0.143** 0.159*  0.759*** 0.411*** 0.496*** 
 (0.116) (0.064) (0.083)  (0.117) (0.065) (0.085) 
        
Quarter 1 0.218*** 0.112*** 0.120***  0.351*** 0.181*** 0.199*** 
(Oct-Dec) (0.067) (0.036) (0.046)  (0.067) (0.037) (0.047) 
        
Quarter 2 0.026 0.007 -0.008  0.040 0.014 0.000 
(Jan-March) (0.066) (0.035) (0.043)  (0.066) (0.035) (0.043) 
        
Quarter 3 0.127* 0.070* 0.079*  0.052 0.029 0.020 
(April-June) (0.067) (0.036) (0.045)  (0.068) (0.037) (0.046) 
        
Model Diff-in-
Diff 
Diff-in-
Diff 
Diff-in-
Diff 
 Diff-in-
Diff 
Diff-in-
Diff 
Diff-in-
Diff 
Notes: This table provides ITT estimates of the treatments in comparison to the basic treatment. The 
precise effects for regressions using the logarithm can be obtained by taking exp (coefficient)-1. The 
same diff-in-diff framework as in the main specifications is used. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A3. Heterogeneous Treatment for October by Pre-intervention Payment Ratio 
 Self-Concept  Plan 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log 
(Payment 
amount | 
>0) 
Combined 
Effect on 
payment 
amount 
IHS 
Payment 
amount in 
N$ 
IHS 
water  
usage in 
N$ 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log 
(Payment 
amount | 
>0) 
Combined 
Effect on 
payment 
amount 
IHS 
Payment 
amount in 
N$ 
IHS 
water  
usage in 
N$ 
            
1st Quartile 0.036 -0.025 22.622 0.123 -0.064  0.048** 0.119 83.363** 0.228** -0.054 
(worst 25%) (0.023) (0.081) (37.489) (0.105) (0.085)  (0.023) (0.078) (36.388) (0.107) (0.085) 
            
2nd Quartile 0.042* 0.116** 43.307** 0.134 0.060  0.117*** 0.051 57.647** 0.324*** 0.053 
 (0.023) (0.053) (21.215) (0.093) (0.069)  (0.023) (0.053) (28.210) (0.095) (0.070) 
            
3rd Quartile 0.004 -0.037 -4.8266 0.128 0.152**  0.079*** -0.013 16.2141 0.261*** 0.050 
 (0.021) (0.054) (9.204) (0.092) (0.068)  (0.021) (0.054) (9.321) (0.091) (0.072) 
            
4th Quartile 0.034 -0.027 5.96963 0.168* -0.007  0.069*** -0.046 13.803 0.223** 0.006 
(best 25%) (0.023) (0.057) (12.294) (0.095) (0.076)  (0.024) (0.061) (13.176) (0.097) (0.073) 
            
            
Model Probit OLS Two-part 
model 
Diff-in-
Diff 
Diff-in-
Diff 
 Probit OLS Two-part 
model 
Diff-in-
Diff 
Diff-in-
Diff 
Notes:  This table reports ITT effects on payment behavior (regressions 1-4, 6-9) and water consumption (regression 5, 10) by pre-intervention fraction of bill paid 
quartile. Regression 1 shows the effect of the treatments on the likelihood of making a payment (marginal effects at means). Regression 2 reports the ITT effect on the 
intensive margin.  Regression 3 shows the estimated combined effect from regressions 1 and 2 using a two-part model (Belotti et al., 2015). Fitted values from the 
two-part model are obtained using Duan’s (1983) smearing retransformation and standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping. Regression 4 and 5 show the estimates 
from a diff-in-diff regression including time and individual fixed effects. The outcome variables are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS). Regressions 
adjust for the randomization method as suggested by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009): We include pre-treatment means used for randomization as well as geographical 
location (proxied by pipeline connection), phone caller fixed effects and date of phone call fixed effects.  In addition, we control for lagged debt amount in N$ and 
lagged water consumption in N$. Control variables are top coded at the 99th percentile. All reported standard errors are clustered at the customer level to account for 
serial correlation. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A4. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects for October by Pre-Intervention Debt 
 Self-Concept  Plan 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log 
(Payment 
amount | >0) 
Combined 
Effect on 
payment 
amount 
IHS 
Payment 
amount in 
N$ 
IHS 
water  
usage in N$ 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log 
(Payment 
amount | >0) 
Combined 
Effect on 
payment 
amount 
IHS 
Payment 
amount in 
N$ 
IHS 
water  
usage in 
N$ 
            
1st Quartile 0.033 0.092 72.277* 0.129 0.004  0.086*** 0.121* 136.129*** 0.408*** 0.088 
(worst 25%) (0.023) (0.069) (38.878) (0.112) (0.084)  (0.023) (0.066) (37.074) (0.114) (0.083) 
            
2nd Quartile 0.046** -0.063 2.751 0.142 0.085  0.119*** -0.057 24.335** 0.245*** 0.011 
 (0.023) (0.047) (10.007) (0.093) (0.071)  (0.022) (0.048) (10.282) (0.094) (0.073) 
            
3rd Quartile 0.038* 0.030 7.738 0.095 -0.034  0.075*** 0.005 10.6169** 0.249*** 0.005 
 (0.022) (0.041) (4.796) (0.088) (0.068)  (0.023) (0.044) (5.020) (0.087) (0.070) 
            
4th Quartile -0.006 -0.021 -2.7748 0.183* 0.069  0.018 0.008 3.7908 0.146 -0.055 
(best 25%) (0.023) (0.063) (6.554) (0.093) (0.074)  (0.023) (0.062) (6.342) (0.093) (0.074) 
            
            
Model Probit OLS Two-part 
model 
Diff-in-Diff Diff-in-Diff  Probit OLS Two-part 
model 
Diff-in-Diff Diff-in-
Diff 
            
Notes:  This table reports ITT effects on payment behavior (regressions 1-4, 6-9) and water consumption (regression 5, 10) by pre-intervention debt amount. Regression 1 shows the effect of 
the treatments on the likelihood of making a payment (marginal effects at means). Regression 2 reports the ITT effect on the intensive margin.  Regression 3 shows the estimated combined 
effect from regressions 1 and 2 using a two-part model (Belotti et al., 2015). Fitted values from the two-part model are obtained using Duan’s (1983) smearing retransformation and standard 
errors are obtained by bootstrapping. Regression 4 and 5 show the estimates from a diff-in-diff regression including time and individual fixed effects. The outcome variables are transformed 
using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS). Regressions adjust for the randomization method as suggested by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009): We include pre-treatment means used for 
randomization as well as geographical location (proxied by pipeline connection), phone caller fixed effects and date of phone call fixed effects.  In addition, we control for lagged debt amount 
in N$ and lagged water consumption in N$. Control variables are top coded at the 99th percentile. All reported standard errors are clustered at the customer level to account for serial correlation. 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix A5: Treatment effects with 95% confidence intervals from the two-part model in Table A4. 
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Table A6. ITT Effects Controlling for Lagged Debt and Lagged Consumption 
 Self-Concept  Plan 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log 
(Payment 
amount | 
>0) 
Combined 
Effect on 
payment 
amount 
IHS 
Payment 
amount in 
N$ 
IHS 
water  
usage in N$ 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log 
(Payment 
amount | 
>0) 
Combined 
Effect on 
payment 
amount 
IHS 
Payment 
amount in 
N$ 
IHS 
water  
usage in N$ 
            
Quarter 1 0.025*** -0.017 8.832 0.152*** 0.010  0.036*** -0.021 14.266** 0.222*** -0.018 
(Oct-Dec) (0.007) (0.020) (5.448) (0.043) (0.034)  (0.007) (0.021) (5.787) (0.043) (0.034) 
            
Quarter 2 0.006 -0.022 -1.058 0.093* -0.021  0.006 -0.033 -2.905 0.038 -0.031 
(Jan-March) (0.007) (0.022) (4.284) (0.050) (0.038)  (0.007) (0.022) (4.235) (0.050) (0.038) 
            
Quarter 3 0.014** 0.036 11.716*** 0.096** -0.043  0.007 0.031 7.765* 0.048 -0.025 
(April-June) (0.007) (0.024) (4.371) (0.044) (0.035)  (0.007) (0.023) (4.193) (0.044) (0.036) 
            
            
Model Probit OLS Two-part 
model 
Diff-in-
Diff 
Diff-in-Diff  Probit OLS Two-part 
model 
Diff-in-
Diff 
Diff-in-Diff 
Notes:  This table reports ITT effects on payment behavior (regressions 1-4, 6-9) and water consumption (regression 5, 10) controlling for lagged debt and water consumption. 
Regression 1 shows the effect of the treatments on the likelihood of making a payment (marginal effects at means). Regression 2 reports the ITT effect on the intensive margin.  
Regression 3 shows the estimated combined effect from regressions 1 and 2 using a two-part model (Belotti et al. 2015). Fitted values from the two-part model are obtained using 
Duan’s (1983) smearing retransformation and standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping. Regression 4 and 5 show the estimates from a diff-in-diff regression including time and 
individual fixed effects. The outcome variables are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS). Regressions adjust for the randomization method as suggested by Bruhn 
and McKenzie (2009): We include pre-treatment means used for randomization as well as geographical location (proxied by pipeline connection), phone caller fixed effects and date 
of phone call fixed effects.  In addition, we control for lagged debt amount in N$ and lagged water consumption in N$. Control variables are top coded at the 99th percentile. All 
reported standard errors are clustered at the customer level to account for serial correlation. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A7. Summary Statistics For Not-contacted Sample 
 Mean SD P25 Median P75 
Untreated (N=8912)      
 Payment in N$ 98.96 380.35 0 0 70 
 Payment in N$ if >0 309.07 622.03 82 152 302.55 
 Consumption in N$ 128.20 302.31 20.2 50.5 111.65 
 Number of payments 3.77 2.79 1.5 3 6 
 Debt in N$ 725.39 2523.84 40.06 168.92 612.4 
 Age of account in month 48.34 38.42 23 38 61 
 Fraction of bill paid 1.20 10.49 .545 .887 1.045 
Notes:  The table reports summary statistics of the pre-intervention year for the not-contacted sample. 
The table provides mean, standard error, 25th percentile, 50th percentile and 75th percentile. 
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Table A8. Balance Check for Matching 
 Entropy Balancing  Coarsened Exact Matching 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log 
(Payment 
amount in 
N$ | >0) 
IHS 
Payment 
amount (in 
N$) 
IHS Water 
usage  
(in N$) 
Debt in N$  
(99% top 
coded) 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log 
(Payment 
amount in 
N$ | >0) 
IHS 
Payment 
amount in 
N$ 
IHS Water  
usage 
in N$ 
Debt in N$  
(99% top 
coded) 
            
Basic  0.002 0.014 0.016 -0.008 7.408  0.004 -0.004 0.023 0.012 -4.403 
(Level difference) (0.007) (0.032) (0.040) (0.033) (28.937)  (0.008) (0.034) (0.044) (0.039) (29.954) 
            
Basic * time trend 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.001 0.904  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.094 
(Trend difference) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (2.341)  (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (1.963) 
            
Observations 132,265 41,433 132,265 132,265 132,265  59,238 20,284 59,238 59,238 59,238 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 
Notes: This table shows the results of the matching procedures used to estimate the effect of the basic treatment in comparison to an untreated group. If the matching procedure was 
successful, we should not expect differences between the basic and untreated group with respect to the pre-intervention characteristics. We test for level difference by regressing the 
outcome variable on the basic treatment dummy and for trend difference by interaction of the basic dummy with the time variable (months). Standard errors are clustered at the 
customer level. As can be seen in the table, both matching procedures result in coefficients close to zero without any statistically significant coefficients. 
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CHAPTER 3.  
 
 
THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF SPECIFIC TIPS TO ENCOURAGE 
WATER CONSERVATION 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Two thirds of the world’s population experiences severe water scarcity for at least one month 
a year (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2016). Lacking access to purified piped water has serious 
economic consequences on industrial and agricultural productivity, as well as on the health 
and wealth of individuals.14 Finding effective interventions to curb water demand is a key 
challenge for the sustainable provision of piped water in water-stressed regions. 
A standard economic approach would be to address the problem of water scarcity by 
increasing prices. This, however, has caveats: Meta-studies show that price elasticity can be 
low in particular in the short term (e.g., Olmstead, Hanemann and Stavins, 2007) implying that 
price changes need to be large in order to reduce water demand substantially.15 Such price 
increases, though, may lack political acceptance for example because of unequal distributional 
effects among poorer households and the fact that access to clean water is a basic human right.  
Non-pecuniary policies are therefore a crucial complementary strategy and are 
especially important when droughts are imminent or unforeseen (Dietz and Stern, 2008). A 
standard non-pecuniary policy are mass communication campaigns, which target customers’ 
behavior through leaflets, letters or other mass outlets. Such campaigns are usually quicker 
and easier to implement than most pecuniary strategies (Katz, Grinstein, Kronrod and Nisan, 
2016). Previous experimental literature on mass communication campaigns focuses on 
interventions reducing water consumption by appealing to social norms, inspired by a study 
                                                     
14 Lacking access to purified water sources leads to waterborne diseases like diarrhea and typhoid fever (Amrita, 
Kremer and Zwane, 2007; Ashraf, Glaeser, Holland and Steinberg, 2017), infant mortality (Gamper-Rabindran, 
Khan, and Timmins, 2010) and inferior educational attainment (Ashraf et al., 2017). 
15 The low elasticity may result from the fact that purified water has limited substitutes and that water payments 
may only account for a small proportion of a households total expenditures. This might cause the wealthy, which 
often are the heaviest users, to respond little to price changes (Mansur and Olmstead, 2012; Ferraro and Miranda, 
2013). Further, customers often have difficulties understanding invoice information and non-payment is common 
in many low- and middle-income countries (Szabo and Ujhelyi, 2015). Rode, Gómez-Baggethun and Krause (2014) 
argue that pricing strategies could even crowd out intrinsic motivation to act pro-environmentally.  
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of Schultz et al. (2007). These interventions provide information of one’s own usage in 
comparison to other households. The treatments in such large-scale experiments reduce water 
consumption between 4.8 to 5.6 percent (Ferraro and Price, 2011; Ferraro and Miranda, 2013; 
Brent, Cook and Olsen, 2015)16. They are particularly effective among high users and show 
substantial long-term effects (Bernedo, Ferraro and Price, 2011; Ferraro, Miranda and Price, 
2013). 
This paper differs from previous literature by investigating two key features of such 
campaigns that have received little attention so far. First, I focus on the phrasing of saving tips. 
Although many interventions include a list of saving tips (e.g., printed on the back of the 
invoice), there seems to be no evidence on when these tips work and when they do not work 
(Lu, Deller and Hviid, 2017). In this study, I investigate whether the degree of specificity of 
the tips matters. Should tips be as specific as possible or should they be less specific and 
instead encourage individuals to contribute with their own knowledge and ideas on how to 
reduce water usage? There are two pre-registered and contradicting hypotheses with respect 
to the effectiveness of specific and less specific tips. While specific tips reduce cognitive effort 
by giving concretized advice on how to act, they run the risk of being inadequate to a particular 
household or might even cause reactance by restricting certain behaviors. Less specific tips in 
contrast foster involvement in the idea-generating process, encouraging individually adequate 
ways to save water. Moreover, prior research suggests that individuals highly value their own 
input to products and ideas (Norton, Mochon and Ariely, 2012; Hooshangi and Loewenstein, 
2016). However, less specific tips may demand too much cognitive effort to find effective 
ways to conserve water.  
Second, I study potential spillovers on payment behavior. Understanding these 
spillovers is not only interesting from a behavioral perspective, it is also important from the 
utility’s revenue perspective as reductions in water usage mechanically lower the billable 
amount. Policy makers might be concerned that a reduction in billable amounts may translate 
into a one-to-one loss in revenues, which could threaten the cost-recovery of high fixed cost 
infrastructure. While this concern might be substantial in settings where 100% of the bill is 
paid, the effects on payment behavior are less clear in settings where many bills are unpaid or 
only partially paid as typical in many low- and middle-income countries (e.g., Szabo and 
Ujhelyi, 2015). Therefore, whether and to which degree reductions in billable amounts affect 
the utility’s revenues is yet an unanswered question.  
                                                     
16 Social norm experiments in the electricity domain are about half the size with treatment effects ranging from 2.0 
to 2.1 percent (Allcott, 2011; Alcott and Rogers, 2014; Costa and Kahn, 2013, Ayres, Raseman and Shih, 2013). 
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To provide answers to these questions, I conduct a natural field experiment (Harrison 
and List, 2004) with around 15,000 customers in cooperation with the Namibian water utility 
(NamWater). In addition, I present evidence from a pre-intervention survey (N=285) 
measuring socio-demographics, knowledge and attitudes towards water usage to discuss the 
intervention and its results. 
Namibia is a typical country facing recurrent water scarcity, because of low, seasonal 
and unpredictable rainfall (Lu et al., 2016). At the time of the intervention (August 2017), 
several regions were facing water scarcity due to limited rainfall in past years, which called 
for a swift intervention. The intervention is implemented only once via text message on 
customers’ mobile phones and behavior observed over 6 months until the start of the rain 
season (as pre-registered). The treatment messages vary the degree of the specificity of saving 
tips. In the specific treatment, customers receive three specific saving tips (e.g. re-use water 
from cooking to water plants). In the semi-specific treatment, customers receive three 
suggestions in a specific domain (e.g. reuse water from the kitchen), but need to concretize the 
water saving activities otherwise. The unspecific treatment does not provide a specific domain, 
but instead encourages customers to find three ways to save water by staying alert, observing 
where too much water is used and by breaking current habits to save water “their own way”. 
It therefore intends to involve customers in the idea-generating process.  
This study provides several policy-relevant insights: First, the specific treatment is 
most effective and decreases water usage by 5.8 percent. The point estimate of the semi-
specific suggests a reduction of 3.1 percent, yet it is statistically insignificantly different from 
zero. The unspecific treatment is ineffective (0.3 percent), which means that merely creating 
awareness and calling to take action is insufficient to achieve a reduction in water usage. The 
provision of specific tips is the pivotal factor of the campaign. 
Second, the treatment effects are entirely driven by customers with above median 
usage (high users). Non-pecuniary strategies are therefore a complementary strategy to 
pecuniary strategies, as high users are often least price sensitive (Mansur and Olmstead, 2012). 
Survey evidence suggests that high users may have more “slack” to improve on than low users, 
rather than being different with respect to socio-demographics or conservational attitudes and 
knowledge. 
Third, despite the large reduction in monthly billable amounts (through decreased 
consumption) the intervention does not significantly affect customers’ payments for water. 
This finding can be explained by the fact that the majority of customers pays less than what 
they are being billed anyway. Instead, customers rather make bulk payments about four times 
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a year and these payments are uncorrelated with the actually billed amount. If anything, the 
semi-specific and unspecific treatment improve the likelihood of making payments.  
Fourth, the intervention is extremely simple and can easily be scaled up. That means 
that even policy makers with limited time or limited resources can employ this intervention 
because of its simplicity (plain text) and low implementation costs of 0.04 USD per customer. 
Despite its simplicity, the treatment effect of the specific treatment corresponds to the largest 
ones found in mass communication literature. The campaign saved about 25.6 million liters17 
within 6 months. Had every customer in the experimental sample received the specific 
treatment, water savings would have accumulated to around 50 million liters. 
  
                                                     
17 25.6 million liters corresponds to about 6.76 million gallons. 
  
 
THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF SPECIFIC TIPS TO ENCOURAGE WATER CONSERVATION 
43 
 
3.2 Experimental Sample and Data 
 
The experimental sample contains all of NamWater’s residential customers in Northern 
Namibia whose accounts provided a phone number at the time of the intervention, which 
corresponds to 71.2% of the total number of customers in that region. The sample is split into 
four approximately equally sized groups and balanced via min-max t-stat method stratified by 
location (with 1,000 redraws) to balance on water consumption, debt and payment behavior. 
The invoice and payment data is heavily right skewed with some extreme outliers and erratic 
data. I use Grubb’s outlier test (Grubbs, 1969) to exclude 288 households with a 99.9% 
confidence level that have unusually and extreme water usages of more than 200,000 liters in 
a single month. This amount approximately corresponds to the volume of a large public 
swimming pool and is potentially due to extreme leakages, faulty accounting data or 
commercial usage.18 A robustness check in the appendix provides several alternative exclusion 
rules (Table A1 and A2) which do not change the results.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the experimental sample of 14,943 customers and 
balance checks between the treatments and the untreated group. I provide estimates on water 
consumption for the untransformed value and for the inverse hyperbolic sine of water 
consumption since unlike the log transformation, the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) is defined 
for zero values (Burbidge, Magee and Robb, 1988; MacKinnon and Magee, 1990).19 The 
inverse hyperbolic sine can be interpreted in the same way as the traditional log transformation. 
McKenzie (2017), for example, uses the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation for profit data 
of entrepreneurs in Nigeria.  
The sample is well balanced. The only marginally significant difference is between control 
and unspecific treatment group for the age of the account. Such differences are controlled for 
in a diff-in-diff regression with individual and month fixed effects. The messages were sent 
out on two consecutive days in August 2017 in English and the local language Oshiwambo. 
Back and forth translations ensured that the content was identical in both languages. Around 
1% of customers become inactive after the intervention, with no statistically significant 
differences between treatments. 
 
                                                     
18 The control group contains more of such cases (30.2%) than any of the other treatments, which would be 
inconsistent with a selection bias in favor of the treatments. 
19 The inverse hyperbolic sine is defined as ln (y+(y2+1)0.5). 
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Table 1. Baseline Summary Statistics and Test of Balance 
 Mean SD P25 Median P75 
Mean 
diff. to 
Control 
P-value 
Untreated Control (N=3,701)        
Water consumption in N$ 125.86 209.89 26.00 65.00 134.55 - - 
IHS water consumption in N$ 4.49 1.88 3.95 4.87 5.60 - - 
Debt in N$ 764.66 3192.38 64.20 246.59 800.45 - - 
Payment amount in N$ 134.80 534.92 0.00 0.00 100.00 - - 
Payment propensity (binary) 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 - - 
Age of account in months 44.97 20.54 29.00 42.00 65.00 - - 
Specific tips (N=3,746)        
Water consumption in N$ 124.87 208.72 26.00 65.00 130.50 -0.99 0.730 
IHS water consumption in N$ 4.49 1.88 3.95 4.87 5.56 -0.01 0.722 
Debt in N$ 811.35 2304.29 64.69 243.00 789.90 46.69 0.433 
Payment amount in N$ 139.60 442.98 0.00 0.00 100.00 4.80 0.723 
Payment propensity (binary) 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.818 
Age of account in months 45.24 20.33 30.00 43.00 64.00 0.27 0.633 
Semi-specific tips (N=3,729)        
Water consumption in N$ 125.71 208.55 26.10 65.00 130.00 -0.15 0.958 
IHS water consumption in N$ 4.51 1.85 3.96 4.87 5.56 0.02 0.479 
Debt in N$ 816.37 2164.34 65.00 236.54 767.36 51.72 0.381 
Payment amount in N$ 120.36 422.77 0.00 0.00 100.00 -14.44 0.279 
Payment propensity (binary) 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.613 
Age of account in months 44.99 20.88 28.00 42.00 66.00 0.02 0.979 
Unspecified tips (N=3,767)        
Water consumption in N$ 128.44 218.35 26.10 65.00 132.50 2.58 0.380 
IHS water consumption in N$ 4.51 1.87 3.96 4.87 5.58 0.020 0.445 
Debt in N$ 786.27 2105.45 64.72 241.69 777.62 21.62 0.710 
Payment amount in N$ 119.55 525.23 0.00 0.00 100.00 -15.25 0.295 
Payment propensity (binary) 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.607 
Age of account in months 45.93 20.40 30.00 43.00 66.00 0.96 0.088 
Notes: The table reports pre-intervention summary statistics of the for the ITT sample. The table provides mean, 
standard error, 25th percentile, median and 75th percentile. Average price at the time of the intervention is 13.15 
N$ (ca. 1 USD) for 1000 liters. The last two columns test for pre-treatment differences in means before the 
intervention using a pooled OLS regression with treatment dummies and standard errors clustered at the customer 
level. I report the regression coefficients and p-values of the treatments in comparison to the basic treatment.  
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3.3 Treatments  
 
Customers randomly either receive specific, semi-specific or unspecific water saving tips 
on their cell phone. All messages are personalized, inform about the current water scarcity and 
the necessity to use less water. Table 2 shows the exact content of the three types of messages. 
 
Table 2. Content of Treatment Messages 
Specific Dear [Name], 
Our nation is low on water supply. You need to start acting today.  
Please use less water.  
Please consider the following tips:  
Shorten the time you spend in the shower by a minute or two.  
Re-use water from cooking and cleaning food to water plants.  
Use a broom instead of water to clean floors in and around your house.  
 
Semi-Specific Dear [Name], 
Our nation is low on water supply. You need to start acting today.  
Please use less water.  
Please consider the following ideas:  
When can you keep the water tap closed and avoid running water (for example 
in the bathroom)?  
How can you re-use water in your household (for example from the kitchen)?  
How can you avoid unnecessary water usage (for example outside the house)? 
 
Unspecific Dear [Name], 
Our nation is low on water supply. You need to start acting today.  
Please use less water.  
Please take a couple of minutes to find three ways to use less water in your 
household.  
Be alert and observe where you use too much water.  
What can you personally change to use less water and to break your habits?  
Save water and do it your own way! 
 
 
The specific treatment contains three concretized ways to save water. The saving tips are 
selected systematically by targeting the three most commonly self-reported main usages of 
water from a pre-intervention survey: Cleaning, bathing and cooking (see Table 6 for survey 
data) and thereby targets behavior that is most salient to the customer. Further, the intervention 
focuses on tips that are mentioned by few (around 5.9%) of customers in the pre-intervention 
surveys (see Table 5 for details) to reduce the risk that customers receive tips that they are 
already aware of.  
The semi-specific treatment partially involves customers in the idea-generating process. 
The treatment provides the same specific domain as the specific treatment, but the actual 
activity to reduce water needs to be concretized by the customer.  
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The unspecific treatment intends to involve customers in the idea-generating process. The 
treatment encourages customers to find three ways to save water in the household without 
providing a specific domain. The message gives general instructions on how to do so: Staying 
alert, observing where too much water is used, reconsidering existing habits and saving water 
“your own way!” 
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3.4 Hypotheses 
 
There are two pre-registered and contradicting hypotheses with respect to the effectiveness of 
the treatments. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Specificity of tips increases the effectiveness of the intervention.  
Steg (2016) argues that complexity and limited cognitive resources reduce the ability and 
motivation to act on pro-environmental behavior. Specific water saving tips help to overcome 
this barrier by providing straightforward suggestions. Further, specific tips may make the 
desired behavior appear easier and therefore more likely to be acted upon (Ajzen, 1991). 
Literature on implementation intentions suggests that specifying an implementation plan 
increases the likelihood of acting as it develops strategies to overcome logistical obstacles 
(Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006). Further, reducing complexity are among the most effective 
“nudges” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). This strand of literature therefore suggests that 
specificity reduces the cognitive effort to find and act upon effective ways to save water. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Specificity of tips decreases the effectiveness of the intervention.  
Customers have better knowledge of their household characteristics and current water saving 
activities. Too specific tips might propose inapplicable actions (e.g. “don’t wash your car with 
a water hose” when one does not own a car) or behaviors that are already acted upon. 
Moreover, a strand of literature argues that individuals overvalue their own input to ideas and 
products. Hooshangi and Loewenstein (2016) find that individuals are overconfident about the 
value of, and overly likely to invest in their own entrepreneurial idea. On the other hand, when 
investing in another person’s idea, they are underconfident about the value of, and 
insufficiently likely to invest in it. Along these lines, the “IKEA-effect” (Norton, Mochon and 
Ariely, 2012) describes the phenomenon that individuals have a higher valuation of self-made 
products. Franke et al., (2010) show that involving customers in the specification and design 
process of products increases their willingness-to-pay for these products. Further, involvement 
of individuals in pro-environmental campaigns improves the acceptability of pro-
environmental strategies (Steg, 2016). Attempts to restrict specific behaviors could also lead 
to (psychological) reactance (Brehm, 1966; Kronrod, Grinstein and Wathieu, 2012).  
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3.5 Estimation Strategy and Results 
 
3.5.1 Water Consumption 
 
Table 3 provides difference-in-difference regressions with month and customer fixed effects 
and clustered standard errors on the customer level (Betrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004). 
I use the following difference-in-difference estimator: 
 
𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 +  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 +  𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 
 
The post dummy variable indicates the six experimental months from August 2017 until 
January 2018, the pre-registered end date.20 Regression 1 and 2 in Table 3 show the intention-
to-treat effects (ITT) on water usage among the full sample. Regression 3 and 4 show the ITT 
effects among the below median water consumers (low-users). Regression 5 and 6 show the 
ITT effects among the above median consumers (high users). Note, that the treatment-on-the-
treated (ToT) effects are larger, as not all text messages were successfully delivered. An upper 
bound for the compliance rate is 91% as the remaining text messages were sent to inactive 
numbers. Other reasons why customers may have remained untreated are for example network 
errors or full memory on a customer’s phone. Thus, a lower bound for the ToT effects can be 
estimated by dividing the ITT effects reported below by the compliance rate.  
 
Result 1: The specific treatment decreases water consumption by 5.8 percent. Unspecific tips 
are ineffective. 
 
The specific treatment reduces water consumption by about 5.8 percent (p=0.045) per 
customer per month in comparison to the untreated group. The effect on the untransformed 
water usage is 7.86 N$ (p=0.029) which translates into a reduction of about 600 liters per 
month per customer. This amount corresponds for example to a reduction of showering time 
by a minute per day. The point estimate of the semi-specific suggests a reduction of 3.1 percent, 
                                                     
20 The pre-registered end date is the 31.12.2017, which falls into the NamWaters billing period of January (The 
accounting month of December ends in mid-December due to holidays). The end date was chosen since the first 
substantial rainfalls arrive around January and thereby alleviate the water scarcity. In 2018, the heavy rain started 
in mid-January. In appendix table A3, I provide the same regressions using the end of the rain season (March 2018) 
as the end date (which is when available water resources reach their peak). The results do not change. 
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yet is statistically insignificantly different from zero (p=0.269). The unspecific treatment has 
a point estimate of 0.3 percent (p=0.931) and is therefore ineffective.21 
Result 2: The treatment effect is driven by high-users. 
 
Regressions 3 and 4 show that for low users all coefficients are statistically insignificantly 
different from zero. Regressions 5 and 6 show large effects for high users in the specific 
treatment. The specific treatment reduces water consumption by 12.7 percent (p=0.004). The 
semi-specific treatment reduces water consumption among the high users by 6.9 percent 
(p=0.107). The point estimate of the unspecific treatment suggests a reduction of 2.1 percent, 
yet is statistically insignificantly different from zero. 
 
 
3.5.2 Payment Behavior  
 
Table 4 shows the treatment effects on payment behavior. Regression 7 shows the 
marginal effects at means on the extensive margin (probability of making a payment) of a 
probit regression. Regression 8 shows the effects on the intensive margin using OLS (the effect 
on the natural logarithm of the payment amount conditional on being larger than zero). 
                                                     
21 The specific treatment is also significantly more effective than the unspecific treatment (table A4 in appendix). 
Table 3. ITT Effects on Water Usage 
 Full Sample  Low Users  High Users 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 IHS Water 
usage in N$ 
Water 
usage in N$ 
 IHS Water 
usage in N$ 
Water 
usage in N$ 
 IHS Water 
usage in N$ 
Water 
usage in N$ 
Specific -0.058** -7.862**  0.032 -2.643  -0.127*** -11.253* 
 (0.029) (3.607)  (0.035) (2.180)  (0.044) (6.773) 
Semi-Specific -0.031 -3.483  0.006 -0.723  -0.069 -6.170 
 (0.028) (3.526)  (0.036) (2.307)  (0.043) (6.661) 
Unspecific 0.003 -3.668  0.030 -1.431  -0.021 -5.527 
 (0.029) (3.625)  (0.036) (2.289)  (0.044) (6.867) 
         
Constant 4.139*** 115.490***  3.419*** 32.956***  4.867*** 198.769*** 
 (0.016) (1.786)  (0.020) (0.612)  (0.024) (3.545) 
         
Observations 146,878 146,878  73,647 73,647  73,231 73,231 
R-squared 0.045 0.030  0.083 0.097  0.032 0.030 
N 14,943 14,943  7,470 7,470  7,473 7,473 
Notes: Regressions show the ITT estimates from a diff-in-diff regression including time and individual fixed effects 
on water consumption. The outcome variables in regression 1, 3 and 5 are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic 
sine (IHS) which can be interpreted as the log transformation. Regressions 2, 4 and 6 show the effects on the 
untransformed value. The average price of water is 13.5 N$ for 1000 liters. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered on the customer level. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Regression 9 estimates the combined effects of regression 7 and 8 using a two-part model 
which multiplies the estimated effects from regression 7 and 8 (Belotti et al., 2015). Fitted 
values from the log transformation of the two-part model are obtained using Duan’s (1983) 
smearing retransformation and standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping. I control for the 
pre-treatment values of strata used for randomization in the regression as recommended by 
Bruhn and McKenzie (2009). All standard errors are clustered at the customer level. 
Regression 10-12 show the estimates for low users and regressions 13-15 show estimates for 
high users.  
 
Result 3:  The campaign does not harm payment behavior. 
 
Regression 7 shows that the semi-specific treatment increases the likelihood of making a 
payment by 1 percentage point (p=0.043). The unspecific treatment increased the probability 
of making a payment by 1.2 percentage points (p=0.018). On the intensive margin (conditional 
on paying), the treatments have negative point estimates (marginally significant for the semi-
specific treatment). None of these effects however accumulates to an economically meaningful 
increase or decrease in payment behavior: The estimates for the combined effect (regression 
3) range from to -0.41 N$ to 2.87 N$22 and are statistically insignificant from zero. 
Interestingly, among low users, the intensive margin is significantly smaller (5.5 to 5.7 
percent) although the billable amount among this group is unchanged. The unspecific 
treatment shows a positive treatment effect among the high users of 10.73 N$ (p=0.027). I find 
no effects on extensive or intensive margin of paying for the high users in the specific 
treatment, whose monthly billable amount was reduced by about 12.7 percent.  
 
                                                     
22 At the time of the intervention, 1 USD was worth about 13 N$.  
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Table 4. Effects on Payment Behavior 
 
Full Sample  Low Users  High users 
 (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15) 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log Payment 
amount in 
N$ (if >0) 
Combined 
Effect 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log Payment 
amount in 
N$ (if >0) 
Combined 
Effect 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log Payment 
amount in 
N$ (if >0) 
Combined 
Effect 
            
Specific 0.005 -0.011 0.447  0.002 -0.031 -1.562  0.008 0.000 4.219 
 (0.005) (0.018) (2.487)  (0.006) (0.023) (1.667)  (0.007) (0.025) (4.965) 
Semi-Specific 0.010** -0.035* -0.409  0.009 -0.057** -1.499  0.010 -0.021 1.785 
 (0.005) (0.018) (2.449)  (0.006) (0.023) (1.777)  (0.007) (0.025) (5.007) 
Unspecific 0.012** -0.015 2.871  0.012* -0.055** -0.759  0.011 0.024 10.733** 
 (0.005) (0.018) (2.452)  (0.006) (0.023) (1.728)  (0.007) (0.025) (4.847) 
            
Observations 89,228 30,089 89,228  45,333 13,598 45,333  43,895 16,491 43,895 
R-squared 0.0989 0.369 -  0.0881 0.316 -  0.1015 0.308 - 
Notes: This table reports ITT effects on payment behavior (regressions 7-9) for the six months post intervention for the full sample. Regression 7 shows the effect of the 
treatments on the likelihood of making a payment (marginal effects at means). Regression 8 reports the ITT effect on the intensive margin.  Regression 9 multiplies the effects 
of regressions 7 and 8 to get an estimate of the combined effect using a two-part model (Belotti et al. 2015).  Regressions 10-12 provide equivalent estimations for low users and 
regressions 14-15 for high users. Fitted values from the log transformation of the two-part model are obtained using Duan’s (1983) smearing retransformation and standard 
errors are obtained by bootstrapping. Regression control for strata used for randomization as recommended by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009). Control variables are top coded at 
the 99th percentile. Four customers attrite in August. All reported standard errors are clustered at the customer level to account for serial correlation.* p<0.1; ** p<0.05 
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3.6 Discussion of Results 
 
Result 1 shows that the specific treatment is most effective. As discussed in the hypotheses 
section, the main reason why specific tips might be more effective is that they reduce cognitive 
effort, which is one of the key barriers to act pro-environmentally when cognitive resources 
are limited (Steg, 2016). The specific treatment provides three concrete tips in plain language 
that are tailored to the specific context and thereby reduce the cognitive effort costs of finding 
effective ways to save water. 
Finding effective ways to save water is not easy for customers in the sample. Table 5 
shows the categorized answers from the pre-intervention survey on whether a customer plans 
to reduce water and if so, to name concrete steps.  
 
 
The first row shows the percentage of interviewees planning to reduce water 
consumption for all and for low and high users. Row i) indicates the fraction of customers 
proposing a way to save water conditional on planning to reduce water consumption and row 
ii) displays the remaining fraction of interviewees that is unable to propose a way to save 
Table 5. Plans to reduce water and concrete ideas from pre-intervention survey 
 All 
Low 
Users 
High 
Users 
P-value 
Plans to reduce consumption in the future  0.703 0.732 0.682 0.371 
 (0.458) (0.444) (0.467)  
  i) Has suggestion on how to reduce water use  0.709 0.671 0.738 0.311 
 (0.455) (0.473) (0.442)  
      a) Store water in containers and lock tapa  0.314 0.305 0.321 0.782 
 (0.465) (0.463) (0.469)  
      b) Tell others to save waterb 0.165 0.134 0.189 0.742 
 (0.372) (0.343) (0.393)  
      c) Use alternative water sources 0.106 0.134 0.085 0.169 
 (0.309) (0.343) (0.280)  
      d) Tip included in specific treatment 0.059 0.049 0.066 0.473 
 (0.235) (0.217) (0.250)  
      e) Other ideas 0.170 0.122 0.208 0.197 
 (0.377) (0.329) (0.407)  
ii)  Doesn’t know how to reduce water use 0.291 0.329 0.262 0.311 
 (0.455) (0.473) (0.442)  
      f)  “Don’t know” 0.296 0.333 0.259 0.551 
 (0.461) (0.480) (0.447)  
      g) Vague answer (e.g. “use water wisely”) 0.704 0.667 0.741 0.551 
 (0.461) (0.480) (0.447)  
Notes: This table shows means and standard errors in parentheses. Multiple answers are possible for a) - e). 
a This water saving strategy is meant to avoid running water by storing water in containers, which allows them 
to visibly monitor their consumption. b  Others refers to people in the household, kids or neighbors . The last 
column shows the p-value of a two-sided Chi-square test testing for a difference between low and high users. 
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water. Rows a) - e) show the fractions of answer types conditional on planning to reduce water 
consumption. Rows f) and g) display fractions of answer types among those that are unable to 
propose a way. The last column provides p-values of testing for differences between high and 
low users. 
Intentions to reduce water consumptions are high since around 70.3% plan to reduce 
water consumption. Yet, around 29.6% of users are unable to mention any concrete steps to 
save water or make vague statements like “use water wisely”. While the other interviewees 
make suggestions, it is unclear to which degree these steps are effective to reduce water 
consumption. The fact that the unspecific treatment is completely ineffective, casts doubt on 
their effectiveness. Table 5 also shows that the tips used in the specific treatment are not 
commonly mentioned, as only 5.9% of interviewees propose ways that are similar to those in 
the treatment. Overall, I do not find any statistically significant differences between low and 
high users for the measured variables. 
If customers indeed find it difficult to come up with effective ways to save water, the 
fact that the unspecific and semi-specific treatment show an increase in the likelihood of 
making payments could be interpreted as a response to their struggle. Customers in the semi-
specific and unspecific treatment may then make these additional payments to fight water 
scarcity in their “own way”, while customers in the specific treatment might feel that they 
already do their part by using less water. Such behaviors in which individuals try to 
compensate their past shortcomings for example by acting more prosocially are known as 
moral cleansing (e.g., Jordan, Mullen and Murnighan, 2011). 
Result 2 shows that the treatment effect is driven by high users. Such heterogeneous 
effect have also been documented for social norm interventions and real-time smart-meter 
feedback.23 Tiefenbeck et al. (2018) interpret this as higher levels of “slack” among high users, 
meaning that high user might just be more wasteful with water and therefore might have more 
room to improve on. However, it could also be that high users are structurally different with 
respect to their demographics or attitudes toward water conservation. To provide suggestive 
answers on this question, Table 6 provides demographics for low and high users from the pre-
intervention survey. The first five rows show the fractions of mentioned main purposes of 
water usage. The table also displays whether interviewees have a job, their gender, household 
earnings, people living in the household and availability of alternative water sources (besides 
piped water from NamWater). Lastly, the table reports whether the customer owns plants for 
gardening or animals. The table also reports, conditional on owning animals, the absolute 
                                                     
23 Heterogeneous effects in social norm interventions have been found by Allcott (2011), Ayres, Raseman and Shih 
(2013), Ferraro and Price, (2011) and Brent, Cook, and Olsen (2015).  
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number and the types of animals. The last column provides p-values of a two-sided Chi-square 
test testing for a difference between low and high users  
 
For none of the presented covariates, I find statistically significant differences between 
high and low users. While this does not mean that there are no differences, it suggests that the 
presented covariates cannot explain much of the difference in consumption. I interpret this as 
evidence in favor of the “slack” interpretation. 
Table 6. Structural differences between high and low users 
 All Low 
Users 
High 
Users 
P-Value 
Main purpose of water usage 
 
    
     Cleaning 0.712 0.694 0.726 0.563 
 (0.453) (0.463) (0.448)  
     Bathing 0.488 0.504 0.476 0.634 
 (0.501) (0.502) (0.501)  
     Cooking 0.393 0.413 0.378 0.548 
 (0.489) (0.494) (0.486)  
     Gardening 0.249 0.231 0.262 0.552 
 (0.433) (0.423) (0.441)  
     Animals 0.253 0.215 0.280 0.208 
 (0.435) (0.412) (0.451)  
     
Has a job 0.484 0.438 0.518 0.180 
 (0.501) (0.498) (0.501)  
Female 0.505 0.561 0.466 0.118 
 (0.501) (0.498) (0.500)  
Household earnings in N$ 4312.6 3412 4965.20 b 0.328 
 (6465.6) (4893.10) (7348.10)  
People living in household 7.449 7.009 7.761 0.191 
 (4.346) (3.974) (4.579)  
Has alternative water sources 0.376 0.383 0.371 0.846 
  (0.485) (0.488) (0.485)  
     
Owns plants 0.263 0.248 0.274 0.616 
 (0.441) (0.434) (0.448)  
Owns animals 0.211 0.190 0.226 0.467 
 (0.408) (0.394) (0.419)  
     Number total animals 7.968 4.711 10.37 0.659 
 (52.58) (17.55) (67.65)  
    Number of goats 5.895 3.215 7.872 a 0.675 
 (48.39) (11.88) (62.99)  
    Number of cattle 1.811 1.248 2.226 0.629 
 (8.098) (6.281) (9.209)  
    Number of donkeys 0.263 0.248 0.274 0.985 
 (1.252) (1.135) (1.335)  
N 285 121 164  
Notes: The table shows means and standard errors in parentheses. Multiple answers are possible for main 
usage. a Includes a customer with 800 goats (mean when dropping this customer is 5.662). b Includes a 
customer who reported a household income of 280 000 N$ (mean when dropping this customer is 4665.46 
N$). Binary variables are tested using a two-sided Chi-square test. Other variables are tested using a two-
sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
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Result 3 shows that the text message campaign does not negatively affect payment 
behavior, although on average the billable amounts is substantially reduced. An explanation 
for this is that the majority of customers pays less than what they are being billed anyway (the 
median fraction of the bill paid is 69%). Payments correlate surprisingly little with the 
monthly-billed amounts. Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of payments and invoices for the whole 
dataset. Dots on the 45-degree line would mark customers that exactly pay their current bill. 
However, only 1.4% of the values lie on that line. Instead, many customers make bulk 
payments in multiples of 100 on average about four times a year. It therefore seems that the 
actually billed amount is rather irrelevant to the payment behavior of the customers. 
 
 
Figure 2: Payments correlate little with invoices. 
 
Also note that a mechanical reduction in payments through lower billable amounts is 
inconsistent with the finding that the reduction on the intensive margin of payments in Table 
4 are smallest in the specific treatment whose billable amount was reduced the largest. The 
results do also not change when extending the time horizon until June 2018 (Table A5). Since 
payment behavior is largely constant, the reduction in water usage in the specific treatment 
translates into an increase of the fraction of the bill paid of 8.3% (p=0.031; Table A6).24 If the 
marginal cost of water is larger than zero, this means that the intervention might even improve 
profits of the utility. 
  
                                                     
24 The fraction of the bill paid is also called the collection efficiency and is calculated as the sum of payments 
divided by sum of invoices for a given time period. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
 
The specific treatment yields treatment effects that are among the largest treatment effects 
found in the mass communication literature and shows that specific advice on how to conserve 
water is a crucial factor for the effectiveness of the intervention. Since customers in the 
unspecific treatment show no reduction in water usage, the experiment shows that merely 
creating awareness is insufficient to reduce water consumption. This suggests that customers’ 
lack of knowledge on how to save water effectively is a severe bottleneck hindering 
conservational behavior, which can be overcome by a simple intervention. 
This study also proposes a systematic way to select specific saving tips to fit the local 
context (Duflo, 2017): The specific treatment targets the average consumers’ most salient 
domains of water use and provides tips that the average customer is unaware of. The specific 
treatment thereby reduces the effort cost of finding effective ways to save water, which seems 
to be the main driver of the results. The difficulty to find effective ways to save water might 
be a particularly limiting factor among the poor whose cognitive capacity has been shown to 
be impeded by having less resources per se (Shah, Mullainathan and Shafir, 2012). 
There are implications for policy makers beyond the insight that saving tips should be 
as specific as possible: The treatment effects are driven by customers with above median 
usage, which are typically least price-sensitive and therefore the study emphasizes the 
complementarity of non-pecuniary to pecuniary strategies as found in previous studies (e.g., 
Ferraro and Price, 2011). Targeting such customers would make non-pecuniary strategies even 
more cost-effective. In addition, the intervention does not negatively influence overall 
payment behavior, which can be explained by the fact that many customers pay less than what 
they are billed for anyway and that the correlation of payments with the amount billed is low. 
This finding alleviates potential conflicts of interest between cost-recovery and curbing water 
demand. If the marginal cost of providing water is larger than zero, than the intervention might 
even have increased profits. Whether and to which degree these results translate to settings in 
which payment morale is substantially higher, however, remains unclear.  
This experiment also contributes to the literature beyond the mass communication 
campaigns. In the real-time smart-metering literature, Tiefenbeck et al. (2018) suggest that 
mixed results with respect to their effectiveness (see e.g., Buchanan, Russo and Anderson, 
2015) could stem from the fact that providing feedback is ineffective, if the adequate behavior 
to reduce consumption is not sufficiently specified. This paper provides valuable apples-to-
apples evidence in support of this claim.  
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Given that billions of people face water scarcity each year across the globe, the 
simplicity of the intervention is the key feature for policy makers that are often time and budget 
constrained. The text message campaign does not require any computational programming to 
provide individualized information as for example necessary in social norm interventions. 
Instead, it only costs around 0.04 USD per customer to implement and in return reduces water 
consumption on average by 5.8%, which corresponds to about 25.6 million liters saved within 
6 months.  
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3.8 Appendix to Chapter 3 
 
 
Table A1. ITT Effects with Different Cut-offs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Water Usage 
(in N$) 
Cut-off at  
1000 N$ 
Water Usage 
(in N$) 
Cut-off at  
1500 N$ 
Water Usage 
(in N$) 
Cut-off at  
2000 N$ 
Water Usage 
(in N$) 
Cut-off at  
2500 N$ 
     
     
Specific -6.173*** -6.723** -7.475** -7.549** 
 (2.005) (2.694) (3.121) (3.410) 
Semi-specific -4.111** -4.599* -5.319* -3.980 
 (2.037) (2.707) (3.162) (3.420) 
Unspecific -2.071 -1.489 -2.173 -1.982 
 (1.992) (2.667) (3.054) (3.342) 
     
Constant 80.256*** 96.354*** 105.817*** 112.326*** 
 (0.956) (1.313) (1.521) (1.700) 
     
Observations 131,900 140,904 144,457 146,159 
R-squared 0.075 0.045 0.037 0.033 
Number of 
customer 
13,379 14,337 14,697 14,869 
Notes: Regressions show the ITT estimates from a diff-in-diff regression including time and 
individual fixed effects on water consumption. Regression 1, 2, 3 and 4 exclude customers whose 
highest invoice exceeded 1000N$, 1500N$, 2000N$ and 2500N$ respectively. The average price 
of water is 13.5 N$ for 1000 liters. All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the customer 
level.  
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Table A2. ITT Effects Trimming Top 1% of Values 
 Full Sample  Low Users  High Users 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 IHS Water usage in 
N$ 
Water usage in 
N$ 
 IHS Water usage in 
N$ 
Water usage in 
N$ 
 IHS Water usage in 
N$ 
Water usage in N$ 
         
Specific -0.052* -7.170***  0.034 -1.881  -0.124*** -11.598** 
 (0.029) (2.694)  (0.035) (1.843)  (0.043) (5.053) 
Semi-Specific -0.040 -5.797**  0.007 -0.094  -0.083* -11.401** 
 (0.028) (2.749)  (0.036) (1.955)  (0.043) (5.167) 
Unspecific 0.001 -4.618*  0.027 -1.578  -0.022 -7.519 
 (0.028) (2.687)  (0.035) (1.887)  (0.044) (5.074) 
         
Constant 4.101*** 101.312***  3.429*** 33.153***  4.793*** 171.140*** 
 (0.016) (1.282)  (0.020) (0.551)  (0.024) (2.561) 
         
Observations 148,130 148,130  74,803 74,803  73,327 73,327 
R-squared 0.045 0.043  0.082 0.129  0.031 0.038 
N 15,228 15,228  7,596 7,596  7,632 7,632 
Notes: Regressions show the ITT estimates from a diff-in-diff regression including time and individual fixed effects on water consumption. Regressions in this table trim the top 1% 
of values in the data. The outcome variables in regression 1, 3 and 5 are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) which can be interpreted as the log transformation. 
Regressions 2, 4 and 6 show the effects on the untransformed value. The average price of water is 13.5 N$ for 1000 liters. All standard errors are clustered on the customer level. 
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Table A3. ITT Effects until End of Rain Season (March) 
 Full Sample  Low Users  High Users 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 IHS Water usage 
in N$ 
Water usage 
in N$ 
 IHS Water usage 
in N$ 
Water usage 
in N$ 
 IHS Water usage 
in N$ 
Water usage 
in N$ 
         
Specific -0.061** -7.558**  0.010 -2.728  -0.114*** -10.520 
 (0.028) (3.484)  (0.034) (2.006)  (0.043) (6.638) 
Semi-Specific -0.029 -3.151  0.007 -1.194  -0.061 -4.632 
 (0.028) (3.406)  (0.035) (2.097)  (0.042) (6.522) 
Unspecific 0.018 -2.900  0.040 -0.533  0.002 -4.739 
 (0.028) (3.499)  (0.034) (2.107)  (0.043) (6.716) 
         
Constant 4.133*** 114.943***  3.426*** 33.167***  4.870*** 199.942*** 
 (0.016) (1.814)  (0.020) (0.625)  (0.025) (3.646) 
         
Observations 176,500 176,500  89,763 89,763  86,737 86,737 
R-squared 0.058 0.028  0.077 0.076  0.061 0.033 
N 14,943 14,943  7,577 7,577  7,366 7,366 
Notes: Regressions show the ITT estimates from a diff-in-diff regression including time and individual fixed effects on water consumption. The 
outcome variables in regression 1, 3 and 5 are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) which can be interpreted as the log 
transformation. Regressions 2, 4 and 6 show the effects on the untransformed value. The average price of water is 13.5 N$ for 1000 liters. All 
standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the customer level. ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A4. ITT Effects in Comparison To Unspecific Treatment 
 Full Sample  Low Users  High Users 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 IHS Water usage in 
N$ 
Water usage in 
N$ 
 IHS Water usage in 
N$ 
Water usage in 
N$ 
 IHS Water usage in 
N$ 
Water usage in 
N$ 
         
Semi-Specific -0.034 0.185  -0.024 0.707  -0.047 -0.645 
 (0.029) (3.588)  (0.036) (2.297)  (0.043) (6.765) 
Specific -0.061** -4.194  0.002 -1.213  -0.106** -5.727 
 (0.029) (3.668)  (0.036) (2.169)  (0.044) (6.875) 
         
Constant 4.146*** 116.251***  3.414*** 32.776***  4.880*** 199.860*** 
 (0.018) (2.051)  (0.023) (0.695)  (0.028) (4.062) 
         
Observations 110,523 110,523  55,198 55,198  55,325 55,325 
R-squared 0.045 0.029  0.084 0.098  0.033 0.029 
N 11,242 11,242  5,596 5,596  5,646 5,646 
Notes: Regressions show the ITT estimates from a diff-in-diff regression including time and individual fixed effects on water consumption. The outcome variables 
in regression 1, 3 and 5 are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) which can be interpreted as the log transformation. Regressions 2, 4 and 6 show 
the effects on the untransformed value. The average price of water is 13.5 N$ for 1000 liters. All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the customer 
level.** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A5. Effects on Payment Behavior until June 2018 
 
Full Sample  Low Users  High Users 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log 
Payment 
amount in 
N$ (if >0) 
Combined 
Effect 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log 
Payment 
amount in 
N$ (if >0) 
Combined 
Effect 
 Payment 
propensity 
(binary) 
Log 
Payment 
amount in 
N$ (if >0) 
Combined 
Effect 
            
Specific 0.005 -0.019 -0.301  0.005 -0.038* -1.255  0.005 -0.014 0.343 
 (0.004) (0.017) (1.662)  (0.005) (0.022) (1.295)  (0.006) (0.024) (3.148) 
Semi-Specific 0.010** -0.026 0.896  0.011** -0.046** -0.150  0.009 -0.019 1.252 
 (0.004) (0.017) (1.670)  (0.005) (0.021) (1.303)  (0.006) (0.023) (3.201) 
Unspecific 0.008* -0.003 2.582  0.009* -0.043** -0.570  0.007 0.030 8.269** 
 (0.004) (0.017) (1.624)  (0.005) (0.021) (1.348)  (0.006) (0.023) (3.255) 
            
Observations 176,033 56,557 176,033  89,687 25,848 89,687  86,346 30,709 86,346 
R-squared 0.0969 0.294   0.0878 0.249   0.0995 0.237  
Notes: This table reports ITT effects on payment behavior (regressions 1-3) for the full sample until June 2018. Regression 1 shows the effect of the treatments on the 
likelihood of making a payment (marginal effects at means). Regression 2 reports the ITT effect on the intensive margin.  Regression 3 multiplies the effects of regressions 
1 and 2 to get an estimate of the combined effect using a two-part model (Belotti et al. 2015). Regressions 4-6 provide equivalent estimations for low users and regressions 
7-9 for high users. Fitted values from the log transformation of the two-part model are obtained using Duan’s (1983) smearing retransformation and standard errors are 
obtained by bootstrapping. Regression control for strata used for randomization as recommended by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009). Control variables are top coded at the 
99th percentile. Four customers attrite in August. All reported standard errors are clustered at the customer level to account for serial correlation.* p<0.1; ** p<0.05 
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Table A6. Treatment Effects on the Collection Efficiency until June 2018 
 (1) (2) 
 Collection Efficiency Collection Efficiency 
   
Specific 0.083** 0.083** 
 (0.039) (0.039) 
Semi-Specific 0.026 0.026 
 (0.039) (0.039) 
Unspecific 0.019 0.018 
 (0.039) (0.039) 
   
Pre collection efficiency   0.006 
  (0.006) 
   
Observations 14,808 14,808 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The table shows the ITT effects on the collection efficiency, i.e. the fraction of the 
overall bill paid from the start of the intervention until June 2018. Collection efficiency is 
top coded at the 99.9th percentile to reduce influence of extreme outliers. Regression 1 
shows a simple OLS regression. Regression 2 controls for the pre-intervention mean of the 
collection efficiency. ** p<0.05 
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CHAPTER 4.  
 
 
USING IDENTITY LABELS TO DECREASE NON-PAYMENT FOR 
WATER: EVIDENCE FROM KOSOVO 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Non-payment of public utility bills is a common problem in low and middle-income 
countries and constrains the maintenance and expansion of infrastructure (Szabó and Ujhelyi, 
2015; Jack and Smith, 2015). Sanctioning of non-paying customers, for example trough 
disconnection from the network, is often difficult to enforce due to ethical, legal and technical 
reasons. Why do customers pay at all in such a setting? In this experiment, I study the role of 
identity (one’s sense of self or self-perception) for the payment of public utility bills. Identity 
concerns are one of the main drivers of human behavior because individuals strive to act 
consistently with their identities (Festinger, 1957; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2006; 2011). Individuals maintain multiple identities and each identity carries distinct 
prescriptive norms, informing which behavior is appropriate in a given situation (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2000). This suggest a straightforward intervention to change undesirable behavior: 
exhort people to take on a new identity (Shah and Ludwig, 2016). In this study, I test whether 
adults’ identity is malleable through written statements about one’s identity (identity labels) and 
whether identity labels can be used to reduce non-payment for water. 
To investigate these questions, I conduct a large-scale field experiment among around 
11,800 customers in cooperation with the Regional Water Company Prishtina (RWCP) in Kosovo 
in order to reduce non-payment for water. Before designing the intervention, we (as a research 
team) conduct pre-intervention surveys to identify the behavioral factors influencing the payment 
decision (Datta and Mullainathan, 2015; Duflo, 2017). The survey provides three key findings 
which motivate the intervention: (i) the current invoice placement does not attract attention, since 
the invoices are typically folded and put in the door crack for lack of owning a mailbox, (ii) people 
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have difficulties understanding the information on the invoice and most importantly, (iii) people 
state that being a “responsible citizen” is important to them. The intervention builds upon these 
findings: To increase attention, we place a sticker along with the invoice at eye-level on a 
customer’s door. To improve understanding of the invoice, we highlight the most important figures 
on the invoice using a text marker. Lastly, and in the focus of this experiment, we print different 
identity labels on the stickers. Identity labels provide individuals with a statement about a desirable 
identity in an attempt to provoke actions that are consistent with that label (Cornelissen, Dewitte, 
Warlop and Yzerbyt, 2007). In total, there are six different sticker treatments and an untreated 
control group. Four stickers include an identity label, while two stickers do not (basic stickers). 
Positively framed basic stickers inform customers that payment ensures 24h water supply, ask 
customers to pay and to use the stickers as a reminder to pay. Negatively framed basic stickers are 
identical to the positive ones, except that they inform customers that payment risks 24h water 
supply. On top of the content of the basic stickers, stickers with positively framed identity labels 
include the persuasion statement “Please be a responsible citizen” and the attribution statement 
“You are a responsible citizen”. Stickers with negatively framed identity labels additionally 
include the persuasion statement “Please don’t be an irresponsible citizen” and the attribution 
statement “You are not an irresponsible citizen” on top of the content of the basic sticker. The 
experiment is implemented over three consecutive months in June to August 2017.  
The experiment disentangles the potential effectiveness of persuasion (“Please be” and 
“Please don’t be”) and attribution (“You are” and “You are not”) labels as well as the role of 
positively and negatively framed identity labels (“responsible citizen” and “irresponsible citizen”). 
The identity labels in this experiment are inspired by a classic psychological study by Miller, 
Brickman and Bolen (1975). They argue that it is easier to influence behavior by telling individuals 
that they already possess a certain identity instead of persuading them to adopt a new identity. In 
their attribution treatment, a teacher repeatedly tells fifth-graders that they already are a “litter-
conscious class”. In their persuasion treatment, a teacher tells the children for example “Don’t be 
a litter-bug”. The attribution treatment leads to less littering behavior than the other treatments 
and therefore becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Such labeling techniques have been suggested 
outside of the classroom for policy making recently (Walton and Wilson, 2018). Identity labels 
are intriguing from a policy perspective, since changing individuals’ identity through more 
elaborate programs like behavioral cognitive therapy might require several weeks of training 
(Blattman, Jamison and Sheridan, 2017).  
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Yet, identity labels are not commonly studied in economics and therefore their influence 
among adults not well understood (Shah and Ludwig, 2016). Whether and which identity labels 
are an effective measure to change behavior among adults is hitherto insufficiently answered. The 
experimental design of Miller, Brickman and Bolen, 1975) has a series of shortcomings, which 
make it difficult to assess the true effectiveness of such techniques. First, it is conducted among 
children. Second, there is a multitude of other treatment specific communication (from the school 
principal and janitor) which might confound the mechanism. Third, the experiment has a very 
small sample size (only one class per treatment), which leads to confounds like teacher specific 
effects and experimental contamination effects. Lastly, they cannot disentangle the effects of 
positive identity label framings (e.g., “litter-conscious class”) and negative identity label framings 
(e.g., “don’t be a litter-bug”).25  
According to deviance regulation theory (Blanton, Stuart and Van den Eijenden, 2001), 
however, the positive or negative framing of identity labels might matter because individuals self-
regulate more on perceived consequences of deviating from behavioral norms than on the basis of 
conforming to behavioral norms. In other words, identity is more defined by one’s distinctness 
rather than by one’s commonalities with others. Therefore, individuals identity is more influenced 
by actions that would make them “stick out from the crowd” (Blanton and Christie, 2003). This 
idea is also formalized by Bénabou and Tirole (2006) who describe that reputational payoffs from 
actions depend on social norms. The reputational rewards or the stigma attached to an action 
depends on how many others engage in that certain behavior. For example, if prosocial behavior 
is believed to be relatively scarce (e.g. becoming an organ donor) the derived utility from being 
the “lone hero” is large. On the contrary, if prosocial behavior is common (e.g., not having a 
criminal record) then the stigma attached to deviating (committing crime) is large. 
Moreover and as pre-registered, I study heterogeneous effects after the intervention ends. 
Post-intervention treatment effects may dramatically influence the overall effectiveness of 
interventions, yet little is known about what influences their persistence (Madrian, 2012; Sunstein, 
2016; Brandon et al., 2017; Thaler, 2018). Frey and Rogers (2014) argue that changes in self-
perception (identity) could be a pivotal mechanism. If self-perception influences behavior and is 
                                                     
25 There are additional other reasons why Miller, Brickman and Bolen (1975) themselves state to be careful about 
considering these results as the basis for a solution to any social problem such as the long-term effects of such 
interventions. 
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malleable, then interventions that change self-perception produce persistent behavioral change as 
long as the change in self-perception is retained. 
Overall, the sticker intervention is highly successful: Sticker types improve the collection 
efficiency (payments divided by billed amount) during the intervention between 9.9 percentage 
points and 26 percentage points. The most effective sticker (“Please don’t be an irresponsible 
citizen”) translates into a 4.5 Euro increase in payments per customer over the three months of the 
intervention in total. This amount corresponds to about 62% of an average monthly bill. 
Negatively framed identity labels are the most effective and on average twice as effective as 
positively framed identity labels. However, I do not find that persuasion or attribution stickers 
yield differential treatment effects. After the intervention ends, I find that customers receiving the 
basic stickers (without identity label) pay significantly less in comparison to customers receiving 
stickers with an identity label.  
To shed light on the behavioral mechanism, I provide evidence from two post-intervention 
surveys. In a telephone survey (N=808), most importantly, we measure self-perceptions of being 
a responsible citizen and the amount of other responsible citizens in the city. Further, we measure 
beliefs on sanctioning and social norms. We also asked which utility bills were paid in the last 
three months to measure unintended spillover effects on other utility bills and demographics such 
as income, education and gender. In a street survey (N=638), we show interviewees randomly one 
of the sticker types and ask whether they have seen the sticker before, what phrases from the 
sticker they remember, reasons for making water payments, their impressions of the sticker and 
their intentions to comply with the requests on the sticker. 
I find direct survey evidence that individuals link payments for water to being a 
responsible citizen. This is not only the most commonly mentioned reason for making payments 
when customers are asked why the stickers would encourage them to pay, but also found in a 
telephone survey: Negatively framed identity labels significantly change customers’ self-
perception with respect to being a responsible citizen in comparison to the untreated group. A 
similar, yet smaller, effect is found for the positively framed identity labels. Such an effect is, 
however, not found for customers receiving the basic sticker. Survey evidence rules out that the 
larger treatment effects of the negatively framed identity labels are driven by a shift in beliefs on 
sanctioning, monitoring, reminders or social norms. Instead, the large effect of the negatively 
framed stickers is consistent with theories suggesting that customers regulate their identity more 
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on what makes them distinct rather than what makes them similar to others (Blanton, Stuart and 
Van den Eijenden, 2001; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006).  
This experiment provides several novel insights: First, I show that customers’ identity 
concerns are a strong motivation to pay utility bills, which explains why customers might pay at 
all in settings where non-payment is difficult to sanction. 
Second, I show that identity among adults is malleable trough identity labels in written 
form. The positive or negative framing of the label is crucial. Self-perception changes particularly 
strongly for negatively framed identity labels. This change in self-perception coincides with the 
largest improvement in payment behavior among all stickers in line with deviance regulation 
theory (Blanton, Stuart and Van den Eijenden, 2001) and shows that identity labels can be an 
effective measure to change behavior. Yet, I do not find that attribution labels are more effective 
than persuasion labels as found by Miller, Brickman and Bolen (1975). Potentially, because their 
study is conducted among children who might be more prone to such identity manipulation 
attempts (Yeager, Dahl and Dweck, 2018). Furthermore, in contrast to their study, the majority of 
stickers in this experiment are placed without personal interaction. 
Third, I find that stickers with identity labels improve payment behavior post-intervention 
in comparison to the basic stickers that do not contain an identity label. This provides apples-to-
apples evidence on how interventions that change self-perception might cause persistent treatment 
effects, which is important to understand for settings in which policy makers are unable to treat 
individuals repeatedly.  
Lastly, this experiment documents that behavioral interventions can be a highly attractive 
policy measure when traditional policy tools, as for example disconnections from the network, are 
difficult to enforce and ethically objectionable. The intervention in this study are tailored to the 
specific context and extremely cost effective. Over the whole year (intervention and post-
intervention) payments increase by up to 7 Euro at the cost of 12 cent per customer. In addition, 
the intervention is perceived positively and is well accepted among the population according to 
survey answers.  
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4.2 Research Setting and Behavioral Diagnosis 
 
Research Setting - The field experiment is conducted in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital and largest city. 
The experimental sample includes eight neighborhoods containing 11,808 customers, which 
corresponds to about 17.5% of the private accounts in the city. The experimental sample is chosen 
in cooperation with RWCP to be representative of the rest of the city. At the time of the 
intervention, about 75% of customers in the sample show debt of more than 8.90 Euro. The median 
customers has accumulated debt beyond 36 Euro, which corresponds on average to about 6.7 
unpaid invoices. Given the average monthly salary is around 400 Euro these amounts are quite 
substantial.  
To illustrate the extent of non-payment, Figure 1 shows a histogram of customers’ 
individual collection efficiency for the pre-intervention year. The collection efficiency is defined 
as the sum of all payments divided by the sum of all invoices for a given time period. About 22.6% 
of customers paid nothing in the pre-intervention year. The rest of the customers show a hump 
shaped distribution peaking at 100% (i.e., paying exactly what is billed). Customers to the left of 
the 100% paid less than what they used in the pre-intervention year and customers to the right of 
100% paid more than what they used (for example to repay outstanding debt or to pay in advance).  
 
 
Figure 1: Histogram of the collection efficiency in the pre-intervention year among the experimental sample. Graph 
excludes 4.6% of customers with a collection efficiency larger than 300%.  
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The median collection efficiency in the experimental sample is 90.8%. The figure 
excludes customers whose collection efficiency exceeds 300% which is the case for 4.6% of 
customers. Note, that the highly right-skewed data causes the mean collection efficiency to be 
relatively high (102.3%). 
 
Behavioral Diagnosis – Effective interventions depend on understanding the local context and 
identifying the relevant behavioral bottlenecks (Datta and Mullainathan, 2015; Duflo, 2017). To 
get a better understanding on customers’ perceptions, a research team of local students conducted 
934 structured pre-intervention surveys among citizens in public spaces throughout the city. The 
interviewers introduced themselves as part of a research team of the University of Cologne and 
interviewees answered anonymously. First, interviewees were asked to rank utility bills for water, 
electricity, internet and waste by their relative importance. This question was asked before 
interviewees knew that the survey elicited perceptions towards water payments to avoid 
interviewer demand effects. To assess potential difficulties in understanding, interviewees were 
then handed an exemplary invoice and asked to identify the total amount due. Finally, the survey 
contained several questions on payments and usage for water and whether being a responsible 
citizen was important to them.  
In addition, the invoice delivery process was identified as an important element 
influencing the customers’ payment decision. To get an in-depth understanding of the bill delivery 
process, we accompanied the RWCP staff (invoicers) over several days and conducted 
unstructured interviews with customers that were met in person. The invoicers read customers’ 
water meters each month and deliver customers’ invoices in person to the customers’ door. Each 
invoicer typically visits around 50-200 customers a day depending of accessibility of a water meter 
in the given area. When at site, the invoicer reads the customers’ water meter and then prints the 
corresponding water bill using a handheld printing device. Since 84% of customers in the sample 
don’t own a mailbox, the bill is typically folded and stuck in the door crack or hung on the door 
handle. Pictures of the bill delivery process can be found in Figure A1 in the appendix. If a 
customer is present during the reading of the water meter, the invoice is handed directly to that 
person (e.g., 14.7% in June). There are three key insights from the pre-intervention surveys: 
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i) Current invoice placement does not create much attention – When the bill is folded 
and then stuck in the door crack or hung on the doorknob, the customer’s attention is 
not drawn to the bill. This problem is confirmed in the unstructured interviews as well 
as when customers are observed when coming home. The invoice is often hardly 
visible which can be seen in Figure A1 in the appendix. The invoice placement does 
not create a feeling of importance or urgency.  
 
ii) Complexity of the invoice – About 49.7% of interviewees are unable to correctly 
identify the total amount due when shown the invoice. This fraction does not 
substantially improve when analyzing the subsample that states to personally be 
responsible for utility payments (53.4%). The complexity of the bill arises from the 
multitude of numbers that are printed on small slip of paper (see appendix Figure A2). 
The most common mistake (70.5% conditional on making a guess) is that 
interviewees in the survey refer to the monthly fee as the amount that needs to get 
paid in total.  
 
iii) Importance of paying for water and being a responsible citizen – About 87.9% of 
interviewees rank the importance of water bills either on first or second place. Water 
is the overall highest ranked bill and ranks statistically significantly higher than 
electricity (p=0.032), internet (p<0.001) and waste (p<0.001, two-sided Mann-
Whitney-U (MWU) test). Given the large fraction of customers having unpaid water 
bills in the administrative data (about 90.5%), only a relatively low fraction (34.7%) 
of interviewees states to have unpaid water bills.26 I interpret this as a social 
desirability response bias caused by the stigma attached to non-payment. Since 100% 
of customers state that being a responsible citizen is important to them,27 customers 
try to avoid being perceived as irresponsible and therefore don’t admit to have debt 
when asked. 
  
                                                     
26 Of those stating to have debt, 88% intend to repay their outstanding bills in the future. The most common stated 
reason for non-payment is insufficient financial means. 
27 Elicited among a subsample of 80 citizens, after which we decided to drop the question from the questionnaire due 
to the uniform consent. 
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4.3 Experimental Design 
 
Treatments – The treatments build upon the findings in the behavioral diagnosis. To increase the 
attention that customers pay to the invoice, the research team uses stickers that places the invoice 
at eye-level on a customer’s door instead of placing the invoice in the door crack or the door 
handle.28 To improve understanding of the invoice, the research team uses markers to highlight 
the most important numbers on the invoice if the customer’s invoice shows debt. In addition, we 
print identity labels on the sticker attempting to provoke label consistent behavior of an identity 
that is important to customers. Figure A2 in the appendix shows pictures of the sticker 
intervention. In total, there are six sticker treatments which are shown in Figure 2 and an untreated 
control group.  
 
 
Figure 2: Treatment messages printed on the stickers.  
 
Stickers in the left column are positively framed (P for positive). Positively framed 
stickers inform customers about the positive consequences of paying (“Paying ensures 24h water 
supply and quality in our city. Please pay for your water.”). In addition, the sticker reads “Place 
this sticker on the inside of your door as a reminder to pay”, which is intended to work as a 
permanent reminder.29 Sticker PB (Positive Basic) differs from sticker PP (Positive Persuasion) 
                                                     
28 Customers with a mailbox received the sticker attached to the back of the invoice. When there was personal contact 
between the research team and a customer, the research team followed a standard script in which the research team 
informed the customer that stickers were given to everyone in the street to remind them to pay for water. Then the exact 
wording on the sticker was read to the customer and the amount to pay was highlighted and explained. I control for 
these variables in the appendix table A1, which does not substantially change the results. 
29 Garner (2005) is to the best of my knowledge the only comparable study that uses post-it notes as reminders to 
increase response rates to a survey.  
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and PA (Positive Attribution) only with respect to one single sentence, but is otherwise identical. 
PP stickers additionally include the sentence “Please be a responsible citizen”. PA stickers include 
the sentence “You are a responsible citizen”. Stickers in the right column are negatively framed 
(N for negative). They state the negative consequences of not paying (“Not paying risks 24h water 
supply and quality in our city. Please pay for your water”). Stickers NP (Negative Persuasion) and 
NA (Negative Attribution) include one additional sentence, but are otherwise identical to NB 
(Negative Basic). NP additionally includes the sentence “Please don’t be an irresponsible citizen” 
and NA includes “You are not an irresponsible citizen”. Throughout this paper, I will refer to PB 
and NB as the basic stickers. PP and PA are called positively framed identity labels. NP and NA 
are referred to as negatively framed identity labels. 
 
Randomization – Treatment assignment is clustered and randomized by date and invoicer. This 
minimizes any potential date and invoicer specific effects. Therefore all neighbors on a given day 
receive the same sticker type to avoid treatment contamination effects. Table 1 shows summary 
statistics for the untreated comparison group and the mean difference and p-value of each of the 
treatments in comparison to the untreated group to test for imbalances. Overall, the balance table 
shows no statistically significantly different variables at the 5% level for any of the measured 
covariates. Since the data is highly right skewed and noisy, I provide the same regressions as in 
the main text with an extensive set of control variables in the appendix (Table A1) which does not 
substantially change the results. 
 
Implementation – The research team placed the stickers according to the assigned treatment over 
three months (June to August 2017). The research team usually learned their treatment assignment 
in the morning each day. We did not treat customers who were inactive (no water usage) during 
the intervention. Each customer was assigned to receive three stickers of the same type throughout 
the experiment.30 The invoices were folded in a way that third parties could not see the invoice 
information. The team documented a range of covariates for example how visible the placement 
of the stickers is to third parties (e.g., on door or mailbox), whether there was personal contact 
(including acceptance and rejection of the sticker), whether the water consumption was estimated 
                                                     
30 Roughly 10.8% received only one sticker during the three months because invoicers became sick, the customer 
became inactive (no consumption) or the handheld printing devices had malfunctions. The sample excludes six 
customers who received different types of stickers during the intervention due to human error.  
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(e.g., not possible when water meter is flooded) or read exactly, building types (apartment block 
or individual house) and on which floor level an apartment is located (-3 to 15) and building quality 
(5-point scale) as an approximation variable for wealth. The research team also accompanied the 
invoicer and measured these covariates on days when no stickers were placed (untreated group) 
to control for any potential effects caused by having more people than usually reading the meter 
or observing people taking notes in front of their house. Figure 3 shows the timeline of the 
experiment. 
 
Post-experimental sticker perception survey (N=638) – After the end of the intervention in 
August, we conducted a street survey in public spaces throughout the city. The interviews were 
conducted by local students who introduced themselves as part of a research team of the University 
of Cologne. We showed interviewees randomly one of the sticker types and asked whether they 
had seen the sticker before. If yes, we asked them to recall the content of the sticker. This was 
done to measure potential experimental contamination effects. If they had not seen the sticker 
before, they were given the sticker for sufficient time to read, before being asked to hand it back 
and to recall the content. This was done to measure which phrases on the sticker were most 
memorable. Afterwards the interviewer handed the sticker back yet again to ask whether and why 
the sticker would encourage them to pay. We then measured their overall impressions of the 
sticker, asked explicitly whether they would feel more monitored than usually if the saw the sticker 
placed on their door and whether they would use the sticker as a reminder. 
 
 
Figure 3: Timeline of the experiment 
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Post-experimental telephone survey (N=808) – Also in August, the research team of local students 
conducted a telephone survey. The research team introduced themselves as part of a research team 
of the University of Cologne. They called all customers whose RWCP account provided a phone 
number and who were part of the experimental sample. Interviewers were unaware of a customer’s 
identity and payment behavior at all times. Customers were called in random order and up to three 
times if a customer was not reached during a previous call attempt. In total, the survey sample 
contains 808 customers who confirmed to be responsible for payments in the household.31 The 
questionnaire focuses on self-perceptions of being a responsible citizen, prevalence of other 
responsible citizens in Pristina, social norms and perceived consequences and thresholds of non-
payment at which potential sanctioning would be enforced. Additionally, the questionnaire asked 
which utility bills were paid in the last three months in order to measure unintended spillover 
effects on other utility bills and demographics such as income, education and gender. 
                                                     
31 We managed to talk to 37.36% of customers whose account provided a phone number. Completion rate is overall 
high with 91.1% on average. I do not find treatment differences in the likelihood to interrupt the interview once started 
i.e., answering yes to “are you the one responsible for water payments in your household?”. The largest pairwise 
difference is found between the untreated group and the P1 treatment and is statistically insignificantly different from 
zero (p=0.360, χ2 - Test). These findings speak against a selection bias into the survey based on the treatment assignment. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Balance Table 
 Untreated 
(N=1,854) 
 PB 
(N=1,589) 
 NB 
(N=1,671) 
 PP 
(N=1,731) 
 NP 
(N=1,579) 
 PA 
(N=1,699) 
 NA 
(N=1,685) 
 Mean 
(1) 
SD 
(2) 
 Mean 
Diff. 
(3) 
P-
value 
(4) 
 Mean 
Diff. 
(5) 
P-
value 
(6) 
 Mean 
Diff. 
(7) 
P-
value 
(8) 
 Mean 
Diff. 
(9) 
P-
value 
(10) 
 Mean 
Diff. 
(11) 
P-
value 
(12) 
 Mean 
Diff. 
(13) 
P-
value 
(14) 
                     
Collection efficiency 0.988 1.420  0.104 .153  -0.031 .724  0.024 .743  0.078 .451  0.052 .604  -0.015 .861 
Payment amount in EUR 6.321 18.92  0.782 .359  0.505 .534  1.342 .136  0.715 .473  1.307 .228  0.165 .854 
Payment propensity (binary) 0.282 0.450  0.044 .065  0.012 .623  0.051 .053  0.025 .397  0.037 .179  -0.008 .741 
Payment amount (if >0) 22.45 30.15  -0.607 .722  0.775 .671  0.622 .733  0.527 .776  1.458 .451  1.283 .475 
Water consumption in EUR 7.281 6.236  0.091 .924  0.340 .719  0.905 .359  -0.007 .994  0.960 .371  -0.073 .941 
Debt amount in EUR 265.6 556.0  -78.354 .332  -58.438 .471  -71.871 .376  -82.122 .294  -62.854 .430  -73.927 .381 
Has debt (binary) 0.912 0.283  0.007 .708  0.011 .565  0.011 .573  0.020 .305  0.014 .406  0.010 .637 
Shared meter 0.238 0.426  -0.096 .346  -0.070 .493  -0.071 .453  -0.022 .841  0.108 .367  -0.082 .466 
Notes: The first two columns report the mean and standard deviation for the untreated group in the pre-intervention year. The remaining columns show the coefficients and the p-value testing for a 
difference between the untreated group and the respective treatment. Differences are tested using an OLS regression in which the outcome variable is regressed on the treatment dummies. Standard 
errors are clustered on the invoicer-date level (unit of randomization). Continuous variables are winsorized at the 99.9th percentile to reduce influence of extreme outliers. 
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4.4 Estimation Strategy and Results 
 
The main outcome variable is the collection efficiency (as displayed in Figure 1). The 
collection efficiency is defined as the sum of all payments divided by the sum of all invoices for 
a given time period. This aggregate measure reduces noise in the outcome variable by averaging 
payment behavior over several months, which is useful for data with high variability and low 
autocorrelation (McKenzie, 2012). Regression 1 shows the marginal effects at means on the 
extensive margin of a probit regression. It measures the probability of making any payment during 
the three month intervention. Regression 2 shows the effects of an OLS regression on the intensive 
margin (the effect on the natural logarithm of the collection efficiency conditional on being larger 
than zero). Regression 3 estimates the combined effects of regression 1 and 2 using a two-part 
model (Belotti et al., 2015). Fitted values from the log transformation of the two-part model are 
obtained using Duan’s (1983) smearing retransformation and standard errors are obtained by 
bootstrapping. I control for the pre-treatment means of the outcome variable (McKenzie, 2012), 
which is the collection efficiency and whether a customer has made any payments in the pre-
intervention year. In addition, I control for the strata used for randomization (invoicer fixed effects 
and date fixed effects) in the regression as recommended by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009). 
Regressions controlling for a wide range of other covariates are presented in the appendix A1. 
They do not substantially change the results. Standard errors are clustered at the level of 
randomization (invoicer date level). Table 2 shows the average treatment effects in comparison to 
the untreated group for the actual intervention period and for the post-experimental periods. Figure 
4 plots the treatment effects with whiskers indicating 95% confidence intervals for the intervention 
periods.   
 
Result 1: Large positive treatment effects of stickers on collection efficiency. 
 
Regression 3 in Table 2 shows that PB (Positive Basic) yields a combined treatment effect 
of 16.3 percentage points (p=0.010) on the collection efficiency during the intervention period in 
comparison to the untreated group. NB (Negative Basic) yields a treatment effect of 18.6 
percentage points (p=0.005). The point estimates of the positively framed identity labels are 
smaller. PP (Positive Persuasion) increases collection efficiency by 14.8 percentage points 
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(p=0.027) and PA (Positive Attribution) by 9.9 percentage points, yet the latter effect is 
statistically insignificantly different from zero (p=0.140). The negatively framed labels yield the 
largest treatment effects. The NP (Negative Persuasion) sticker shows a treatment effect of 25.0 
percentage points (p<0.001) and the NA (Negative Attribution) sticker an effect of 26.2 percentage 
points (p<0.001). The increase for the NP and NA sticker corresponds to about 4.20 Euro and 4.50 
Euro, respectively, in total per customer over the three experimental months.  
 
 
Figure 4: Average treatment effects on collection efficiency with 95% confidence intervals by sticker type in comparison 
to untreated control group during the intervention (June to August 2017). 
 
Result 2: No evidence that attribution labels are more effective than persuasion labels. 
 
The regression analysis suggests that attribution stickers are not more effective than persuasion 
stickers when holding the positive or negative identity frame constant (i.e. comparing PP vs. PA 
and NP vs. NA). The differences are tested in Table 3. Regression 9 shows that the combined 
treatment effect of PP is statistically insignificantly different from PA (p=0.403). The point 
estimate of PA is even 4.9 percentage points smaller than the one of PP indicating that even with 
larger statistical power, the attribution treatment would not be more effective than the persuasion 
treatment. The treatment differences between decreases to 2.5 percentage points when controlling 
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for covariates (see Table A1). The treatment difference of 1.3 percentage points between NP and 
NA is also statistically insignificantly different from each other (p=0.836).  
 
Result 3: Negative identity labels are twice as effective as positively framed identity labels. 
 
Negatively framed identity labels (NP and NA) are on average about twice as effective as 
positively framed identity labels (PP and PA). Differences are tested in the right panel (Panel B) 
of Table 3. Regression 12 shows that the difference of 10.1 percentage points is marginally 
statistically significant (p=0.095) for persuasion (PP vs. NP). The difference between positive and 
negative attribution stickers (PA vs. NA) is 16.2 percentage points and statistically significantly 
different from zero (p=0.009).32 The pooled difference between positive and negative identity 
labels is 13.1 percentage points (p=0.005) as tested in regression Table A2 in the appendix. 
 
Result 4: Stickers with identity label are more effective than basic sticker after intervention ends. 
 
As pre-registered, I now analyze how the different sticker types affect payment behavior for the 
nine months after the intervention ends. The right panel (regressions 4-6) in Table 2 shows the 
regression results for the post-intervention data (September 2017 until May 2018). I use the same 
regression model as in the previous analysis. I find that both basic stickers show negative effects. 
The post-intervention point estimates of the combined effect of the PB sticker is negative 5.9 
percentage points (p=0.131) and negative 4.2 percentage points in the NB treatment (p=0.268) in 
comparison to the untreated group. The difference becomes statistically significant after 
controlling for covariates in Table A1. The point estimates of the stickers containing a positively 
framed identity label are in the range of 3.1 to 3.4 percentage points, yet statistically insignificantly 
different from the untreated group. While the NP treatment is marginally statistically significant 
on the extensive margin (p=0.074), the overall combined point estimate of 4.4 percentage points 
is statistically insignificant as well. The NA shows has the smallest point estimate among the 
stickers with identity label and is close to zero.  
 
  
                                                     
32 For the basic stickers the positive framing is not statistically different from the negative framing (p=0.709) 
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Table 2. Average Treatment Effects on Collection Efficiency 
 Intervention (June `17 – Aug. `17)  Post-Intervention (Sept. `17 – May `18) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Payment 
Propensity 
Log 
Collection 
efficiency>0 
Combined 
Effect 
 Payment 
Propensity 
Log 
Collection 
efficiency>0 
Combined 
Effect 
        
Positive Basic (PB) 0.050** 0.031 0.163***  0.006 -0.006 -0.059 
 (0.021) (0.054) (0.063)  (0.018) (0.027) (0.039) 
Negative Basic (NB) 0.064*** 0.022 0.186***  0.004 -0.030 -0.042 
 (0.018) (0.051) (0.066)  (0.020) (0.029) (0.038) 
        
Pos. Persuasion (PP) 0.036* 0.044 0.148**  0.026 0.007 0.031 
 (0.022) (0.047) (0.067)  (0.020) (0.030) (0.038) 
Neg. Persuasion (NP) 0.074*** 0.050 0.250***  0.036* -0.021 0.044 
 (0.021) (0.053) (0.067)  (0.020) (0.025) (0.040) 
        
Pos. Attribution (PA) 0.035 0.010 0.099  0.016 0.022 0.034 
 (0.022) (0.053) (0.067)  (0.021) (0.035) (0.041) 
Neg. Attribution (NA) 0.072*** 0.065 0.262***  0.019 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.022) (0.058) (0.065)  (0.018) (0.026) (0.039) 
        
Observations 11,808 7,028 11,808  11,794 9,182 11,794 
R-squared 0.133 0.115 -  0.1574 0.0460 - 
Notes: The first three columns of Table 2 report average treatment effects on collection efficiency for the treatment 
periods (June-August 2017) in comparison to the untreated group. The last three columns show treatment effects for the 
post-intervention periods (September 2017-May 2018). Regression 1 and 4 show the treatment effects of a probit 
regression on the likelihood of making a payment (marginal effects at means). Regression 2 and 5 report average 
treatment effect of an OLS regression on the intensive margin. Regressions 3 combines the effects of regressions 1 and 
2 using a two-part model (Belotti et al. 2015). Similarly, regression 6 combines the effects of regression 4 and 5. Fitted 
values from the log transformation of the two-part model are obtained using Duan’s (1983) smearing retransformation 
and standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping. I control for the pre-treatment values of collection efficiency and 
whether any payments were made (main outcome variables), as well as the strata used for randomization (invoicer and 
date dummies) in the regression as recommended by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009). Control variables are winsorized at 
the 99.9th percentile. All reported standard errors are clustered at the invoicer-date level (unit of randomization). 14 
customers attrite from the sample after having been treated during the intervention. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
In comparison to the basic sticker, however, stickers with identity labels yield statistically 
significantly larger treatment effects. Positively framed identity labels treatment effects are 8.4 
percentage points larger (p=0.002) than the basic stickers and negatively framed identity labels 
6.9 percentage points larger (p=0.010). Individually tested, all but NA are yield statistically larger 
post-intervention treatment effects than the corresponding basic stickers (Table A4).33 
                                                     
33 The post-intervention treatment effects of NB is statistically significantly different from NP (p=0.027), but not from 
NA (p=0.370). PB is statistically different from PP (p=0.013) and so is PA (p=0.017). 
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Table 3. Testing for Differences Between Sticker Treatments 
Panel A Persuasion vs. Attribution  Panel B Positive vs. Negative 
 (7) (8) (9)   (10) (11) (12) 
 Payment 
Propensity 
Log 
Collection 
efficiency>0 
Combined 
Effect 
  Payment 
Propensity 
Log 
Collection 
efficiency>0 
Combined 
Effect 
     Basic (PB+NB) 0.064*** 0.022 0.163*** 
Basic (PB+NB) 0.057*** 0.027 0.175***   (0.018) (0.051) (0.063) 
 (0.018) (0.048) (0.057)  Basic*Positive (PB) -0.014 0.009 0.023 
Pos. Identity (PP+PA) 0.037* 0.045 0.149**   (0.017) (0.044) (0.061) 
 (0.022) (0.047) (0.067)  Persuasion (PP+NP) 0.074*** 0.051 0.250*** 
Pos. Identity*Attribution (PA) -0.002 -0.035 -0.049   (0.021) (0.054) (0.067) 
 (0.022) (0.040) (0.059)  Persuasion*Positive (PP) -0.038* -0.006 -0.101* 
Neg. Identity (NP+NA) 0.075*** 0.051 0.250***   (0.022) (0.038) (0.061) 
 (0.021) (0.054) (0.067)  Attribution (PA+NA) 0.072*** 0.066 0.262*** 
Neg. Identity*Attribution (NA) -0.002 0.014 0.013   (0.022) (0.058) (0.065) 
 (0.021) (0.048) (0.061)  Attribution*Positive (PA) -0.037 -0.056 -0.162*** 
      (0.023) (0.051) (0.062) 
         
Observations 11,808 7,028 11,808  Observations 11,808 7,028 11,808 
R-squared 0.133 0.115 -  R-squared 0.1330 0.115 - 
Notes: This table reports heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to persuasion or attribution framing (left panel) and with respect to positive or negative framing (right 
panel) on collection efficiency for the treatment periods (June-August 2017) in comparison to the untreated control group. Regression 7 and 10 show the treatment effects of 
a probit regression on the likelihood of making a payment (marginal effects at means). Regression 8 and 9 report average treatment effect of an OLS regression on the 
intensive margin. Regression 9 and 12 combine the effects using a two-part model (Belotti et al. 2015). Fitted values from the log transformation of the two-part model are 
obtained using Duan’s (1983) smearing retransformation and standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping. I control for the pre-treatment values of collection efficiency and 
whether any payments were made, as well as the strata used for randomization (invoicer and date dummies) in the regression as recommended by Bruhn and McKenzie 
(2009). Control variables are winsorized at the 99.9th percentile. All reported standard errors are clustered at the invoicer-date level (unit of randomization). * p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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4.5 Post-Experimental Survey Results 
 
4.5.1 Behavioral Mechanism  
 
This section provides answers from both the street and the telephone survey to shed light on 
the behavioral mechanism that might have caused the negatively framed identity labels to be 
so effective. Table 4 displays descriptive statistics of both surveys. Panel A shows the average 
answers sorted by the sticker type that was shown to interviewees in the street survey.  
 
 
The sample in Panel A excludes customers stating to have seen the sticker at home since their 
opinion might be distorted due to being part of the actual experiment. Panel B displays answers 
Table 4. Main Survey Results 
Untreated  Basic  
Positive 
Identity 
 
Negative 
Identity 
   PB NB  PP PA  NP NA 
Panel A: Street Survey           
Encouraging to pay    0.544 0.468  0.667 0.620  0.574 0.628 
   Be a responsible citizen  -  0.510 0.364  0.500 0.649  0.455 0.327 
   Sticker grabs attention  -  0.388 0.568  0.448 0.414  0.389 0.449 
   Otherwise cut-offs  -  0.041 0.205  0.224 0.053  0.167 0.286 
Would use as reminder  -  0.467 0.340  0.314 0.462  0.394 0.397 
Feels more monitored -  0.567 0.538  0.682 0.527  0.462 0.436 
Useful and good    0.878 0.915  0.906 0.879  0.935 0.899 
N=540 -  91 94  87 95  94 79 
Panel B: Telephone Survey          
Self-perception (“always”) 45.87  46.53 41.44  38.68 37.61  34.58 31.68 
Social norms (more than half) 0.615  0.564 0.628  0.664 0.578  0.660 0.529 
Aware of any consequences  0.894  0.951 0.878  0.899 0.903  0.937 0.952 
Aware of cut-offs  0.491  0.558 0.496  0.449 0.573  0.519 0.563 
How much debt (median) 100  100 90  70 100  100 100 
How much debt in bills (md.) 3  2.75 2.5  3 3  3 3 
Other utility bills paid 2.109  2.236 2.174  2.079 2.052  2.137 2.063 
N=808 120  106 115  117 121  117 112 
Notes: The table shows selected answers from both post experimental surveys. Panel A shows results from the 
street survey excluding customers stating to have seen the sticker at home. The first row shows the fraction of 
customers stating that the sticker would encourage them to pay. The following rows show the categorized reasons 
for why so, conditional on being encouraged to pay. The next rows show the fraction of customers that would use 
the sticker as a reminder to pay and the fraction of customers that would feel more monitored than usually. Panel 
B shows results from the telephone survey among those stating to be responsible for payments of the water bill. 
The first row shows the fraction of people always thinking of themselves as responsible citizens. The next row 
displays the fraction of customers believing that more than half of customers in Pristina pay their bills regularly. 
The following rows measure whether customers are aware of any consequences of non-payment (and in particular 
cut-offs) and the median thresholds at which these sanctions would be enforced. The last fraction shows the sum 
of other utility bills that customers state to have paid during the last three months. 
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from the telephone survey. The table shows answers sorted by the treatment group that the 
interviewed customers were actually part of in the experiment. 
 
Being a responsible citizen is main motivation for making payments – In the post-experimental 
street survey, we asked interviewees why the stickers would encourage them to pay. Answers 
were open-ended and categorized by the interviewer. The descriptive statistics are shown in 
the indented rows in Panel A. The most commonly stated reason is being or wanting to be a 
responsible citizen (47.4%).34 The second most common answer is that the sticker would grab 
their attention (41.1%). Note, that these are precisely the two channels (identity and attention) 
that the intervention was designed to address (since we identified these mechanisms to be 
relevant in the pre-intervention survey). This shows that identity concerns are a crucial 
motivation to make payments in the experiment.35 
 
Negative identity labels change customers’ self-perception – If the stickers establish or 
strengthen a link between the payment decision and one’s identity, we should observe a 
reflection of this in customers’ self-perception. In the telephone survey, we measured to which 
degree customers identified as responsible citizen by asking “How often do you think of 
yourself as responsible citizen?” Figure 5 shows interviewees’ answers pooled across all 
treatments.  
 
 
Figure 5: Self-perception of being a responsible citizen. 
 
                                                     
34 This answer is also the most common reason for the basic sticker, which speaks against an interviewer demand 
effect since these stickers do not contain any “responsible citizen” wording.  
35 The answer categories were defined after running pilot surveys. Alternative reasons why the sticker would 
encourage them to pay are significantly less often mentioned, for example through fearing cut-offs (16.08%) or to 
ensure 24h water supply in the city (18.33%) or because they would use the sticker as a reminder (10.93%). 
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Around 90% of customers always or often think of themselves as responsible citizen.  In both 
the NP and NA treatment, the self-perception is different: In comparison to the untreated 
group, customers in the NP and NA treatment on average think less often of themselves as 
responsible citizen. In the untreated group 45.9% state to be always responsible. This fraction 
statistically significantly decreases to 34.6% (p=0.040, χ2 -Test) in the NP and 31.7% (p=0.017, 
χ2 -Test) in the NA treatment. A similar yet smaller effect is found for positively framed 
identity labels but not for the basic stickers. 36 Customers who made below median payments 
during the three months of the intervention drive this downward shift in self-perception.37  
 
Higher effectiveness of negatively framed identity labels is in line with deviance regulation 
theory – According to deviance regulation theory, individuals self-regulate more based on 
what would make them “stick out”. In order to check whether this could explain the larger 
effectiveness of the negatively framed identity labels, I provide survey answers with respect 
to social norms and the prevalence of other responsible citizen in Pristina. The left panel of 
Figure 6 shows beliefs on social norms (“How many in your street/building pay their water 
bill regularly?”) and the right panel beliefs on prevalence of other responsible citizens in the 
city (“How many people in Pristina are responsible citizen?”).  
 
 
Figure 6: The left panel shows beliefs on social norms and the right panel beliefs on the prevalence of other 
responsible citizens in the city. 
                                                     
36 The pooled difference in self-perception between positively framed identity stickers and the untreated group is 
marginally significant (p=0.065, MWU-test). The pooled difference between basic stickers and the untreated group 
is statistically insignificant (p=0.612, MWU-test). The pooled difference in self-perception between negatively 
framed identity stickers is statistically significant in comparison to the basic stickers (p=0.014, MWU-test) as well 
as in comparison to the untreated group (p=0.010, MWU-test). 
37 Customers with below median payments think less often of themselves as responsible citizen in comparison to 
the untreated group, but only if they received an identity label. Table A5 shows that self-perception is lower for 
below median payers receiving positively framed identity labels (p=0.043) or negatively framed identity labels 
(p=0.055), but not for customers receiving the basic stickers (p=0.831). This finding suggests that customers might 
not simply adopt the labeled identity. Instead, the identity label may causes customers to regulate (self-signal and 
shape) their identity through observation of their own actions (Bem, 1967, Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; 2011). 
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Both measures show that the majority of citizens in Pristina is believed to pay the bill regularly 
and that customers believe that the majority of citizens in Pristina are responsible citizens. 
Therefore, non-payment and being an irresponsible citizen would make them “stick out from 
the crowd”, which might explain why the negatively framed identity labels outperform the 
positively framed identity labels.38 
 
4.5.2 Ruling Out Alternative Channels  
 
The results so far show that the customers’ payment decision is linked to their identity and that 
customers’ self-perception changes particularly strongly among customers receiving the 
negatively framed stickers, which coincides with the largest increase in payment behavior. 
There are however several alternative mechanisms that could potentially confound the 
mechanism. I present a number of alternative channels and argue that these can be ruled out.  
 
No treatment differences in social norms – The sticker intervention could have changed beliefs 
on other’s payment behavior (social norms). For example, customers might potentially believe 
that everyone else’s payment behavior was similar to theirs, since all stickers in a building 
contained the same message. Alternatively, the intervention could cause neighbors to discuss 
their payment habits spreading information about others’ payment behavior. One can also 
imagine that the identity labels implicitly convey information about the behavior of others. For 
example, an irregular payer receiving the “You are a responsible citizen” sticker might shift 
his beliefs about social norms downwards. All these channels would reflect in changes in the 
beliefs about others’ payment behavior. The intervention does not cause a significant shift in 
beliefs on social norms when comparing the negatively framed identity labels (or any of the 
treatments) with the untreated group. The direction of the effect size is also not uniform, for 
example beliefs shift insignificantly upwards in the NP treatment (p=0.213, MWU-test) and 
insignificantly downwards in the NA treatment (p=0.808, MWU-test). A change in social 
norms causing the effectiveness of the negatively framed identity labels is therefore 
inconsistent with the survey evidence. 
 
                                                     
38 Alternative explanation might be that the positive framings have little room to improve on, since most customers 
already think of themselves as responsible citizens (ceiling effects). Alternatively, individuals might be loss-averse 
in their identity “stock”. 
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No treatment differences in sanctioning beliefs – As a result of receiving a sticker on their 
door, customers might believe that they could potentially face sanctions (cut-offs, law suits) 
or might be at the threshold of getting sanctioned. To measure such effects, we elicited 
awareness of sanctions and the debt thresholds at which customers would expect sanctions in 
the telephone survey. Customers are not statistically significantly more aware of any sort of 
sanctions in general or specifically for disconnections. Neither, do I find that customers in the 
treatments have different beliefs regarding the threshold at which one is considered for 
sanctions in comparison to the untreated group. The median beliefs for the threshold are 
identical for the untreated group and the negatively framed identity labels. Lastly, I find that 
if anything, the intervention is more effective among customers sharing a collective meter 
(Table A6). Sanctions among this group are particularly difficult to enforce, since the whole 
building would need to be disconnected from water supply, even if individual households are 
paying. I conclude, that it is unlikely that fear of getting sanctioned explains the treatment 
effects. 
 
No treatment differences in perceptions of being monitored - The street survey asked 
customers explicitly about whether customers would feel more monitored than usually if they 
saw the sticker hanging on their door. Around half of interviewees (53.6%) agree that they 
would feel more monitored than usually. While monitoring might play a role why the stickers 
worked in general, they cannot explain why the negatively framed identity labels were so 
effective. If anything, customers seeing the negatively framed labels would feel less monitored 
in comparison to the basic stickers (p=0.040, MWU-test). Therefore, an increase in the 
perception of being monitored is also inconsistent with the survey results. 
 
No treatment differences in intentions of placing the sticker as reminder – Another channel 
that can be ruled out is that customers were more likely to place certain sticker type on their 
door as a reminder to pay. However, only relatively few interviewees (39.6%) state that they 
would place the sticker on their door. Moreover, there are no differences in the intentions of 
placing the negatively framed stickers on the door that could explain the larger effectiveness 
of the negatively framed stickers. 
 
  
  
 
USING IDENTITY LABELS TO DECREASE NON-PAYMENT FOR WATER: EVIDENCE FROM KOSOVO 
87 
 
4.5.3 Further Survey Insights  
 
High acceptance of the intervention - The overall impression of the intervention is very 
positive. On average 90.2% agree or partially agree that the stickers are “useful and good”. 
The intervention has an even higher approval rate among customers that report to have seen a 
sticker at home in comparison to those seeing the sticker for the first time (p=0.019, χ2 - Test). 
The high approval rate is also reflected in the acceptance rate of the sticker when customers 
are met in person as less than 1% reject the sticker. Moreover, the majority of customers state 
that the stickers would encourage them to pay (58.9%). In comparison to the basic stickers, 
positive labels are statistically significant more encouraging (p=0.008, χ2 - Test) and so are 
negative identity labels (p=0.070, χ2 - Test). Among customers stating that they would not be 
encouraged, the most common answer is that they are already paying (66.9%) and that they 
don’t need a reminder or help (24.6%). 
 
Negligible contagion effects – The experiment was carefully designed to minimize 
experimental contagion effects. First, treatments are clustered by invoicer and day such that 
neighbors receive the same sticker type. Second, we did not treat neighborhoods too close to 
the city center to avoid visibility to pedestrians going window shopping or drinking coffee. 
We also did not treat businesses and inactive customers to avoid that stickers would be left 
hanging on the door when no one was home. The vast majority was placed inside of apartment 
blocks where a key was necessary to enter the building. In addition, the company did not 
mention the intervention publicly. In total, only about 9% of stickers were placed in spots 
where they could potentially be seen from the street level. 
Nevertheless, we measured experimental contagion effects in our street survey by 
asking whether customers had seen the sticker before. Around 15.7% of interviewees state to 
have seen the sticker at home. This is in line with what we would expect given that we treated 
about 17.5% of the city. Only about 4.1% state to have seen the sticker in the street and 6.2% 
report to have seen the sticker at friends or their family’s house.  The remaining interviewees 
state to see a sticker for the first time. Among those that saw stickers in the street or at a friend’s 
house, the recall of the content is low. They only have a good recall (as coded by interviewers) 
for the phrase “Please pay for your water“ which is mentioned by 70.3% of interviewees. This 
phrase is common to all stickers and therefore should not cause contagion effects between the 
treatment arms. For all other phrases on the sticker, these interviewees are more likely to recall 
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nothing at all rather than being able to at least partially recall any of the other phrases. 
Contagion effects therefore do not seem to confound the effects found in this study. 
 
Manipulation check of identity label – Survey evidence suggests that customers being part of 
the actual experiment read the sticker content, and in particular, the relevant identity label. 
About 46% of customers who report having seen the sticker at home recall the identity phrase. 
However, customers that received a basic sticker are technically unable to recall an identity 
label because it is not content of the sticker. We could adjust the recall rate for the fact only 
66.5% of all customers in the experiment received a sticker with identity label. Dividing the 
recall rate of 46% by the share of customers receiving an identity labeled sticker yields a rough 
estimate of about 69.1%.39 Interviewees stating to have seen the sticker at home have a better 
recall of the identity label than all other groups (p=0.009, MWU-test) and also compared to 
those having seen it in the street (p=0.019, MWU-test). 
 
No spillovers on other utility bills – A question that has received little attention in the literature 
is to which degree such interventions may influence the payment of other utility bills. Negative 
spillovers might stem from budgeting effects or from increased attention to payment of the 
water bills at the cost of other utility bills. On the other hand, customers’ overall willingness 
to pay towards utility payment may increase due to the changes in the self-perception of being 
a responsible citizen. The survey evidence here does not provide hard facts. Judging from the 
self-reported data however, it seems that there are no significant spillovers on the reported 
amount of other utility bills paid. The largest difference is found between the PA sticker with 
2.05 bills and the PB sticker with 2.24 bills, yet this difference is statistically insignificantly 
different from zero (p=0.228, χ2-test). This suggests that there were no spillovers on other 
utility bills, at least not on the extensive margin. 
  
                                                     
39 This is a rough estimate since interviewees might recall what they saw when we briefly showed them the sticker 
in the beginning of the survey and not what the saw at home. In addition, by chance, we could have interviewed a 
larger proportion of a certain sticker type in the interview in comparison to the actual experiment, which would 
also bias the estimate. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates the role of identity concerns for public utility payments using 
identity labels. It shows that identity concerns are a crucial motivation to pay for water utility 
and that adults’ identity is malleable through simple written identity labels on a sticker. The 
identity labels are a highly effective measure to improve collection efficiency. The positive or 
negative framing of identity labels matters. Negatively framed identity labels are about twice 
as effective as positively framed identity labels in improving payment behavior. After the 
interventions ends, the basic stickers pay significantly less than stickers with identity label, 
which provides novel evidence on the persistence of treatment effects. Understanding such 
effects is crucial in settings where policy makers are unable to treat individuals repeatedly for 
example for logistical or financial reasons since the long-term effects may dramatically 
influence the overall effectiveness (Sunstein, 2016). Frey and Rogers (2014) argue that if 
identity affects behavior and identity is malleable, then treatment effects may persist as long 
as the change in identity is retained. This study thereby contributes to this literature by 
providing apples-to-apples evidence that self-perception changing interventions may indeed 
change behavior persistently.  
The post-experimental surveys provide evidence that identity concerns are an 
important motivation to pay for water. This is not only the most commonly mentioned reason 
for making payments in open-ended answer questions, but also found in changes of customers’ 
self-perception in a telephone survey. The survey also rules out several alternative mechanisms 
that could explain the high effectiveness of the negatively framed identity labels as for example 
changed beliefs on sanctioning, monitoring, social norms or reminders. Instead, the large 
effectiveness of the negatively framed stickers correlates with the largest change in self-
perception among all sticker types which is consistent with behavioral theories suggesting that 
individuals identity is regulated more based on what makes them distinct rather than what they 
have in common with others (Blanton, Stuart and Van den Eijenden, 2001; Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2006). 
There are many other domains in which identity labels could be used to encourage 
civic behavior as for example voter mobilization, avoiding littering, volunteering for public 
services, driving carefully or paying taxes. Some of these domains might be even more 
promising than payment of utility bills since they constitute behaviors that might be more 
intuitively associated with being a responsible citizen. The results of this study could also be 
interesting beyond policymaking as identity labels are frequently used in everyday 
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communication without the intention to influence behavior. Individuals are for example 
labeled as nerd, millennial or techie which might affect how they see themselves and thereby 
their educational, career and health choices. 
Lastly, traditional tools like disconnecting non-paying customers from the supply 
network are not only technically and legally difficult to enforce, they may also be politically 
unwanted and ethically objectionable. In contrast, the use of appropriate behavioral 
interventions is appealing. In this study, the sticker intervention is not only well accepted 
among the population, it is also highly cost efficient. The best performing sticker type (“Please 
don’t be an irresponsible citizen”) increases payments by about 7 Euro per customer over the 
span of a year at a cost of merely 12 cents. This suggest a back-of-the-envelope return-on-
investment of around 5800%.  
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4.7 Appendix to Chapter 4 
 
 
Figure A3: Typical bill delivery process. Step 1: Reading the water meter. Step 2: Entering meter reading and 
printing the invoice using handheld device. Step 3: Placing the invoice on door handle or in door crack. The 
placement does not draw attention to invoice. 
 
 
 
Figure A4: Treatment implementation. Left picture shows the sticker along with the folded invoice placed on a 
door. The content cannot be seen by third parties. Right picture shows the highlighted numbers on the invoice if 
the invoice was unraveled. 
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Table A1. Treatment Effects with Controls 
  Intervention  Post-Intervention 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  Payment 
Propensity 
Log 
Collection 
Efficiency>
0 
Combined 
Effect 
 Payment 
Propensity 
Log 
Collection 
Efficiency>
0 
Combined 
Effect 
         
PB  0.037** 0.042 0.146**  -0.002 -0.068** -0.078** 
  (0.017) (0.052) (0.062)  (0.014) (0.029) (0.038) 
NB  0.039** 0.036 0.142**  -0.015 -0.049* -0.078** 
  (0.015) (0.048) (0.066)  (0.018) (0.028) (0.038) 
PP  0.016 0.059 0.114*  0.014 -0.019 0.001 
  (0.019) (0.044) (0.066)  (0.017) (0.030) (0.037) 
NP  0.055*** 0.061 0.213***  0.027 -0.026 0.012 
  (0.020) (0.050) (0.067)  (0.019) (0.033) (0.040) 
PA  0.020 0.031 0.089  0.006 0.004 0.014 
  (0.020) (0.050) (0.068)  (0.018) (0.034) (0.041) 
NA  0.058*** 0.071 0.234***  0.004 -0.035 -0.033 
  (0.019) (0.055) (0.064)  (0.015) (0.032) (0.038) 
         
Obs.  11,808 7,028 11,808  11,794 9,182 11,794 
R-squared  0.162 0.126 -  0.212 0.057 - 
Notes: Table A1 reports average treatment effects on collection efficiency for the treatment periods (June-August 
2017) in comparison to the untreated control group. Regression 1 shows the effect of the treatments on the 
likelihood of making a payment (marginal effects at means). Regression 2 reports average treatment effect on the 
intensive margin.  Regression 3 combines the effects of regressions 1 and 2 using a two-part model (Belotti et al. 
2015). Fitted values from the log transformation of the two-part model are obtained using Duan’s (1983) smearing 
retransformation and standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping. I control for the pre-treatment values of 
collection efficiency, whether any  payments were made, average invoice, average debt, average payments, 
dummies whether the customer has a shared water meter, mailbox or was met personally during the intervention 
as well as the strata used for randomization (invoicer and date dummies) in the regression as recommended by 
Bruhn and McKenzie (2009). Control variables are  winsorized at the 99.9th percentile. All reported standard errors 
are clustered at the invoicer-date level (level of randomization). * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A2. Differences in Treatment Effects Between Positive and Negative 
Stickers 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Payment 
Propensity 
Log 
Collection 
Efficiency>0 
Combined 
Effect 
    
Sticker 0.057*** 0.027 0.175*** 
 (0.018) (0.048) (0.057) 
Sticker * identity label -0.021 0.001 -0.050 
 (0.015) (0.029) (0.042) 
Sticker * identity label * negative 0.037** 0.030 0.131*** 
 (0.016) (0.033) (0.047) 
    
Observations 11,808 7,028 11,808 
R-squared 0.133 0.115 - 
Notes: Table A2 test how treatment effects differ between positive and negatively framed 
identity stickers during the treatment period during the treatment periods (June-August 2017). 
To test for differences, I use a regression with sticker indicating all stickers. Identity label 
indicates stickers containing an identity label and negative indicates whether the identity label 
is negative. Regression 1 shows the effect of the treatments on the likelihood of making a 
payment (marginal effects at means). Regression 2 reports average treatment effect on the 
intensive margin.  Regression 3 combines the effects of regressions 1 and 2 using a two-part 
model (Belotti et al. 2015). Fitted values from the log transformation of the two-part model are 
obtained using Duan’s (1983) smearing retransformation and standard errors are obtained by 
bootstrapping. I control for the pre-treatment values of collection efficiency and whether any 
payments were made in the pre-intervention year as well as the strata used for randomization 
(invoicer and date dummies) in the regression as recommended by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009). 
Control variables are winsorized at the 99.9th percentile. All reported standard errors are 
clustered at the invoicer-date level (unit of randomization). ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A3. Pooled Differences in Post-intervention Treatment Effects  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Payment 
Propensity 
Log 
Collection 
Efficiency>
0 
Combined 
Effect 
    
Sticker 0.005 -0.052** -0.051 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.033) 
Sticker*Positive identity label 0.016 0.051** 0.084*** 
 (0.013) (0.025) (0.027) 
Sticker*Negative identity label 0.022* 0.031 0.069*** 
 (0.012) (0.024) (0.027) 
    
Observations 11,794 9,182 11,794 
R-squared 0.157 0.046 - 
Notes: Table A3 test how treatment effects differ between positive and negatively framed identity 
stickers for the post-intervention period (September-May 2018). To test for differences, I use a 
regression with sticker indicating all stickers. Identity label indicates stickers containing an identity 
label and negative indicates whether the identity label is negative. Regression 1 shows the effect 
of the treatments on the likelihood of making a payment (marginal effects at means). Regression 2 
reports average treatment effect on the intensive margin.  Regression 3 combines the effects of 
regressions 1 and 2 using a two-part model (Belotti et al. 2015). Fitted values from the log 
transformation of the two-part model are obtained using Duan’s (1983) smearing retransformation 
and standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping. I control for the pre-treatment values of 
collection efficiency and whether any payments were made in the pre-intervention year as well as 
the strata used for randomization (invoicer and date dummies) in the regression as recommended 
by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009). Control variables are winsorized at the 99.9th percentile. All 
reported standard errors are clustered at the invoicer-date level (unit of randomization). * p<0.1; 
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A4. Post-intervention Sticker Differences 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Payment 
Propensity 
Log Collection 
Efficiency>0 
Combined 
Effect 
    
NB+NP+NA 0.004 -0.042 -0.042 
 (0.020) (0.029) (0.038) 
NP 0.032 0.031 0.085** 
 (0.020) (0.034) (0.039) 
NA 0.015 0.011 0.036 
 (0.018) (0.037) (0.040) 
    
PB+PP+PA 0.006 -0.061** -0.059 
 (0.018) (0.030) (0.039) 
PP 0.020 0.052 0.090** 
 (0.016) (0.033) (0.036) 
PA 0.010 0.068* 0.092** 
 (0.016) (0.035) (0.039) 
    
Observations 11,794 9,182 11,794 
R-squared 0.1574 0.046 - 
Notes: Table A4 test heterogeneous effects with respect to stickers with or without identity label for the 
post-intervention period (September-May 2018). N1+N2+N3 pools all negative framed stickers. P1+P2+P3 
pools all positively framed stickers. Regression 1 shows the effect of the treatments on the likelihood of 
making a payment (marginal effects at means). Regression 2 reports average treatment effect on the 
intensive margin.  Regression 3 combines the effects of regressions 1 and 2 using a two-part model (Belotti 
et al. 2015). Fitted values from the log transformation of the two-part model are obtained using Duan’s 
(1983) smearing retransformation and standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping. I control for the pre-
treatment values of collection efficiency and whether any payments were made in the pre-intervention year 
as well as the strata used for randomization (invoicer and date dummies) in the regression as recommended 
by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009). Control variables are winsorized at the 99.9th percentile. All reported 
standard errors are clustered at the invoicer-date level (unit of randomization). * p<0.1; ** p<0.05 
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Table A5. Changes in Self-Perception in Comparison to Untreated Group 
 (1) 
 Self-Perception  
“How often do you think of 
yourself as responsible 
citizen?” 
  
Basic 0.066 
 (0.310) 
Positive Identity Label -0.660** 
 (0.326) 
Negative identity Label -0.619* 
 (0.323) 
  
Collection efficiency>100% (ca. median) 0.299 
 (0.353) 
  
Basic*Collection efficiency>100% -0.332 
 (0.440) 
Pos. Identity Label*Collection efficiency>100% 0.519 
 (0.450) 
Neg. identity Label*Collection efficiency>100% 0.089 
 (0.445) 
  
Observations 744 
Pseudo R2 0.0150 
Notes: This table shows heterogeneous effects with respect to customers’ self-perception 
depending on whether they paid fully during the intervention or not, which coincides with a 
median split. Ordered logit regression model with robust standard errors in parentheses and no 
additional controls ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A6. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Water Meter Type 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Payment 
Propensity 
Log Collection 
Efficiency>0 
Combined Effect 
PB 0.093 0.170 0.449*** 
 (0.069) (0.188) (0.155) 
NB 0.093** -0.001 0.228 
 (0.042) (0.186) (0.158) 
PP 0.193*** 0.043 0.531*** 
 (0.046) (0.193) (0.161) 
NP 0.088** 0.229 0.513*** 
 (0.041) (0.182) (0.159) 
PA 0.121*** 0.124 0.458*** 
 (0.043) (0.183) (0.146) 
NA 0.155** 0.133 0.554*** 
 (0.068) (0.194) (0.174) 
    
Individual meter  0.150*** 0.050 0.434*** 
 (0.038) (0.206) (0.136) 
    
PB* Individual meter -0.062 -0.157 -0.355** 
 (0.072) (0.207) (0.170) 
NB* Individual meter -0.046 0.028 -0.077 
 (0.048) (0.207) (0.172) 
PP* Individual meter -0.197*** 0.008 -0.476*** 
 (0.054) (0.221) (0.176) 
NP* Individual meter -0.025 -0.211 -0.333* 
 (0.049) (0.206) (0.174) 
PA* Individual meter -0.105** -0.146 -0.447*** 
 (0.047) (0.208) (0.163) 
NA* Individual meter -0.106 -0.072 -0.355* 
 (0.074) (0.215) (0.182) 
    
Observations 11,808 7,028 11,808 
R-squared 0.137 0.116 - 
Notes: This table shows heterogeneous treatment effects during the intervention period (June-August 2017) with 
respect to owning a shared versus an individual water meter. Regression 1 shows the effect of the treatments on 
the likelihood of making a payment (marginal effects at means). Regression 2 reports average treatment effect on 
the intensive margin.  Regression 3 combines the effects of regressions 1 and 2 using a two-part model (Belotti et 
al. 2015). Fitted values from the log transformation of the two-part model are obtained using Duan’s (1983) 
smearing retransformation and standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping. I control for the pre-treatment values 
of collection efficiency and whether any payments were made in the pre-intervention year as well as the strata used 
for randomization (invoicer and date dummies) in the regression as recommended by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009). 
Control variables are  winsorized at the 99.9th percentile. All reported standard errors are clustered at the invoicer-
date level (unit of randomization). * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 98 
CHAPTER 5.  
 
 
THE SELF-SERVING BEHAVIOR OF THE RICH CAUSES 
CONTAGION EFFECTS AMONG THE POOR 
 
 
Joint work with Bettina Rockenbach and Arne Weiß 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In many societies wealth and economic power is concentrated among a small group. As 
manifested in a wide range of religious, philosophical and political thought, social norms ask 
this rich group to serve society and to share their wealth with the less fortunate.40 However, 
the rich often fail to comply with this expectation. This is, arguably, a particular concern in 
many developing countries in which the rich are held less accountable and constrained by 
institutional checks and balances (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Besley and Perrson, 
2014). This allows the rich to engage in multiple ways of self-serving behavior, for example 
in form of corruption (Bardhan, 2006), elite capture (e.g., Platteau and Gaspart, 2003; Bardhan 
and Mookherjee, 2006) and tax evasion (e.g., “Paradise Papers”).41 With their disproportionate 
influence on economic and political outcomes, the rich’s self-serving behavior has obvious 
direct consequences for economic development. In this paper, we ask whether there is an 
additional indirect effect when other members of society learn about self-serving behavior of 
the rich. The answer to this question is largely empirical because the theoretical literature 
(which we review in section 3) yields conflicting predictions.  
We report the results of a framed field experiment in Namibia designed to provide 
causal evidence on potential behavioral contagion effects from the rich’s self-serving behavior 
to the behavior of the poor.  Moreover, by experimental design as well as through 
                                                     
40 An early manifestation of this expectation can be found in the bible "From everyone who has been given much, 
much will be demanded” (Luke 12:48). A moral obligation of the rich to share with society can also be found in 
Zakat in the Quran, in the writings of many great philosophers such as Aristotle, Bentham, Marx, Rawls and Smith 
and in the widely used progressive income taxation.   
41 More information can be found under https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers. 
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complementary qualitative evidence, we disentangle them from mere conformity effects. Such 
conformity effects could stem from the poor’s expectation that the rich possess better 
information (Vesterlund, 2003) or the poor’s desire to imitate the rich in order to signal a 
higher status (Kumru and Vesterlund, 2010). Reliably ruling out such confounds requires 
varying both the reference group and the content of the information about the behavior of 
others. The existing empirical literature, however, does not provide such variations and thus 
does not allow a conclusive answer to our question. It either predominantly focuses on 
reference groups that are of the same socioeconomic status (Bicchieri and Xiao, 2010; Cason 
and Mui 1998; Croson and Shang, 2009; Frey and Meyer, 2004; Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2013; 
Krupka and Weber, 2009; Shang et al., 2008; Shang and Croson, 2009) or does not vary the 
content of the information provided (Ebeling, Feldhaus and Fendrich, 2017; Kumru and 
Vesterlund, 2010), i.e., whether the rich behaved self-servingly or pro-socially. Furthermore, 
these studies are conducted exclusively in developed countries, typically in student subject 
pools. To close this gap, we measure the behavior of participants from a poor neighborhood 
after they received information about other’s self-serving or pro-social behavior, either from 
a rich neighborhood or their poor neighborhood. Thus, in a controlled way we vary both the 
socioeconomic status of the comparison group (rich and poor) and their reported behavior 
(self-serving and pro-social). 
Our framed field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) is conducted in Namibia, one of 
the countries with the highest income inequality worldwide (World Bank, 2014). Differences 
in wealth are therefore pronounced and naturally existing. Thus, our experiment combines 
strict experimental control with a high degree of realism (Levitt and List, 2009). We find that 
information about the egoistic behavior of the rich induces the poor to act significantly more 
egoistically. By contrast, neither the rich’s pro-social behavior nor information on how other 
poor individuals behaved affects the poor. The spread of egoism is therefore not a simple 
conformity effect. We show that it is instead caused by a change in injunctive norms: the rich’s 
(unexpected) failure to share leads other members of society to view their own egoistic 
behavior as more acceptable.42 Thus, the rich’s egoistic behavior causes a double damage: 
Society not only suffers from their low contributions but also indirectly from contagion effects.  
 
                                                     
42 Other self-serving exploitations of the decision context have been found in situations of uncertainty: for example 
about the consequences of one’s decisions (e.g., Dana, Weber, Krupka, 2006; Haisley and Weber, 2010; Exley, 
2015), the responsibility for an outcome (Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012) or the relevant norms applying to a 
decision situation (Spiekermann and Weiss, 2016; Charness, Naef, and Sontuoso, 2018). 
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5.2 Experimental Design 
 
5.2.1 Experimental Set-up 
 
Our experimental study took place in the poor Ombili neighborhood in Windhoek, Namibia’s 
capital and largest city. The participants received information about the sharing behavior from 
the rich Klein-Windhoek neighborhood or their own neighborhood. Wealth differences are not 
only apparent in administrative statistics (Table A1) but also dominated how our experimental 
participants perceived the rich neighborhood (Table A2). 
 
 
Figure 5. Map of Windhoek by income level (Uhlendahl et al., 2010). The poor receive social information from 
either the impoverished Ombili neighborhood or the rich Klein-Windhoek neighborhood. 
 
In order to conduct the experiment, we set up a new laboratory at the Ombili community 
center. Before running the experimental sessions, we informed the community leaders as well 
as the district counsellor about our experimental protocol without disclosing any research 
hypotheses. The Ministry of Home Affairs issued a research visa. We employed a team of nine 
Namibian research assistants, all fluent in English. Six were also fluent in Oshiwambo, the 
most common language in the Ombili neighborhood. Most assistants were native speakers of 
several other languages spoken in Windhoek, which helped overcome potential problems in 
understanding. The research assistants were not informed about the hypotheses underlying our 
experimental study either.  
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To recruit participants, the research assistants approached potential participants on the 
streets and asked them to participate in an experiment. If someone agreed, the recruiter would 
put her or his signature on a “ticket” allowing participation in the experiment within the next 
40 minutes. The research assistants signed up 349 participants within a week in November 
2014. We did not allow persons without a ticket to take part in this experiment in order to 
avoid contaminaton effects between experimental sessions. Furthermore, the research 
assistants never issued tickets to persons that asked for a ticket themselves. They also changed 
their recruiting locations within the Ombili neighborhood regularly.   
To avoid security concerns regarding cash handling in the field laboratory, participants 
were paid in air-time for their mobile phones. The requirement that only owners of a cell phone 
could participate is not particularly restrictive, as most people own a cell phone even in poor 
neighborhoods (see Table A1). Air-time is a credit for pre-paid mobile phones, which can be 
used for texting, phone calls, internet data packages as well as small purchases. Air-time can 
easily be transferred for free from one user to the next. All our experimental participants knew 
and used air-time. We transferred all transactions in the afternoon of the same day that the 
experimental session took place. To strengthen participants’ trust in the transaction, they were 
informed that they could come the following day in case they would not receive their air-time. 
No participant complained about the payment process throughout the whole experiment. 
We required participants to be able to read and write on their own in order to allow for 
full anonymity. The instructions and questions were pre-tested to check and improve 
understandability of the experiment. We offered sessions in English and Oshiwambo, which 
were run simultaneously by our Namibian research assistants in two separate rooms. When 
preparing the instructions, the English version were translated into Oshiwambo and back to 
English several times to ensure that instructions were as identical as possible in both 
languages. We showed participants how to mark their decisions on an exemplary sheet to 
ensure understanding. Participants made their choices privately in cubicles made out of 
cardboard (see picture in A10) and turned in all completed paper sheets into urns by 
themselves. We never recorded any names of participants. 
 
5.2.2 Treatments 
 
Participants played a modified version of the dictator game (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin and 
Sefton, 1994), in which they could choose between two options to share an amount of 60N$ 
(~5US$) between themselves and the Disaster Management division of the widely known 
Namibian Red Cross (NRC). Option A gave participants 55N$ and 5N$ to the NRC. For 
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readability purposes, we will label this option EGO (“egoistic”) throughout the rest of the 
paper. Option B gave 30N$ to participants and 30N$ to the NRC. We will label this option PS 
(“pro-social”). The endowment of 60N$ corresponded to roughly four hourly wages to 
participants (Namibian Statistics Agency, 2016). By choosing the Disaster Management 
division as a recipient, we avoided that neither subject group directly benefited from the 
contributions. Prior to the experiment, we signed a contract with the Namibian Red Cross 
(NRC) that stated our obligation to give money to the Namibian Red Cross Disaster 
Management Division according to the decisions of the participants. This contract was shown 
to all participants before the experiment to reaffirm participants that their decisions were not 
hypothetical. No participant expressed unfamiliarity with the Red Cross. We studied five 
treatments with a total of 349 participants (see Table 1) to identify the underlying mechanisms 
behind any changes in behavior.  
 
Table 1. Treatment Overview (N=349) 
Reference Group  No Information  Majority EGO  Majority  PS 
No Reference 
 Baseline 
(N=81) 
    
Rich Neighborhood 
(Klein-Windhoek) 
 
  
Rich EGO 
Treatment 
(N=72) 
 
Rich PS 
Treatment 
(N=50) 
Poor Neighborhood 
(Ombili) 
 
  
Poor EGO 
Treatment 
(N = 86) 
 
Poor PS 
Treatment 
(N=60) 
 
In the Baseline treatment, participants did not receive any information about the behavior of 
others. In the other four treatments, participants received, prior to taking their own decision, 
information about the majority behavior of participants either from the rich neighborhood 
(Klein-Windhoek) or from their own neighborhood (Ombili). In the Rich EGO treatment, we 
informed participants that in “a session we recently conducted [in Klein-Windhoek] most 
participants chose option A.” In the Poor EGO treatment, the bracket term was substituted by 
“here at Ombili Community Center.” In the Rich PS treatment, we informed that in “a session 
we conducted recently [in Klein-Windhoek], the majority of participants decided for option 
B.” In the Poor PS treatment, the bracket term was substituted by “here at Ombili Community 
Center.” 
This 2x2 experimental design leads to the four information treatments Rich EGO, Rich 
PS, Poor EGO and Poor PS. The social information was not deceptive. As in previous literature 
(e.g., Biccieri and Xiao, 2009), it referred to a selectively chosen experimental session, which 
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we conducted in Ombili and also in Klein-Windhoek for the purpose of gathering the social 
information for the experiment.  
 
 
The experimental sessions ended with a questionnaire in which we elicited beliefs about social 
norms, participants’ perceptions of both comparison groups (see Tables A2-A6), as well as 
demographics (Table 2).  Most importantly, we measured injunctive norms (Cialdini, Reno 
and Callgreen, 1990) by asking “Which option do you think SHOULD be chosen by 
participants here?” In order to clarify the concept of injunctive norms to the participants, we 
gave the examples that one should not litter and that one should not drink and drive. Further, 
we asked whether and, if so, why participants were surprised by the information given to them. 
The questionnaire data allows us to better understand the motives guiding behavior and to test 
whether participants indeed expected the rich to share with society. Further details can be 
found in the appendix sections experimental design and instructions.  
Participants’ demographics in our treatments are displayed in Table 2. About two thirds 
of our participants live in shacks built from corrugated iron and stated to have no monthly 
income. In contrast, the monthly median income in the rich district is between 1100-2000 USD 
(Uhlendahl et al., 2010). The sample is overall well balanced between treatments. The only 
Table 2. Demographics Across Treatments 
 Baseline Rich EGO Rich PS Poor EGO Poor PS 
Age 25.98 
(8.52) 
26.76 
(7.28) 
25.38 
(9.41) 
25.32 
(7.26) 
23.9 
(6.57) 
Female 0.4 
(0.49) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
0.54 
(0.50) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
No Income 0.62 0.61 0.75 0.65 0.67 
Corrugated   Iron 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.71 0.57 
Secondary School 0.71 0.65 0.8 0.72 0.65 
People in HH 
 
6.1 
(3.26) 
5.99 
(2.6) 
6.18 
(2.7) 
6.01 
(3.57) 
5.9 
(2.4) 
Session in 
Oshiwambo 
 
0.54 
(0.50) 
0.47 
(0.53) 
0.58 
(0.50) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
0.35** 
(0.48) 
Observations 81 72 50 86 60 
Notes: No Income indicates whether the participant has regular income or not. Secondary school indicates 
completion of secondary school. We report the percentage share of the modus for ordinally scaled variables 
income level, materials of which house is constructed and education. Interval variables show means with 
standard errors in parenthesis. For interval variables, we use t-tests (allowing for unequal variances). For binary 
categorical variables, we use the Chi-Square tests. For ordinally scaled variables, we use a Mann-Whiney-U-
test. All tests are two-sided. ** indicates a statistically significant difference (p<0.05) in comparison to the 
Baseline. 
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variable that was statistically significant different in comparison to the Baseline was the share 
of participants who participated in Oshiwambo in the Poor PS treatment.43 
 
  
                                                     
43 We control for this and other covariates in the regression analysis (Table 3) which does not change our main 
result. 
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5.3 Predictions 
 
The literature on social comparisons leads to inconclusive predictions for our research 
question: A first strand predicts conformity to the ingroup and divergence from the outgroup 
based upon the assumption that conforming and diverging behavior is driven by psychological 
and socioeconomic closeness to comparison groups (Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler, 2003). A 
social identity perspective yields the same prediction as participants might aim to maintain a 
distinct positive social identity: “Whatever they are, we are not” (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; 
Hogg, 2006). A second strand of literature, by contrast, argues for conformity to the rich group 
because of status seeking and upward assimilation: Conforming to the rich allows the poor to 
conclude that they are among the “better ones” (Collins, 2000; Kumru and Vesterlund, 2010).  
Importantly, both strands predict conformity to either group regardless of the content of the 
social information. For example, if behavior is driven by a status-seeking motivation, we 
should observe conformity to the rich in both the Rich EGO and the Rich PS treatment. 
However, if it is learning about a social norm violation that influences the poor’s behavior, we 
should observe an effect specific to a certain comparison group and a certain behavior, i.e., 
only when the rich behaved egoistically. Our 2x2 experimental design allows separating 
between mere conformity effects and effects driven by a social norm violation and thus 
identifying the behavioral consequences of the rich’s self-serving behavior for the rest of 
society.   
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5.4 Results 
 
In the baseline treatment, absent any comparison information, 59% of the participants in the 
poor neighborhood Ombili choose the egoistic option (see Figure 2A). When subjects are 
informed about the egoistic behavior of the rich, the share of egoistic choices significantly 
increases to 75% (Baseline vs. Rich EGO treatment χ2(1,153)=4.25, p=0.039). This means that 
the number of pro-social choices decreases by almost 40% and the total amount donated by 
about 26%. However, when the poor receive the information that the rich behaved 
predominantly pro-socially, their behavior does not change compared to the baseline treatment 
(Baseline vs. Rich PS χ2(1,131)=0.02, p=0.887). The share of pro-social choices is neither 
significantly different when subjects are informed that the poor behaved egoistically (Baseline 
vs. Poor EGO treatment χ2(1,167)=1.20, p=0.272) nor when subjects receive information that 
the poor behaved pro-socially (Baseline vs. Poor PS treatment χ2(1,141)=0.08, p=0.773).  
 
 
Table 3 reports parametric regression results. The regressions allow us to control for possible 
between-treatment differences in participants’ demographics and, by estimating robust 
standard errors clustered at the session level, to account for possible session effects (Frechette, 
2012). In models 1 and 2, we run a probit regression with dummy variables for the four social 
information treatments. The regression table shows marginal effects at means. Model 1 shows 
that without control variables the probability of choosing the egoistic option is 16 percentage 
points higher (p=0.02) in the Rich EGO treatment than in the baseline treatment. This 
difference increases to 18 percentage points when adding controls (p=0.004). The coefficients 
Figure 2. Bars in Panel A show the share of egoistic choices across treatments and binomial 95% confidence 
intervals (Clopper-Pearson). Bars in Panel B indicate the share of participants stating that the egoistic option should 
be chosen by participants (injunctive norms). ** indicates a statistically significant difference (p<0.05) of a two-
sided chi-squared-test in comparison to the Baseline. 
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for the other treatments always remain insignificantly different from zero. Note that a Wald 
test rejects equality of coefficients between Rich EGO and Poor EGO (p=0.19 without controls 
and p=0.003 when adding controls), suggesting that the participants are more likely to choose 
the egoistic option when the information about egoistic behavior comes from the rich instead 
of the poor reference group.  
Since participants’ behavior is only significantly changed by information about the 
egoistic behavior of the rich, our results can neither be explained by stronger conformity to 
groups that are similar (Fatas, Heap and Arjona, 2018; Gino, Ayal and Ariely, 2009; Jetten, 
Spears, and Manstead, 1996; Shang, Reed and Croson, 2008) nor by a status-seeking 
motivation (Ebeling, Feldhaus and Fendrich, 2017; Kumru and Vesterlund, 2010). The 
absence of a visible status-seeking motivation in our experimental results corroborates earlier 
findings that status concerns are less important among the very poor (Akay, Martinsson and 
Medhin, 2012). Instead, our data suggest that only the self-serving behavior by the rich spreads 
among other members of society.  
How does the social information change participants’ beliefs about what should be 
done? The bars in Figure 2B correspond to participants’ personal injunctive norms. In the 
baseline treatment, 47% participants state that EGO should be chosen. When being informed 
that the rich behaved egoistically (Rich EGO treatment), a statistically significantly larger 
share of participants (65%) state that the egoistic option should be chosen (χ2(1,149)=3.90, 
p=0.048). The injunctive norm is unaffected in the Rich PS treatment (χ2(1,127)=0.063, 
p=0.801). Note that these results are consistent with the existence of a social norm that asks 
the rich to share with society. Learning that the rich share merely confirms what the poor 
expect of this group anyway. By contrast, learning about the egoistic behavior of the rich 
allows the poor to justify their own egoistic behavior: “If even the rich do not share, why 
should I?” Interestingly, in the Poor PS treatment injunctive norms also change 
(χ2(1,138)=4.93, p=0.026), but, as noted above, actual behavior is unaffected. 
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The questionnaire data supports the interpretation of the main result in light of a social 
norm violation. First, participants overwhelmingly associate people in Klein-Windhoek with 
wealth (Table A2). Second and more importantly, the poor expect the rich to decide pro-
socially, as 60% of participants in the Rich EGO treatment are surprised by that information. 
This exceeds the respective shares in the other treatments, where the level of surprised 
participants is between 42% and 44% (Rich EGO vs. Poor EGO: (χ2 (1,152)=4.56, p=0.033);  
Rich EGO vs. Poor PS: (χ2 (1,130)=3.52, p=0.061); Rich EGO vs. Rich PS: (χ2(1,119)=4.10, 
p=0.043). In a qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2000), three independent raters classified 
participants’ statements on why they were surprised. Krippendorff’s Alpha (Hayes and 
Krippendorf, 2007) indicates satisfactory inter-coder reliability. Roughly 25% of the 
statements were classified as “The rich should share.” Another 18% of participants explicitly 
relate their surprise to the wealth of the people in Klein-Windhoek (e.g., “yes, because they 
are rich”). Another 23% of participants merely reiterate that they were surprised 
(Krippendorff’s Alpha: 0.74). The statements of participants in the Rich PS treatment who 
were not surprised paint a similar picture: 50% state that the rich have enough money to donate 
and 19% declare that the rich have the responsibility to donate. 19% state that PS is the right 
option (Krippendorff’s Alpha: 0.8). In contrast, statements from the Poor EGO and Poor PS 
treatment do not indicate a role-specific norm for the poor to share. 
Table 3. Probability to Choose Egoistic Option 
 EGO Choice 
  (1) 
EGO Choice 
(2) 
   
Rich EGO 0.163** 0.180*** 
 (0.070) (0.066) 
Rich PS -0.012 -0.037 
 (0.123) (0.111) 
Poor Ego 0.081 0.088 
 (0.067) (0.069) 
Poor PS 0.023 0.014 
 (0.106) (0.097) 
   
   
Observations 349 344 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.013 0.033 
Controls No Yes 
Number of Session 25 25 
Notes: The table reports marginal effects at means from a probit regression on the 
probability of choosing the egoistic option in comparison to the baseline. Controls 
include age, gender, a dummy controlling for participants reporting no income, a 
dummy controlling for the materials of which a house is build, e.g., corrugated 
iron or brick, a dummy variable controlling for the type of toilet, a dummy 
controlling for education and a dummy controlling whether the session was in 
English or Oshiwambo. Standard errors are clustered by experimental session.** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
We show that the responsibility of the rich goes beyond material contributions: They 
set moral benchmarks. The failure of the rich to share with society causes a double damage: 
Society not only directly suffers from low contributions by the rich but also from a contagion 
effect. In our experiment, this effect was strong enough to change the allocation by an 
equivalent of about two hourly wages among a substantial share of participants. Further, we 
show that the spread of egoism is not a simple conformity effect, but caused by a change in 
injunctive norms: the rich’s (unexpected) norm violation triggers a change in what the others’ 
think they should do towards egoism. Understanding this mechanism is particularly important 
for developing countries, where limited state capacity makes society even more depend on the 
voluntary contributions of all members of society. 
We believe that our findings may be relevant to a wide range of settings, such as tax 
compliance, environmental protection or performing civic duties. Taking the example of tax 
compliance, Traxler (2010) models the spillover effects of the tax evasion of moral reference 
groups on the tax compliance of others, which can lead to a large reduction in overall tax 
revenue. Our experimental results show that the rich may be a particularly influential reference 
group because their norm violation allows others to feel legitimized for their own egoistic 
behavior. In times when information travels fast and the behavior of the rich and powerful is 
at the center of (social) media attention, the detrimental consequences of their self-serving 
behavior can quickly amplify.  
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5.6 Appendix for Chapter 5 
 
 
Table A1. Wealth and Infrastructure Differences Between the Comparison Groups 
Household owns / 
has access to 
Improvised 
Housing 
Unit 
(Shack) 
Cement 
Block/ 
Brick 
Houses 
Internet 
at Home  
Piped 
Water 
Inside 
Electricity 
for 
Lighting 
Mobile 
Telephone 
Ombili 
(Tobias Hainyeko) 
65.8 % 14.8 % 2.4 % 13.2 % 27 % 68.8 % 
Klein-Windhoek 
(Windhoek East) 
0.4 % 97.1 % 57.6 % 97.5 % 99 % 87.2 % 
 Source: Namibian Statistics Agency (2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. First associations with Klein-Windhoek (rich neighborhood) 
Category Classification  Percentage Share 
People in Klein-Windhoek are rich and have high living standards 55.9% 
Positive Characteristics (good, helpful, respect) 15.7% 
Difference not related to wealth 8.3% 
Expressing questions / missing knowledge 9.3% 
Other type of association 7.9% 
Incomprehensible statement 4.2% 
Notes: We classify first associations with Klein-Windhoek given by participants in the baseline treatments, 
who did not receive social information. 
Table A3. First associations with own neighborhood. 
Category Classification Percentage Share 
People live in poverty. Bad standard of living. Help/change is needed 53.7% 
Some people misbehave 9% 
Good people that respect each other 22.4% 
Other reasons 9% 
No idea /  Not understandable 6% 
Notes: We classify first associations with Klein-Windhoek given by participants in the baseline treatments, who 
do not receive social information 
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Table A4. Amount of “good people” in Klein-Windhoek vs Ombili 
Amount of Good People 
(N= 81) 
Own Neighborhood Klein-Windhoek 
Most  17 28 
Many 17 12 
Some 29 29 
Few 16 9 
None 2 3 
Notes: We find no difference in the share of “good people” in Klein-Windhoek in comparison 
to their own neighborhood according to the views of participant in the Baseline (two-sided 
Friedman test, p=0.5785). 
Table A5. Perceived similarity with people from either neighborhood 
Perceived Similarity 
(N= 81, Baseline sample) 
Own Neighborhood Klein-Windhoek 
Very Similar  17 6 
Similar 23 14 
Different 13 15 
Very Different 22 25 
None of the above 6 21 
Notes: Participants perceive themselves to be more similar to people from own 
neighborhood (two-sided Friedman test, p=0.0027). 
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Table A6. Average empirical and normative expectations for different neighborhoods 
across treatments.  
 
Empirical 
expectations for 
the participant’s 
own session 
2nd order 
normative 
expectations for 
own session 
Empirical 
expectations for 
Klein-Windhoek 
2nd order 
normative 
expectations for 
Klein-Windhoek 
Baseline A 70.8% 
(30.5%) 
72.5% 
(27.1%) 
82.3% 
(24%) 
72.5% 
(31.2%) 
Baseline B 64.9% 
(34.8%) 
54.4% 
(38.3%) 
47.8% 
(35.7%) 
45.6% 
(38.4%) 
Poor EGO 81.4% 
(23%) 
78.2% 
(30%) 
69.5% 
(31.9%) 
68.2% 
(33.3%) 
Poor PS 50.7% 
(33.7%) 
40.8% 
(34.2%) 
41.3% 
(31.3%) 
37.2% 
(30.0%) 
Rich EGO 87.9% 
(18.6%) 
86.9% 
(20.5%) 
 
85.6% 
(20.3%) 
Rich PS 46.5% 
(30.4%) 
40% 
(33.4%) 
 
22.6% 
(22.4%) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Empirical expectations for Klein-Windhoek were not measured in 
the Rich EGO and Rich PS treatment because empirical information was already given to them as a 
treatment manipulation. Empirical Expectations: “Please guess: What share of participants here in this 
session decided for Option A? You will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess.” 2nd Order 
Normative Expectations in this session: “Please guess: What share of participants here in this session thinks 
that option A SHOULD be chosen. You will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
“Empirical Expectations for Klein Windhoek: “What share of participants in Klein-Windhoek decided for 
option A?”2nd Order Normative Expectations for Klein Windhoek: “Please guess: What share of 
participants in Klein-Windhoek in the mentioned session thinks that option A SHOULD be chosen? You 
will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess.” 
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Table A7. Probit Regression Only for “Strong” Beliefs 
  EGO Choice 
(1) 
EGO Choice 
(2) 
Rich EGO 0.165** 0.184***  
(0.071) (0.068) 
Rich PS - 0.038 -0.067  
(0.117) (0.108) 
Poor EGO 0.082 0.089  
(0.068) (0.07) 
Poor PS - 0.038 -0.067  
(0.117) (0.108) 
   
Zero income  -0.012 
  (0.06) 
No brick house  0.065 
  (0.069) 
No flush toilet  -0.118 
  (0.075) 
No secondary school  -0.089 
  (0.113) 
Oshiwambo language  0.062 
  (0.067) 
Age  0.002 
  (0.003) 
Gender  -0.002 
  (0.053) 
   
Neighborhood Dummies  Yes 
   
Observations 313 310 
Pseudo R-squared 0.023 0.045 
Number of Clusters 25 25 
Notes: The table reports marginal effects at means from a probit regression on the 
probability of choosing the egoistic option in comparison to the baseline. Controls include 
age, gender, a dummy controlling for participants reporting no income (Zero income), a 
dummy controlling for the materials of which a house is build, e.g., corrugated iron or brick 
(No brick house), a dummy variable controlling for the type of toilet (No flush toilet), a 
dummy controlling for education (No secondary school) and a dummy controlling whether 
the session was in English or Oshiwambo (Session language). Standard errors are clustered 
by experimental session.** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
  
 
THE SELF-SERVING BEHAVIOR OF THE RICH CAUSES CONTAGION EFFECTS AMONG THE POOR 
114 
 
A8. Details of the Experimental Design 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, we inform participants in all treatments that the sessions 
are conducted in both Klein-Windhoek (the rich neighborhood) and in the Ombili community 
center (the poor neighborhood). We then ask participants to write down whether they are 
taking part in Ombili or in Klein-Windhoek. This prepares the participants for the forthcoming 
social information. The fact that 98% of participants correctly answered that they are taking 
part in Ombili also serves as a successful check that participants were able to follow the 
instructions and could communicate in writing.  
In the information treatments (Rich EGO, Poor Ego, Rich PS and Poor PS), participants 
then receive information about the behavior of participants from a previous session from their 
own poor neighborhood (Ombili) or of participants from the rich neighborhood (Klein-
Windhoek). In the Poor EGO treatment, we inform participants that in “a session we recently 
conducted [here at Ombili Community Center] most participants chose option A.” In the Rich 
EGO treatment, the term in brackets was substituted by “in Klein-Windhoek.” In the Poor PS 
treatment, we informed that in “a session we conducted recently [here at Ombili Community 
Center], the majority of participants decided for option B.” In the Rich PS treatment, the term 
in brackets was substituted by “in Klein-Windhoek.” To provide the social information 
without deception, we ran sessions consisting of ten participants on the street in Klein-
Windhoek and selected those in which the majority behaved either prosocially or egoistically. 
For the Poor EGO and Poor PS treatments, we used selected sessions from the baseline 
treatment.  
After receiving information about the majority behavior of another group, participants 
were asked to guess how many participants in the mentioned session behaved prosocially or 
egoistically. Participants in the EGO treatments answered to the question “What share of 
participants in that session in Klein-Windhoek [Ombili Community Center] decided for 
Option A?” by marking their guess on a scale from 8 out of 10 to 10 out of 10. In the PS 
treatments, participants were asked to guess “What share of participants in that session in 
Klein-Windhoek [Ombili Community Center] decided for Option B?” on a scale from 6 out 
of 10 to 10 out of 10. The believe range elicitation is kept equal between comparison groups, 
the crucial element in the social comparison theories, but varies slightly between the PS and 
EGO treatments. We perform a robustness check of our main results by running the regression 
of Table 3 only with participants that had similarly strong beliefs, i.e., by dropping those 
observations in the PS treatments that believed that less than 80% decided for option B. Table 
A7 shows that the results stay qualitatively the same. The coefficient for Rich Ego is 
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statistically different from zero (p=0.02 and p<0.01 when adding controls). In the baseline 
treatment, participants are neither provided with social information nor asked for their own 
estimates about the behavior of another group.   
All participants then play a modified pen-and-paper version of the dictator game. They 
can choose between two options, which determine how a total of 60N$ (~5US$) will be split 
between themselves and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management, which is an 
established charity and well known among participants. Option A gives participants 55N$ and 
5N$ to the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management. Option B gives 30N$ to themselves 
and 30N$ to the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management. The Disaster Management 
division of the Red Cross was chosen to avoid that participants might directly benefit 
themselves when giving to the charity.  
The second part of the experiment measures beliefs on social norms. In line with the 
experimental manipulation, we elicited expectations in the two EGO treatments by asking 
what share of participants decided for option A and in the two PS treatments by asking for the 
share who decided for option B. In order to compare expectation in the social information 
treatments to the baseline treatment, we ran two different versions of the latter. One randomly 
selected half of the participants in the baseline treatment (baseline A) were asked what share 
decided for option A and the remaining half (baseline B) were asked for the share that decided 
for option B. The belief elicitations were incentivized by paying an additional 1 N$ in air time 
for every correct guess.  
 We measure empirical expectations by asking “Please guess: What share of participants 
here in this session decided for Option A?” We then ask for personal injunctive norms by 
asking “Which option do you think SHOULD be chosen by participants here?“ Further, we 
measure 2nd-order normative expectations by asking “Please guess: What share of participants 
here in this session thinks that option A SHOULD be chosen?” Afterwards we measure 
empirical expectations for Klein-Windhoek by asking “Please guess: What share of 
participants in Klein-Windhoek decided for option A?” and 2nd order normative expectations 
by asking “Please guess: What share of participants in Klein-Windhoek in the mentioned 
session thinks that option A SHOULD be chosen?”  
Participants of pilot sessions struggled with the belief elicitation by percentage shares. A 
debriefing revealed that several participants gave answers that were inconsistent with what 
they wanted to express. Many had difficulties in understanding the concept of percentage 
shares. Before each of the main sessions, we tried to enhance understanding of percentage 
shares by giving brief visual examples with apples and tomatoes. We are nevertheless still 
skeptical about the quality of the belief elicitation data by percentage shares and therefore 
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focus our analysis on expectations and norms that required only binary answers. Note that 
difficulties of study participants in developing countries with complex psychological scales 
have already been thoroughly documented elsewhere (see Laajaj and Marcours, 2017). The 
data of the belief elicitation by percentage shares is given in Table A6.  
The third part of the experiment asks participants in which neighborhood they live as 
well as for their first associations with people from their own neighborhood and from Klein-
Windhoek. Furthermore, we measure the perceived similarity with either neighborhood and 
the amount of “good people” in either neighborhood. In the information treatments, we 
additionally asked whether and why participants were surprised by the information given to 
them (e.g., “Did it surprise you that in the mentioned session the majority of people in Klein-
Windhoek decided for option A?”) 
The questionnaire ended with demographics containing questions on the materials from 
which their house is built, type of toilet, income per month, languages spoken, age, gender, 
occupation, education, how many people live in their household and whether and if so they 
knew details about the experiment prior to participating. Lastly, we ask whether they could be 
contacted for future studies and for their phone number for air-time transfers. 
Below are the instructions for all treatment variations. Part one and two of the instructions 
vary by treatment. Part three is identical in all treatments except that in the information 
treatments, we additionally asked whether and why participants were surprised by the 
information given to them (e.g., “Did it surprise you that in the mentioned session the majority 
of people in Klein-Windhoek decided for option A?”) 
As explained before, there exist two variations for the Baseline for the second part of the 
instructions. In version Baseline A we elicit beliefs about norms by asking “What share of 
participants […] decided for option A?”, whereas in Baseline B we ask “What share of 
participants […] decided for option B?”  
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[Treatment Instructions Baseline A] 
Survey – First Part 
 
This survey is being conducted in Klein-Windhoek and at Ombili Community center.  
Are you taking part in Klein-Windhoek or at Ombili Community Center?   
 
Information: 
Your decision in this part of the survey will decide how a total of 60 N$ will be split between 
yourself and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management, which is a charitable 
organization. There are two options: option A and option B. Option A and option B are 
described in the following: 
 
Option A   
You receive N$ 55 and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 5  
Option B 
You receive N$ 30 and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 30 
 
 
Now split the N$ 60 between yourself and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management. 
Only mark one option, otherwise you will not receive air-time. You cannot change your 
decision later in this survey. 
 
 
☐ Option A You receive N$ 55  
The Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 5  
 
OR 
 
☐ Option B You receive N$ 30  
The Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 30 
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Survey – Second Part    
    
1. Please guess: What share of participants here in this session decided for Option A? You 
will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
☐ 1 out of 10  A BBBBBBBBB 
☐ 2 out of 10  AA BBBBBBBB 
☐ 3 out of 10  AAA BBBBBBB 
☐ 4 out of 10  AAAA BBBBBB 
☐ 5 out of 10  AAAAA BBBBB 
☐ 6 out of 10  AAAAAA BBBB 
☐ 7 out of 10  AAAAAAA BBB 
☐ 8 out of 10  AAAAAAAA BB 
☐ 9 out of 10  AAAAAAAAA B 
☐ 10 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
   
 
2. Which option do you think SHOULD be chosen by participants here? 
 
☐ Option A   ☐ Option B 
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3. Please guess: What share of participants here in this session thinks that option A SHOULD 
be chosen. You will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
☐ 1 out of 10  A BBBBBBBBB 
☐ 2 out of 10  AA BBBBBBBB 
☐ 3 out of 10  AAA BBBBBBB 
☐ 4 out of 10  AAAA BBBBBB 
☐ 5 out of 10  AAAAA BBBBB 
☐ 6 out of 10  AAAAAA BBBB 
☐ 7 out of 10  AAAAAAA BBB 
☐ 8 out of 10  AAAAAAAA BB 
☐ 9 out of 10  AAAAAAAAA B 
☐ 10 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
 
4. Please guess: What share of participants in Klein-Windhoek decided for option A? You 
will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
☐ 1 out of 10  A BBBBBBBBB 
☐ 2 out of 10  AA BBBBBBBB 
☐ 3 out of 10  AAA BBBBBBB 
☐ 4 out of 10  AAAA BBBBBB 
☐ 5 out of 10  AAAAA BBBBB 
☐ 6 out of 10  AAAAAA BBBB 
☐ 7 out of 10  AAAAAAA BBB 
☐ 8 out of 10  AAAAAAAA BB 
☐ 9 out of 10  AAAAAAAAA B 
☐ 10 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA  
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5. Please guess: What share of participants in Klein-Windhoek thinks that option A 
SHOULD be chosen.  You will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
☐ 1 out of 10  A BBBBBBBBB 
☐ 2 out of 10  AA BBBBBBBB 
☐ 3 out of 10  AAA BBBBBBB 
☐ 4 out of 10  AAAA BBBBBB 
☐ 5 out of 10  AAAAA BBBBB 
☐ 6 out of 10  AAAAAA BBBB 
☐ 7 out of 10  AAAAAAA BBB 
☐ 8 out of 10  AAAAAAAA BB 
☐ 9 out of 10  AAAAAAAAA B 
☐ 10 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA  
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Survey – Third Part 
 
1. In which neighborhood do you live? 
 
 
2. What comes to your mind first when you think about the people in your neighborhood? 
 
3. Please mark the statement to which you agree the most: 
 
☐ I am very similar to the people in the neighborhood I live in 
☐ I am similar to the people in the neighborhood I live in 
☐ I am different to the people in the neighborhood I live in   
☐ I am very different to the people in the neighborhood I live in 
☐ none of the above 
 
4. Please mark the statement to which you agree the most: 
 
☐ Most people in in the neighborhood I live in are good people 
☐ Many people in in the neighborhood I live in are good people 
☐ Some people in the neighborhood I live in are a good people 
☐ few people in in the neighborhood I live in are good people 
☐ There are no good people in my neighborhood 
 
 
5. What comes to your mind first if you think about people in Klein-Windhoek? 
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6. Please mark the statement to which you agree the most: 
 
☐ I am very similar to people in Klein-Windhoek 
☐ I am similar to people in Klein-Windhoek   
☐ I am different to people in Klein-Windhoek 
☐ I am very different to people in Klein-Windhoek  
☐ none of the above applies 
 
7. Please mark the statement to which you agree the most: 
 
☐ Most people in Klein Windhoek are good people 
☐ Many people in Klein Windhoek are good people 
☐ Some people in Klein Windhoek are a good people 
☐ Few people in Klein Windhoek are a good people 
☐ There are no good people in Klein-Windhoek  
 
 
8. From which materials is the place you live in mostly build: 
 
☐ I do not live in a house or flat  ☐ Plastic bags and nature materials 
☐ Corrugated iron     ☐ Bricks 
☐ Bricks with more than three rooms  
 
9. What kind of toilet do the members of your household use 
 
☐ Flush-toilette     ☐ Dry-toilette / Longdrop 
☐ Flush-by-hand toilette   ☐ none 
 
10. What is your income per month? 
 
☐ no income    ☐N$ 1 to N$ 300  
☐N$ 301 to N$ 600   ☐N$ 601 to N$ 1800  
☐N$ 1801 to N$ 5000   ☐more than N$ 5000  
 
11. What is your home language? 
 
 
 
12. Which other language or languages do you speak fluently? 
 
☐ No    ☐ Yes, I speak ____________________ 
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13. How old are you? 
 
 
14. What is your gender? 
 
☐ Female   ☐ Male 
15. What is your current occupation? 
 
☐ I do not have a job   ☐ My current occupation is ___________________ 
 
16. If you work, in which district do you work? 
 
 
17. How many people live in your household (including yourself)? 
 
 
18. Which is your highest completed degree of education? 
 
☐ No School  ☐ Primary ☐ Secondary   ☐ University/College  
 
 
19. Before coming to this survey today, have you heard details about specific questions in 
this survey? 
 
☐ No  ☐ Yes, I have heard that _____________________   
 
 
20. Can we contact you for further surveys in the future? 
 
☐ No   ☐ Yes 
 
 
21. Please state your cell phone number for payments 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
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[Treatment Instructions Baseline B] 
 
Survey – First Part 
 
 
1. This survey is being conducted in Klein-Windhoek and at Ombili Community center.  
Are you taking part in Klein-Windhoek or at Ombili Community Center?   
 
 
  Information: 
Your decision in this part of the survey will decide how a total of 60 N$ will be split between 
yourself and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management, which is a charitable organization. 
There are two options: option A and option B. Option A and option B are described in the 
following: 
 
Option A   
You receive N$ 55 and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 5  
Option B 
You receive N$ 30 and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 30 
 
 
2. Now split the N$ 60 between yourself and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster 
Management. Only mark one option, otherwise you will not receive air-time. You 
cannot change your decision later in this survey. 
 
 
☐ Option A You receive N$ 55  
The Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 5 
OR 
 
☐ Option B You receive N$ 30  
The Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives 30 N$  
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Survey – Second Part 
    
1. Please guess: What share of participants here in this session decided for Option B? You 
will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
… 
  ☐ 10 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
   
 
2. Which option do you think SHOULD be chosen by participants here? 
 
☐ Option A   ☐ Option B 
 
3. Please guess: What share of participants here in this session thinks that option B SHOULD 
be chosen. You will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
… 
  ☐ 10 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
 
4. Please guess: What share of participants in Klein-Windhoek decided for option B? You 
will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
… 
  ☐ 10 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
 
5. Please guess: What share of participants in Klein-Windhoek thinks that option B 
SHOULD be chosen.  You will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
… 
  ☐ 10 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
 
Survey – Third Part 
 
(identical in all treatments) 
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 [Treatment Instructions Rich Ego] 
 
Survey – First Part 
1. This survey is being conducted in Klein-Windhoek and at Ombili Community center.  
Are you taking part in Klein-Windhoek or at Ombili Community Center?   
 
 
Information: 
Your decision in this part of the survey will decide how a total of 60 N$ will be split between 
yourself and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management, which is a charitable organization. 
There are two options: option A and option B. Option A and option B are described in the 
following: 
 
Option A   
You receive N$ 55 and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 5  
Option B 
You receive N$ 30 and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 30 
 
2. In a survey session we conducted recently in Klein-Windhoek, most of the 
participants decided for option A.  
Please guess: What share of participants in that session in Klein-Windhoek decided for 
Option A? You will receive N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
☐ 8 out of 10  AAAAAAAA BB 
☐ 9 out of 10  AAAAAAAAA B 
☐ 10 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
 
3. Now split the N$ 60 between yourself and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster 
Management. Only mark one option, otherwise you will not receive air-time. You 
cannot change your decision later in this survey. 
 
☐ Option A You receive N$ 55  
The Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 5  
OR 
 
☐ Option B You receive N$ 30  
The Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 30 
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Survey – Second Part 
    
4. Please guess: What share of participants here in this session decided for Option A? You 
will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
… 
☐ 10 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
   
 
5. Which option do you think SHOULD be chosen by participants here? 
 
☐ Option A   ☐ Option B 
 
 
6. Please guess: What share of participants here in this session thinks that option A SHOULD 
be chosen. You will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
… 
  ☐ 10 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
 
7. Please guess: What share of participants in Klein-Windhoek in the mentioned session 
thinks that option A SHOULD be chosen.  You will receive an additional N$ 1 in air 
time for a right guess. 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
… 
  ☐ 10 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA  
 
Survey – Third Part 
 
(Identical in all treatments) 
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[Treatment Instructions Rich PS] 
Survey – First Part 
 
1. This survey is being conducted in Klein-Windhoek and at Ombili Community center.  
Are you taking part in Klein-Windhoek or at Ombili Community Center?   
 
 
  Information: 
Your decision in this part of the survey will decide how a total of 60 N$ will be split between 
yourself and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management, which is a charitable organization. 
There are two options: option A and option B. Option A and option B are described in the 
following: 
 
Option A   
You receive N$ 55 and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 5  
Option B 
You receive N$ 30 and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 30 
 
2. In a survey session we conducted recently in Klein-Windhoek, the majority of 
participants decided for option B.  
Please guess: What share of participants in that session in Klein-Windhoek decided for 
Option B? You will receive N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
☐ 6 out of 10  BBBBBB AAAA 
☐ 7 out of 10  BBBBBBB AAA 
☐ 8 out of 10  BBBBBBBB AA 
☐ 9 out of 10  BBBBBBBBB A 
☐ 10 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
 
3. Now split the N$ 60 between yourself and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster 
Management. Only mark one option, otherwise you will not receive air-time. You 
cannot change your decision later in this survey. 
 
☐ Option A You receive N$ 55  
The Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 5  
OR 
 
☐ Option B You receive N$ 30  
The Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 30 
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Survey – Second Part 
    
4. Please guess: What share of participants here in this session decided for Option B? You 
will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
… 
☐ 10 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
 
 
6. Which option do you think SHOULD be chosen by participants here? 
 
☐ Option A   ☐ Option B 
 
 
7. Please guess: What share of participants here in this session thinks that option B SHOULD 
be chosen. You will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
… 
☐ 10 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
 
 
8. Please guess: What share of participants in Klein-Windhoek in the mentioned session 
thinks that option B SHOULD be chosen.  You will receive an additional N$ 1 in air 
time for a right guess. 
 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
… 
  ☐ 10 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
 
 
Survey – Third Part 
 
(identical in all treatments) 
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[Treatment Instructions Poor EGO} 
Survey – First Part 
 
1. This survey is being conducted in Klein-Windhoek and at Ombili Community center.  
Are you taking part in Klein-Windhoek or at Ombili Community Center?   
 
 
Information: 
Your decision in this part of the survey will decide how a total of 60 N$ will be split between 
yourself and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management, which is a charitable 
organization. There are two options: option A and option B. Option A and option B are 
described in the following: 
 
Option A   
You receive N$ 55 and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 5  
Option B 
You receive N$ 30 and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 30 
 
2. In a survey session we conducted recently here at Ombili Community Center, most of 
the participants decided for option A.  
Please guess: What share of participants in that session at Ombili Community Center 
decided for Option A? You will receive N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
☐ 8 out of 10  AAAAAAAA BB 
☐ 9 out of 10  AAAAAAAAA B 
☐ 10 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
 
3. Now split the N$ 60 between yourself and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster 
Management. Only mark one option, otherwise you will not receive air-time. You 
cannot change your decision later in this survey. 
 
☐ Option A You receive N$ 55  
The Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 5 
OR 
 
☐ Option B You receive N$ 30  
The Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 30 
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Survey – Second Part 
    
4. Please guess: What share of participants here in this session today decided for Option A? 
You will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
… 
  ☐ 10 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA   
 
5. Which option do you think SHOULD be chosen by participants here? 
 
☐ Option A   ☐ Option B 
 
6. Please guess: What share of participants here in this session thinks that option A SHOULD 
be chosen. You will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
… 
☐ 10 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
 
5. Please guess: What share of participants in Klein-Windhoek decided for option A? You 
will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
… 
☐ 10 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA  
 
6. Please guess: What share of participants in Klein-Windhoek thinks that option A 
SHOULD be chosen.  You will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
… 
☐ 10 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA  
 
 
Survey – Third Part 
 
(identical in all treatments)
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[Treatment Instructions Poor PS] 
Survey – First Part 
 
1. This survey is being conducted in Klein-Windhoek and at Ombili Community center.  
Are you taking part in Klein-Windhoek or at Ombili Community Center?   
 
 
Information: 
Your decision in this part of the survey will decide how a total of 60 N$ will be split between 
yourself and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management, which is a charitable organization. 
There are two options: option A and option B. Option A and option B are described in the following: 
 
Option A   
You receive N$ 55 and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 5  
Option B 
You receive N$ 30 and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 30 
 
2. In a survey session we conducted recently here at Ombili Community Center, the 
majority of participants decided for option B.  
Please guess: What share of participants in that session at Ombili Community Center 
decided for Option B? You will receive N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
 
☐ 6 out of 10  BBBBBB AAAA 
☐ 7 out of 10  BBBBBBB AAA 
☐ 8 out of 10  BBBBBBBB AA 
☐ 9 out of 10  BBBBBBBBB A 
☐ 10 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
 
3. Now split the N$ 60 between yourself and the Namibian Red Cross Disaster 
Management. Only mark one option, otherwise you will not receive air-time. You 
cannot change your decision later in this survey. 
 
☐ Option A You receive N$ 55  
The Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 5  
 
OR 
 
☐ Option B You receive N$ 30  
The Namibian Red Cross Disaster Management receives N$ 30  
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Survey – Second Part 
    
4. Please guess: What share of participants here in this session today decided for Option B? 
You will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
… 
  ☐ 10 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
   
 
5. Which option do you think SHOULD be chosen by participants here? 
 
☐ Option A   ☐ Option B 
 
6. Please guess: What share of participants here in this session thinks that option B SHOULD 
be chosen. You will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
… 
☐ 10 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
 
7. Please guess: What share of participants in Klein-Windhoek decided for option B? You 
will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
.. 
☐ 10 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
 
8. Please guess: What share of participants in Klein-Windhoek thinks that option B 
SHOULD be chosen.  You will receive an additional N$ 1 in air time for a right guess. 
 
☐ 0 out of 10  AAAAAAAAAA 
… 
☐ 10 out of 10  BBBBBBBBBB 
 
 
 
 
Survey – Third Part 
 
(identical in all treatments) 
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Figure A10: Picture of Laboratory Session 
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